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ABSTRACT 
Although this dissertation consists of three indepen-
dent essays, the underlying objective which initiated this 
research was to examine whether human capital theory by itself 
could (a) explain the phenomenon of the "overeducated" Greek 
and (b) offer any social investment criteria for educational 
planning. 
Although the first objective has been met (and is the 
subject matter of the first essay) the appropriateness of the 
human capital social investment criterion (the social rate of 
return to education) has been challenged by the so called 
"screening" hypothesis which is especially strong if considered 
in the context of hierachically organized "internal labour 
markets". 
Disillusionment with the social rate of return led 
to an analysis of the "internal labour market" concept and 
an attempt to elucidate its relationship (if any) with human 
capital theory (the subject of the second essay). 
Lastly another version of "screening", this time by 
sex is explored in the context of "internal labour markets" 
and its predictions are tested against those of the labour 
supply (human capital) theories by means of a three company 
sample drawn personally from the Greek Manufacturing Industry 
(the subject matter of the third essay). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The exceptional propensity for higher education 
has been one of the distinguished features of the Greek 
11 
society which can be traced back to the early years of the 
independent Greek State in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. As early as 1847, Buchon in La Grece Continent-
ale et Ie More"'e (Paris, 1847) observed: 
"The least sophisticated Greek whom you employ 
for reading and conversation in his language, 
will put aside what little he earns by this 
to go and get his law degree in Paris. Hire 
a servant and he will save up to study medicine 
at Pisa." 1 
More recently, H. Leibenstein, during his short visit in 
Athens, in 1966, was also impressed with the Greek educ-
ational performance. An examination of the comparative 
figures presented in Table 1 led him to conclude: 
"If we compare the proportion in various age 
groups in school in Greece with other 
countries at its economic level, then Greece 
does as well or better than most. This is true 
not only in the primary and secondary level, 
especially if we include Greeks studying abroad. 
Even if we compare the proportion in each age 
group attending school or university in Greece 
with Western European countries, we find that 
1. Mentioned by K. Andrews, ~thens. London: Phoenix 
House, 1967, p. 75. 
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Greece does better than a great deal many of 
them and as well as most." 1 
As was noted by' Leibenstein, the number of Greeks 
studying abroad has been spectacularly high. In 1961, as 
Tables 2 and 3 show, 8800 Greeks, representing 24% of the 
total number of students in higher education were enrolled 
in higher educational institutions abroad. 
By 1975, as Table 4 demonstrates, this number has 
nearly tripled and according to Table 5, Greece is ranked 
third in the world with respect to the number of students 
studying in foreign higher educational institutions, after 
the US and Iran. Italy, because of its proximity and 
relative cheapness, has been the most favoured destination, 
followed by Germany, France, Britain and the us. A curious 
recent development has been the flow of Greek students, 
attracted by rock bottom costs, to communist countries 
like Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. 
It is thus obvious that the extremely marked 
propensity among Greeks toward higher education lS, comp-
aratively, even higher than the image presented by inter-
national statistics. Whatever the0retical or methodological 
objections one might have towards linear projections, it is 
interesting to note that according to OECD, by 1985, Greece 
might have up to 94% of her youth enrolled in institutions 
1. H. Leibenstein, "Returns to Education in Greece: A 
Discussion of Results and Policy Implications." Dev-
elopment Advisory Service, Economic Development Report 
No. 94. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, 1967, p. 2. 
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TABLE 1 
COMPARATIVE EDUCATIONAL DATA FOR GREECE AND 
SELECTED OTHER COUNTRIES1 (1961) 
Number graduating Entrants to higher Number graduating 
from secondary education as a from higher education 
COUNTRY education as a % proportion of as a % of relevant 
of relevant age number graduating age group 
group from secondary 
general education 
GREECE 17.6 45 3.6 
United States 65.5 50 16.9 
Canada 38.0 40 6.9 
Belgium 11.0 62 3.3 
Ireland 13.0 40 n.a. 
Great Britain 6.0 78 3.4 
France 11.0 81 3.4 
Netherlands 6.0 67 1.7 
Norway 11.5 47 2.8 
Sweden 11.0 67 4.3 
U.S.S.R. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 6.0 71 2.2 
Switzerland 5.5 n.a. 4. 7 
Austria 10.0 56 1.7 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 6. 5 60 2.6 
West Germany 5.0 81 2. 7 
Spain 5.0 50 1.4 
Yugoslavia 11.5 n.a. 4.3 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Turkey 2.0 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Education and Development, Country Reports, 
The Mediterranean Regional ProJect, Greece, 
DEeD, Parls, 1965, Table 8, p. 57. 
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TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF GREEK STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS ABROAD BY COUNTRY AND 
BY TYPE OF STUDY (1961) 
TOTAL NO. OF % STUDYING % STUDYING 
COUNTRY OF GREEK SCIENTIFIC HUMANITIES 
STUDY STUDENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL 
SUBJECTS SUBJECTS 
Austria 2450 70.9 29.1 
Germany 2130 60.9 39.1 
Italy 1420 63.6 36.4 
United States 1200 48.4 51. 6 
France 600 25.8 74.2 
Switzerland 500 43.1 56.9 
Others 500 51.0 49.0 
TOTAL 8800 58.8 41. 2 
Source: The Mediterranean Regional Project, op.cit., 
Table 10, p.62. 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF GREEK STUDENTS ABROAD AS % OF THE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF GREEK STUDENTS IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION BY TYPE OF STUDY (1961) 
TYPE OF STUDY 
Scientific and Technological 
Subjects 
Humanities and Social Sciences 
All Students 
% STUDYING ABROAD 
33.2 
17.0 
24.0 
Source: The Mediterranean Regional Project, op.cit., 
Table 11, p. 62. 
15 
16 
TABLE 4 
NUMBER OF GREEK STUDENTS STUDYING ABROAD BY COUNTRY (1975) 
COUNTRY NUMBER 
United States 1910 
France 2666 
United Kingdom 2301 
Canada 443 
Germany 3395 
Italy 10418 
Austria 1011 
Switzerland 361 
Belgium 307 
Spain 69 
Australia 30 
Romania 30 
Czechoslovakia 115 
Sweden 108 
Yugoslavia 10 
Denmark 17 
Netherlands 39 
Other 133 
TOTAL 23363 
Source: Figures taken from Statistical Yearbook 1977 
UNESCO, Table 5.7. 
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TABLE 5 
NUMBER OF FOREIGN STUDENTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (1975) 
COUNTRIES 
United States 
Iran 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
China 
United Kingdom 
Nigeria 
Malaysia 
India 
Italy 
West Germany 
Cyprus 
Japan 
Turkey 
Morocco 
Thailand 
France 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Source: 
NUMBER OF STUDENTS 
STUDYING ABROAD 
29414 
33021 
23363 
21059 
17201 
16866 
16348 
16162 
14805 
11251 
10759 
10725 
10506 
9541 
9344 
9092 
9010 
7444 
4198 
Figures taken from Statistical Yearbook 1977 
UNESCO, Table 5.7. 
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of higher education, followed up by the US with 75% of 
the equivalent age group and, at a distance, by all other 
developed countries. l Apart from the impressive number of 
students in higher education, the academic orientation of 
the Greek student body is very particular. Its main 
features are a striking preference for law and social 
sciences, coupled with a very pronounced reluctance to 
study technology and science. It is no coincidence that 
60% of the places currently offered by Greek Universities 
are either Law, Economics and Political Science or Liter-
2 
ature. The only exception is civil, and to a lesser extent, 
mechanical and electrical engineering, which can be explained 
by the paramount importance of the construction industry in 
the Greek economy in the postwar period. 3 
The social composition of the Greek student body 
is also quite atypical. The degree of class selection in 
Greek Universities is exceptionally low. In a recent study 
based on a sample of approximately 2000 students of the 
University of Athens, J. Lambiri-Dimaki reports that 29% of 
1. OECD, Developpement de l'enseignementdans les pays de 
l'OCDE depuis 1950, Cahier II, pp. 131-7, Paris, 1971. 
2. The number of places offered by Greek Universities by 
special subject for the academic year 1978-79 is shown 
in Table 6. 
3. As reported by N. Vernadakis in his book Econometric Models 
for the Developing Economies: A Case Study of Greece. 
London: Saxon House, 1978, investment in dwellings 
accounted for 30 - 45% of total fixed capital invest-
ment in the period 1950 - 1966. 
TABLE 6 
PLACES OFFERED BY GREEK UNIVERSITIES 
(BY SPECIAL SUBJECT) FOR THE 
ACADEMIC YEAR 1978-79 
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1. University of Athens NO. OF PLACES 
Department of Theology 
Department of Law and Economics 
Medical School . 
Department of Literature 
Department of Physics and Mathematics 
175 
1575 
310 
810 
805 
2. University of Salonica 
Department of Theology 145 
Department of Literature 700 
Department of Physics and Mathematics 785 
Department of Law and Economics 725 
Medical School 310 
Department of Engineering and Architecture 
(Civil1 Chemical, Mechanical, Electrical) 440 
Department of Forestry and Agriculture 165 
3. Athens Polytechnic 
Engineering and Architecture 
4. University of Patras 
Department of Physics and Mathematics 
Department of Engineering 
Medical School 
5. University of Ioannina 
Department of Literature 
6. 
7 • 
Department of Physics and Mathematics 
Medical School 
University of Thrace 
Department of Law 
Department of Engineering 
University of Crete 
Department of Literature 
Department of Physics and Mathematics 
485 
550 
220 
60 
250 
330 
60 
300 
200 
100 
120 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
B. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Athens School of Economic and Commercial 
Studies BOO 
"Pantios" School of Political Science 700 
School of Indistrial Studies (Piraeus) 600 
School of Industrial Studies BOO 
School of Agriculture (Athens) 165 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PLACES 12675 
Notes: 
The figures were kindly provided by the Greek Statistical 
Service. 
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the students came from villages of less than 2000 inhabitants 
with another 13% from country towns of 2000 - 10000 inhabit-
ants. l These percentages are particularly high if compared 
with the relative participation of lower classes in higher 
education in other countries. For France, for example, 
2 Bourdieu and Passeron report that no more than 15% of the 
entire student body came,in 1961 / from peasant or working 
class families, although peasants and workers represented 
more than 60% of the population. The exceptional degree of 
democratization of higher education led Tsoukalas 3 to assert 
that Greece had the most open educational system among 
Western European countries. It is noteworthy also, that the 
Greek educational selection system being geared almost ex-
elusively to the testing of memory and not to the testing of 
ability to think in a critical or original manner, ironically 
enough functioned in a relatively just way, in the sense 
that it allowed the hard working lower class children to 
succeed in the various entrance examinations without being in 
a disadvantageous position compared with children coming 
from more favourable familY backgrounds. 4 
1. J. Lambiri-Dimaki, Towards a Greek Sociolo of Education 
(in Greek). Athens: National Centre for Social Researc , 
1974. 
2. P. Bourdieu and J.G. Passeron, Les Heritiers. Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1964. 
3. C. Tsoukalas, "Higher Education in Greece as a Mechanism 
of Social Reproduction", Devkalion, (in Greek), March, 
1975, pp. 18-33. 
4. This point was noted by J. Lambiri-Dimaki in "Democrat-
izati0n of Education in Contemporary Greece", Epitheorisi 
Kinonikon Erevnon, 1st quarter, 1977, pp. 55-64. 
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Moreover, the phenomenon of over-education was 
not coupled with impressive sums of public funds to higher 
education. Table 7 demonstrates that as a percentage of 
GNP and as a percentage of total public expenditures, alloc-
ations to education have been the lowest among 17 OECD 
countries. The low budget allocations to education raise 
some doubts about the quality of education which are immed-
I 
iately reinforced by the statistics of Table 8/which show 
that Greece has relatively high student - staff ratios as 
compared with the other OECD countries. 
(i) The Demand for Higher Education in Greece: 
Some Sociological Explanations 
The impressive, albeit atypical, performance of 
the Greeks at the Higher Education level has" as expected--1 
attracted the attention of sociologists (educational socio-
logists in particular). 
In this section the attempt will be made to 
present briefly their arguments advanced to explain the 
phenomenon of the "over-educated" Greek. Although sociolog-
ists usually tend to stress factors such as prestige, power 
or status, in the case of Greece they have paid attention 
rather more to historical or institutional factors, as will 
be seen below. 
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TABLE 7 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN EDUCATION AS % OF GNP AND AS 
% OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE FOR SELECTIVE 
COUNTRIES (1975) 
COUNTRIES % OF GNP % OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
Austria 5.7 8.5 
Belgium 6.2 22.1 
Denmark 8.2 15.2 
Finland 6.7 16.7 
France 5.6 n.a. 
West Germany 4.5 14.4 
Greece 1.7 8.0 
Ireland 6.5 10.8 
Italy 5.0 11.7 
Netherlands 8. 7 23.7 
Norway 7.1 14.7 
Portugal 2.4 n.a. 
Spain 1.7 1.1 
Sweden 7.4 13.4 
Switzerland 5.1 19.4 
United Kingdom 6.2 14.0 
United States 6.2 18.1 
Source: Figures taken from Statistical Yearbook 1977, 
UNESCO, Table 6.1. 
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TABLE 8 
NUMBER OF STAFF z STUDENTS AND STUDENT:STAFF RATIO 
IN UNIVERSITY EDUCATION FOR 16 SELECTIVE COUNTRIES (1975) 
COUNTRIES NO. OF NO. OF STUDENT /STAFF STAFF STUDENTS RATIO 
Austria 10001 86123 8.61 
Denmark 4777 60106 12.58 
Finland 5225 75765 14.50 
France 40512 811258 20.02 
Germany 103578 836002 8.07 
Greece 5956 95385 16.01 
Ireland 2261 22727 10.05 
Italy 41824 968119 23.14 
Netherlands 13000 120134 9.24 
Norway 3757 40774 10.85 
Portugal 4168 51489 12.35 
Spain 22848 405869 17.76 
Switzerland 5414 52623 9.71 
Yugoslavia 14923 271517 18.19 
Canada 30732 546769 17.79 
United States 488000 6912182 14.16 
Source: Taken from Statistical Yearbook 1977, 
UNESCO, Table 5.1. 
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(a) Clientelistic Politics 1 
Unlike in most Western countries, the articul-
ation in Greece between the State and the various interest 
groups had a less collective, more personalistic character 
which can be dated back to the early days of Independence. 
The linkage between State and society was not in terms of 
parties representing class interests, but in terms of 
purely clientelistic networks. 
Greek MPs, especially those elected in the coun-
tryside, relied heavily on clientelism to secure their 
election. Since surplus labour that was leaving the villages 
could not be absorbed into an almost non-existent Greek 
industry, it was, and is, a commonplace to exchange votes 
for jobs in the State Bureaucracy. 
It was a natural corollary of this that the Greek 
State bureaucracy/quite early on, achieved a size completely 
out of proportion to the country's resources and population. 
It has been calculated by Dertilis,2 for example, that in 
the beginnings of the twentieth century and after standard-
izing for population size, Greece had seven times more 
civil servants than the United Kingdom. 
1. For a more general analysis of Greek political clientel-
ism, see K.P. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece. 
California: Stanford University Press, 1969. 
2. G. Dertilis, 'Social Change and Military Intervention in 
Politics: Greece l88l-l92W: unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Sheffield, 1976. 
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Despite its impressive growth, public sector job 
openings could not keep pace with the insatiable demand for 
white collar occupations. Some rationing had to take place. 
In such a situation, it was obvious, that preference would 
be given to those with the higher educational qualifications. 
By providing higher education for his son, there-
fore, a father maximised the probability that his local MP 
would secure a job for him in the State bureaucracry. 
Hence one explanation for the frantic scramble for access 
to higher education and also an explanation of the high 
proportion of Greek students corning from the countryside. 
(b) The Economic Structure of the Country 
The Greek economy never had, and in my opinion 
never will have a strong industrial sector. It relied on 
the tertiary sector, particularly shipping and tourism. To 
many left-wing economists and sociologists this is a typical 
phenomenon of the exploitation of the so-called "peripheral" 
countries arising from "the functional necessities of central 
capital".l To right wing orthodox economists, however, this 
phenomenon is a result of the law of comparative advantage 
1. For such a neo-Marxist approach to development see C. 
Tsoukalas, "Dependance et reproduction: Ie r6le de 
l'appareil scolaire en Grece dans une formation trans-
territoriale", unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Paris, 1975, and N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: 
Facets of Underdevelopment. London: MacMillan, 1978. 
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which states that each country specialises in the production 
of those goods and services in which it has a comparative 
advantage over other countries. 
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the 
tertiary sector was always the backbone of the Greek economy. 
This has direct effects on educational demand. More so 
than in other sectors, formal education is of paramount 
importance in the services,where professional and career 
outlets and perspectives are to a very large extent a 
function of the level and quality of education received. 
The rapid extension of job openings in the tertiary sector 
has thus a multiplied effect on the demand for education, 
especially secondary and higher education. Urban migration, 
due to the lack of an urban proletariat had a higher payoff 
rate as an investment if it was associated with the attain-
ment of a university degree. 
(c) Education as a Means of Limiting Land Fragmentation 
As Mouzelis and Attalides have suggested: education 
for at least one son may be partly a means of limiting 
extreme land fragmentation and of dealing with the need of 
the daughter's dowry. Especially in regions dominated by 
family smallholdings, family planning dictated that migration 
1. N. Mouzelis and M. Attalides, "Greece", in M. Scotford -
Archer and S. Giner (eds.), Contemporary Europe. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973. 
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was the only solution to avoid land fragmentation. Domestic 
urban migration/as was seen before, had a higher chance of 
success if coupled with an educational investment. Migrat-
ion abroad, on the other hand, entailed risks but made no 
demands on higher educational qualification. 
Furthermore, in societies where the dowry system 
is a rule rather than an exception, the financial success 
of an educated son could alleviate the burden to the father 
and also reduce the risk factor associated with the ability 
of the household in providing the dowry. 
Cd) The Role of the Diaspora Greeks 
The rapid growth of international trade in the 
Near East in the 18th and 19th centuries was centred, for 
a number of historical reasons that we cannot enter upon 
here, around the activities of ethnic minorities among 
which the Greeks found themselves in a dominant position. 
Greek communities in places like Alexandria, Smyrna or 
Odessa, consisted mainly of merchants, agents, lawyers, 
intermediaries and speculators of all kinds. In 1828, when 
the Greek State gained its independence, the Greek commun-
ities abroad were far more numerous, more urbanised and 
richer than the communities within the independent state. 
The rapid expansion of the Greek communities in Eastern 
Mediterranean, which reached its peak just before World 
War I, meant that they could not replenish their own ranks 
29 
by normal processes of reproduction. This resulted in a 
large migration flow from mainland Greece, especially from 
the islands and the countryside. 
The spectacular development of the Greek commun-
ities abroad had significant retroactive effects on the 
independent Greek State and especially on educational 
demand for the following reasons: 
(i) A large flow of money, originating from the 
diaspora Greeks, poured into the country either 
in the form of remittances to parents and rel-
atives or as an investment in dwellings. This 
flow of money strengthened the already expanding 
tertiary sector of the urban centres and the 
ability of the State to expand its own bureau-
cracy, thus/reinforcing further rural-urban migra-
tion and educational demand. 
(ii) The hostile reaction of the Ottoman empire against 
any kind of cultural expansion of its minorities 
meant a shortage of secondary schools and a 
complete lack of university institutions. In the 
communities abroad, diaspora Greeks had to send 
their children back to mainland Greece, accentuat-
ing even further the demand for education. 
The decisive contribution of Greek communities 
abroad towards financing the Greek educational system should 
have come as no big surprise. Tsoukalas l has even calculated 
1. C. Tsoukalas, op. cit., Part II, Ch. 2. 
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that up to l880}the ten top donations to education by rich 
Greeks living abroad were in total much higher than the 
State's entire education budget. 
(ii) Educational Planning in Greece: The Practice 
of Manpower Forecasting 
In the 1950's and 1960's and to a lesser extent 
in the 1970's, the field of educational planning was dom-
inated by manpower forecasting.l Most countries, irrespective 
of size, wealth and level of development, based their plans 
for educational expansion on long-term forecasts (even up 
to twenty years) of the requirements for educated manpower. 
Greece provided no exception. A typical example 
of manpower forecasting can be found in the Mediterranean 
Regional project~ sponsored by OECD, in which the educational 
requirements were forecast for six Mediterranean countries, 
including Greece. The methodology used in the project, 
designed to estimate the educational needs of the Greek 
economy for the period 1961-1979, was broadly the following: 
(a) The empl~yment and productivity estimates by 
economic sector, of the existing five year econ-
omic plans were projected to 1979. 
1. For a good review of the literature in manpower fore-
casting, see M. Blaug, The Economics of Education. 
London: Allen Lane, 1970, ch. S. 
2. OECD, Country Reports: The Mediterranean Regional 
Project: Greece. Paris, 1965. 
31 
(b) These projections were then converted into 
forecasts of occupational structure. 
(c) This optimal occupational structure was in turn 
converted into educational categories "on the 
basis of the situation existing in 1961 and the 
general targets of the Greek society".l 
Implicit in the methodology described above are 
the following assumptions: 
(a) That the planner has perfect foresight in 
forecasting the future employment, productivity 
levels, price and wage levels, that is the future 
state of the economy and the future state of 
technology as well. 
(b) That the present mix between capital and different 
labour inputs is the optimum one. 
(c) That every occupation can be precisely defined in 
terms of the tasks required. 
(d) That the occupational structure of the economy is 
not going to change during the planning period, 
that is, an engineer today will be equivalent to 
an engineer twenty years later. 
(e) That every occupation is associated with a single 
educational level. 
It is hard to lend support to any of these ass-
umptions. Experience has shown that economists have con-
sistently failed in their forecasts of the future levels of 
1. Mediterranean Regional Project: Greece, op cit. p. 48. 
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prices, productivity or employment. Evidence has also been 
accumulated that there are significant substitution poss-
ibilities between 
(i) different years of education 
(ii) different types of education 
(iii) different combinations of education and experience 
(iv) capital and labour 
(v) different labour inputs. l 
The inadequacy of the present occupational class-
ification system requires little elaboration. Moreover, 
hard evidence has shown that the majority of occupat-
ions are associated with a variety of educational levels. 
To reinforce this very last point, an OECD comparative 
study conducted ten years ago and comprising 53 countries, 
demonstrated that an amazing variety of manpower and educ-
ational structures was quite compatible with identical levels 
and rates of growth of GNP and per capita income. 2 
Apart from the above deficiencies, manpower fore-
casting does not consider seriously the cost side of the required 
educational expansion. It seems that educational expansion 
1. C.R.S. Dougherty, for example 1 usin~ a CES production function in his article, "Estlf.lates-"of Labour A.c;gregation 
Functions" . Journal of Pol i tical Economy, Sept. jOct. , \q12., 
pp. 1101-19, found that the elasticity of substitution 
between different labour inputs was ~uite high~ 
OECD, Occupational and Educational Structures of the 
Labo~r Force and Levels of Economic Development. 
Paris, 1970. 
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has to be achieved at all costs since it is vital for the 
smooth functioning of the economy. 
1 In summary, as Blaug pointed out: 
Manpower forecasting is hardly economics at 
all but is instead a purely mindless mechanical 
exercise, involving such patently absurd 
assumptions as fixed labour output and fixed 
occupation-education coefficients, as if the 
economy were a special kind of machine instead 
of something much more like a biological 
organism. 2 
Manpower forecasts, by consistently pointing to 
severe shortages of qualified people and by yielding exact 
numbers of manpower required, had a lot of intuitive 
appeal. They were particularly welcomed by politicians, 
especially in countries like Greece with a strong social 
demand for education, since they legitimised the educational 
expansion needed for election (or re-election) purposes. 
For Greece, educational planning according to manpower 
forecasts or social demand models (that is, models which 
try to equate the supply with the demand for education) 
made little practical difference. Both consisted of "wild 
guesses in an upward direction".3 
1. M. Blaug, "Manpower forecasting as a technique not an 
approach to planning", Prospects, Winter 1973, 
pp. 458-463. 
2. Ibid, p. 462. 
3. Ibid, p. 462. 
(iii) Private Demand for Education and Educational 
Planning. The Human Capital Alternatives 
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The human capital research programme is a relativ-
ely new research area of economics which emerged only twenty 
years ago. Its "hard core" is the notion of human capital. 
The central idea is that human capacities are in large part 
acquired or developed through formal and informal education 
at home and at school and through training, experience and 
mobility in the labour market. These activities are costly, 
as they involve direct expenses and earnings or consumption 
forgone by students, trainees or workers in the process of 
labour mobility. Since benefits derived from these act-
ivities accrue mainly in the future and are for the most 
part quite durable, the costly acquisition of human capital 
is an act of investment. 
The general categories of human capital invest-
ments can be described in a life-cycle chronology. Res-
ources in child care and child development represent pre 
school investments in formal school education. Investments 
in labour market mobility, job choice, job training and work 
effort occur during the working life, while investments in 
health and other maintenance activities continue throughout 
life. 
The application of the concept of human capital 
to education led to the birth of a new subject area, the 
economics of education. Human capital theory provided a 
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new alternative (or complement) to the sociological explan-
ations of the demand for education and also furnished a 
new approach to educational planning, the private and 
social rate of return respectively. 
Human capital theorists argue that the indiv-
idual's decision to demand education depends on the fo11-
owing factors: 
(a) The individual's expectation of the present 
value of the future financial benefits he will 
receive, less the pecuniary costs of education 
(PV i ) , 
(b) the non-pecuniary (or psychic) benefits of being 
an educated person in relation to the non-pecun-
iary costs (N i ), and 
(c) the ability of the individual (or the household) 
to meet the financial costs that education 
entails (oi), 
If (PV 1 + N1 ) > 0 the person will wish to be educated. This 
wish will be translated into effective demand for education 
if the potential student is able to pay the direct costs. 
Letting oi having the value one if the ith family can obtain 
financing for direct schooling costs and zero otherwise, the 
individual demand for education is: 
. . 
if 0 1 (PV 1 + N 1 ) 
(1) 
otherwise 
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and the aggregate demand for education is: 
Interpersonal differences in (1) would cause the total 
demand for education to vary directly with the 
( 2) 
"objective" private present value. of educational invest-
ment or, what is the same thing, the rate of return (ROR) 
to education which simply is the rate of discount which 
equates the present value to zero. 
D = g (PV 0 r RO R) (3) 
Before proceeding further, the following caveats should 
be borne in mind: 
(1) The responsiveness of the demand for education 
to the rate of return does not imply that individuals 
actually compute such returns, but rather, following Fried-
man1 , that they behave as if they do. 2 
1. M. Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" 
in his Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953. 
2. People can be assumed to approximate fairly accurately 
the intereducational earnlngs differentials by the 
differential incomes of their friends and relatives. 
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(2) That the individual's human capital investment 
decisions depend on monetary incentives does not imply that 
monetary incentives necessarily "dominate" decision making. 
Persons with a strong attachment to certain types of work 
are likely to choose that work and the associated education 
even though the economic returns may be relatively low. 
Moderate changes in salaries in the market will have little 
impact on the jobs or career choices of these types of 
people. At the same time, there are likely to be some 
people who are on the "margin" or with no strong commitment 
to any single occupation. These individuals will usually 
change their career (educational) plans as pecuniary incent-
ives change and will move into the areas that provide the 
greatest gain in income. 
(3) The size of the private returns is not the only 
determinant of the demand for education. Sociological 
explanations based on historical or institutional factors 
and on status, prestige and power considerations may be of 
some importance but they are dominated by the pecuniary 
(rate of return) factors. We may view sociological factors 
as determining a minimum value of the demand for education, 
and high private returns as raising demand above the base. 
In this sense, human capital and sociological explanations 
can be better thought as complements rather than substitutes. 
In the field of educational planning, after many 
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years of disillusionment with manpower forecasting l human 
I 
capital theory offered a new investment criterion, the 
social rate of return. Educational provision is considered 
as a typical investment project and, therefore, the costs 
and benefits of this project have to be taken into account. 
In practice, the benefits of education in rate of return 
analysis are taken to be the extra before tax payments that 
typically accrue to people with additional education 
although the so-called "externalities" of education are not 
encapsulated in personal income flows. On the cost side, 
the direct costs of education (in buildings, staff salaries 
etc.) and the indirect costs of forgone earnings whilst at 
school or university have to be included. 2 The yield to 
an educational investment programme, the social rate of 
return, does indeed furnish a new social investment criterion: 
resources are to be allocated to levels of education and to 
years of schooling so as to equalize the marginal social 
rate of return on educational investment and, furthermore , 
this equalised yield on educational investment should not 
fall below the yield on alternative social or private 
1. A collection of eight case studies in the book by B. 
Ahamad and M. Blaug (eds.),The Practice of Manpower 
Forecasting: A Collection of Case Studies. Amsterdam: 
Elsevler SClentlflc, 1973, left no doubt that nearly 
all manpower forecasts were failures when put into the 
practical test of whether in the event they were 
proved right. 
2. In the calculation of private returns, benefits are 
approximated by the after tax intereducational earnings 
differentials, whilst forgone earnings constitute 
usually the only private costs, since education is 
usually publicly provided. 
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investments. Especially in the decade 1965-1975, calcul-
I 
ations of rates of return to education swept the world. 
Literally hundreds of such studies have been 
carried out, although in the last 4-5 years the obsession 
with rates of return seems to have petered out. 
Rates of return, especially social rates of 
return have been consistently criticised since their birth. 2 
The objections that have been advanced fall broadly into 
the following categories: 
(1) In most rate of return analyses, the intereduc-
ational earnings differentials are estimated by means of an 
earnings function, i.e. a regression model in which earn-
ings are explained by a set of independent variables incl-
uding schooling. Earnings functions suffer from the foll-
owing econometric problems: 
1. 
(a) the identification problem. An earnings function 
is a reduced form equation, encompassing both 
demand and supply factors. In the absence of 
estimated parameters of the underlying simultan-
eous-equation model, there is every reason to 
suspect that the coefficients of the single 
For a good 
of return, 
Returns to 
Amster am: 
survey of comparative evidence on rates 
see: G. Psacharopoulos and K. Hinchliffe, 
Education: An International Com arison, 
Elsevler Scientific, 1973. 
2. See, for example, J. Vaizey, The Economics of Education. 
London: Faber, 1962 and H.G. S1iaffer, "A Crltlque of the 
Concept of Human Capital", American Economic Review, 
September, 1961, pp. 1026-35. 
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. b· d 1 equat10n are 1ase. 
(b) The problem of multicollinearity among the income 
determining variables. Education, native ability, 
socio-economic background, ~chievement motivation 
are correlated and it is; therefore.difficu1t to 
identify the increment in earnings associated with 
an increment in education. 
(c) The problem of proxy-variables. The appropriate-
ness of using proxies for various independent 
variables has also been questioned. Is IQ a 
satisfactory measure of ability? Is parents' 
income, education or occupation an appropriate 
proxy for family background ? 
Cd) The problem of data sources. With some noticeable 
exceptions; all fitted earnings functions have 
1. For a discussion of the identification problem in an 
earnings function, see: F.D. Morgenstern, "Direct and 
Indirect Effects on Earnings of Schooling and Socio-
Economic Background", Review of Economics and Statistics, 
May, 1973, pp. 225-33. By estimating both a non-recur-
sive single-equation earnings function for the US and 
a recursive model, he showed that home background exerts 
weak direct and strong indirect effects on earnings, 
and this produces a bias in the schooling coefficient 
of single-equation earnings function. 
2. See for example, I. Fagerlind, Formal Education and 
Adult Earnings. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wicks ell 
International, 1975. In this longitudinal study, 15,000 
individuals from Malmo, Sweden, were followed up from 
the age of 10 in 1938 to the age of 45 in 1971. 
(2) 
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made use of cross-section data despite the fact ) 
that the temporal order of variables like native 
ability, family background, formal schooling, 
occupational status and personal earnings points 
to longitudinal data as the most appropriate 
framework for analysis. Cross-section earnings 
differentials are then adjusted under alternative 
assumptions about productivity growth. l Research-
ers have seldom realised that rates of return are 
very sensitive to different productivity assump-
tions. 2 Moreover, it is usually assumed that each 
educational group shares proportionately in the 
growth of productivity which legitimately raises 
additional doubts. 
Private rates of return have not adequately dealt 
with the problems of risk and uncertainty. The rates that 
motivate students are expected rates of return and there 
is no reason to think that risk aversion is uniformly dist-
ributed among the members of a particular educational 
1. Longitudinal data suffer from the same defect since 
they implicitly assume that the productivity rates 
for the past 20 to 30 years are expected to continue 
in the future. 
2. Leibenstein, for example, found that the rate of return 
for secondary education for Greece, while standing at 
3% under a 0% rate of growth assumption, dramatically 
jumped to 7% under a 4% growth assumption. 
(Leibenstein, Ope cit., Table 6, p. 13.) 
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cohort. Thus, even when the means and variances of ex 
post returns are treated as best estimates of ex ante 
returns, we cannot predict how students will behave in 
choosing schooling without taking a view of their attitudes 
1· 2 towards risk. In a recent article, ~. Eden showed that 
rates of return are insufficient statistics for comparing 
alternative earnings paths. Specifically, he proved that if 
one income path X has more cumulative variation at the out-
set and less variation toward the end than another income 
path, Y, then X dominates Y in the sense that the decision 
3 maker prefers X to Y. Thus, even if the rate of return to 
university and secondary education is the same, students may 
still opt for university provided that the university earnings 
stream displays more variance in the early years and less in 
later ones as compared with the secondary school earnings stream. 
(3) Implicit in all present value or rate of return 
calculations is the assumption that the rate of discount, 
or what is the same thing, the rate of time preference of 
the individual (or the society) is constant. (i. e. that the 
1. Recent attempts by Y. Weiss in "The Risk.Element in 
Occupational and Educational Choices", J. Polito Economy, 
Nov./Dec. 1972, pp. 1203-13, supposed to show that risk 
differentials among individuals are not very important 
have raised more questions than they were supposed to 
answer. For a critical comment, see: J. Hause, "The 
Risk Element in Occupational and Educational Choices: 
Comment", J. Polito Economy, July/August, 1974, pp. 803-8. 
2. B. Eden, "Stochastic Dominance in Human Capital", J. Polito 
Economy, February, 1980, pp. 135-145. 
3. The intuitive reasoning is that a decision maker with 
income path X can, by engaging in a fair gamble, create 
the random variation of the cumulative income under Y 
and still have the advantage that more of the uncertainty 
is resolved at an earlier age. 
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rate at which we discount 2000's and 1990's pounds to make 
them equivalent to today's, is the same). 
From the individual's viewpoint, in a static 
utility maximising framework, this might be considered to be 
a fair assumption, although, in a dynamic utility maximising 
context, the non-constancy of the rate of time preference 
has long been recognised by Bohm-Bawerkl and Marshal1 2 but 
has been more explicitly treated by Strotz. 3 
Even in a static framework, however, the constant 
rate of time preference assumption is valid if, and only if, 
two further conditions are met. 
(A) Assume that two earnings streams represented with 
profiles (b) and (c) are associated with the same rate of 
return over profile (a). ((b) and (c) can be thought of as 
the earnings profiles associated with two different fields 
in higher education and (a) as the profile for secondary 
education.) The three profiles are portrayed graphically 
in Figure 1. Profile (c) offers more earnings after the age 
of 40 and less before that age as compared with profile (b). 
1. Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capital (trans. by 
w. Smart). London: G.E. Stechert & Co., 1891, pp. 
257-258. 
2. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th edn.). 
London: Macmillan, 1920, p. 120. 
3. R. Strotz, "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility 
Maximization", Review of Economic Studies, No. 61, 
1955-56, pp. 165-185. 
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Figure 1 
AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES FOR TWO DIFFERENT KINDS OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION WITH THE SAME RATE OF RETURN 
Profile (c) 
Profile (b) 
Profile (a) 
40 
AGE 
45 
Suppose, furthermore, that the individual is expecting 
to incur heavy expenses for his children's education 
after the age of 40 and that he would prefer, therefore, 
the e~rnings stream that prcrfile (c) entails. The equal rate 
of return associated with the two profiles, however, implies 
that the individual is indifferent to the choice posed by 
them. That is, even if he likes profile (c), since it is 
associated with higher earnings after the age of 40, he 
is equally attracted by profile (b), since he can save out 
of the higher earnings before 40 that (b) entails and spend 
these savings later/when his higher financial requirements 
arise. 
If, however, the individual is afraid of his 
financial extravagance and thinks that by choosing profile 
(b) he will not keep to his intention of saving part of 
the higher income before the age of 40, he may well choose 
profile (c) in order to avoid potential temptation. His 
action can be described as a precommitment strategy. Pref-
erence for (c) rather than (b) implies in effect, that the 
individual, in order to secure his desired ex ante alloc-
ation of consumption, attaches higher weight to the later 
than the earlier years in the discounting process. By doing 
that, the present value of profile (c) becomes greater than 
that of (b), although they are equal under the constant 
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rate of time preference assumption. Thus, if the individual 
is uncertain about his future consistency, he may opt for 
a precommitment strategy which challenges the constant 
rate of time preference assumption. 
(B) The assumption of constant rate of time preference 
implies that people are in general consistent planners. 
Consistency in planning is a characteristic that people do 
not inherit by birth but acquire through education at home 
and at schools. (I remember that I wrote at least half a 
dozen essays in school about the virtues of frugality.) 
The acquisition of a constant rate of discount in turn 
implies that low-income groups with little education or 
training may exhibit inconsistent or imprudent planning by 
sharply discounting the future. l 
It is seen,therefore, that the assumption of cons-
tant rate of time preference requires that. on average, people: 
(a) do not adopt precommitment strategies and (b) have 
learnt the virtues of frugality, i.e. they have learnt to 
plan consistently. 
(4) The use of earnings data usually drawn from 
aggregate sources does not take into account the so-called 
"moonlighting" income/which is of paramount importance espec-
ially in LDCs. Is "moonlighting" more widespread among the 
1. The incidence of sharp discounting of the future by "prim-
itive races, children and other uninstructive groups in 
society" was clearly asserted by I. Fisher, The Theory of 
Interest. London: Macmillan, 1930, ch. IV, § 9, and 
earlier by Bohm-Bawerk, Ope cit., p. 246. 
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more or less educated people? Unless we assume that all 
educational groups equally share in moonlighting, rate of 
return calculations based on declared incomes will undoubt-
edly be biased in either direction. 
(5) Rates of return are not useful for normative 
purposes or even as a basis for positive description because 
there are significant market failures on both the cost and 
revenue side of education, whose effects, because of their 
essential character, cannot be eliminated from the data. 
In measuring the benefits of education, the existence of 
externalities is more easily recognised than estimated. 
There may be positive external production effects from 
education if, for example, it helps to create a scientific 
environment conducive to more successful research and dev-
elopment activities. On the other hand, there may be 
public disutilities associated with education. The recent 
phenomenon of educated unemployed has been seen to create 
major social problems. It has also been recognised that 
education involves consumption externalities as well. The 
benefits of education in making better neighbours and cit-
izens are examples of such effects. Education might also 
enhance the non-pecuniary attractions of certain occupations. 
Since the effects of externalities are not transmitted 
through markets, estimation of their significance is not 
possible by traditional means. 
The usual response to this criticism has been 
that if the external benefits of education are assumed to be 
positive, the private rates of return can still provide a 
lower bound to the social rates of return. Even if we 
grant the point that the external effects of education are 
positive, failure to include the direct costs of education 
in the private calculus (which is the case when education 
is publicly provided) will necessarily result in private 
returns being higher than social returns. To the extent 
that the divergence between the two rates of return is 
large enough, the social rate ceases to be a practical 
social investment criterion, since the supply of education 
(which is determined by the politicians) is a function of 
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the private returns. The social rate of return is a poten-
tially useful investment criterion when and only when 
the private and social returns are of broadly similar 
. d 1 magnltu es. 
(iv) Education, Screening and Internal Labour Markets 
The most devastating criticism of rates of return 
has, however, come from the proponents of the so-called 
1. For a further discussion of the political constraint 
in educational planning, see: G. Fields, "The Alloc-
ation of Resources to Education in Less Develoned 
Countries", Journal of Public Economics. Febru~ry, 
1974, pp. 133 - 143. 
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screening hypothesis 1 (for which the terms signalling 
hypothesis or simply credentialism are also used in the 
jargon)!which basically challenges the view that earnings 
differentials, standardised for differences due to other 
factors, measure the social returns to education. The basic 
ingredients of the screening hypothesis are the following: 
(a) Employers prefer more than less educated workers 
not because they possess cognitive skills but 
because they possess certain personality traits 
like ability, achievement drive, self-reliance 
or compliance with organisational rules. 2 
1. The most prominent expositions of the "screening hypo-
thesis" can be found in (a) E.S. Phelps, "The Statist-
ical Theory of Racism and Sexism", Amer. Econ Review, 
Sept, 1972, pp. 619-61; (b) K.J. Arrow "Higher Educ-
ation as a Filter", Journal of Public Economics, July 
1973, pp. 193-216; (c) D. Starett, "Social Institut-
ions and the Distribution of Income: A Neo-classical 
Defence of Radical Positions", Institute for Mathemat-
ical Studies in the Social Sciences, Technical Report 
117, Stanford University, December 1973; (d) M. Roth-
child, "Models of Market Organisation with Imperfect 
Information: A Survey", Journal of Political Econom , 
Nov./Dec, 1973, pp. 1283-1308; (e P.J. Taubman and 
T. Wales, in Higher Education and Earnings: College 
as an Investment and Screening Device. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1974; (f) L.C. Thurow, "Measuring the 
Economic Benefits of Education", in M.S. Gordon (ed.), 
Hi her Education and the Labor Market. New York: 
i C raw- 111, 1 7 , pp. 373-418; g M. Spence, Market 
Signallin~, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974; 
(h) P. Wlles, "The Correlation Between Education and 
Earnings: The-Externa1-Test-Not-Content-Hypothesis 
(ETNC) " , Higher Education, February, 1974, pp. 43-58; 
(i) J.E. Stiglitz, "The Theory of "Screening", Educ-
ation and the Distribution of Income", American Economic 
Review, June,1975, pp. 283-300; (j) K.I. Wolpin, "Ed-
ucation and Screening", American Economic Review, Dec-
embe~ 1977, pp. 949-958. 
2. It is interesting to note that signalling models make 
no attempt to identify the precise nature of these 
characteristics. 
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(b) These desirable attributes cannot be known with 
certainty at the time of hiring and the employer 
faced with a selection problem is tempted to treat 
1" II 
educational qualifications as a screening device 
to sort out new workers in terms of those att-
ributes. Of course after some period of observ-
ation of a worker's performance, employers are 
able to measure more or less accurately his 
productivity. The discrete time-lag involved in 
learning an individual's productive capabilities 
makes the hiring decision an investment under un-
certainty. 
(c) Cognitive skills are acquired by on-the-job 
training and employers are therefore/concerned 
I 
with selecting job applicants in terms of their 
trainability. Potential trainability is directly 
related to possession of those personaility traits 
for which educational qualifications serve as a 
proxy. Education and training costs are, therefore, 
inversely related. 
1. It should be kept in mind that education is not the 
only screening device that employers may use. At the 
time of hiring, employers are able to observe a variety 
of personal data such as age, race, sex, education and 
test scores. Spence calls those traits that the worker 
cannot alter, like race or sex, "indices", while those 
that are alterable, like education, "signals". It is 
interesting to note that in the first exposition of 
the signalling hypothesis by Phelps, race and sex were 
considered as "screening" devices. Subsequently, the 
analysis was easily extended to take into account 
educational qualifications. 
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The question, therefore, arises whether formal education is 
the most efficient selection mechanism that can sort out 
individuals in terms of their trainability. This weak 
version of the screening hypothesis expounded above runs 
into the serious difficulty that it accounts at best for 
starting salaries and not for the earnings of long-time 
employees in different firms. An employer has every 
opportunity with long-term employees to acquire independent 
evidence of job performance without continuing to rely on 
educational qualifications. Yet the correlation between 
earnings and length of schooling actually increases in the 
first 10-15 years of work experience,l a fact difficult to 
explain by this version of the screening hypothesis. In 
another interesting test of the screening hypothesis, 
Wolpin 2 found that self-employed workers in non-professional 
occupations obtained about the same level of schooling as 
non-professional salaried workers. Since self-employed 
workers have less incentive to acquire the educational 
"signal" than salaried employees, Wo1pin concluded that his 
evidence could not lend support to a predominant screening 
interpretation. 
A stronger version of "screening", however, sur-
mounts these difficulties by assuming that firms operate 
1. For a report of such a finding, see R. Layard and G. 
Psacharopou1os, "The Screening Hypothesis and the 
Returns to Education", Journal of Political Economy, 
Sep/Oct, 1974, pp. 985-998. 
2. K. Wolpin, op. cit. 
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their own hierarchically organised and departmentally based 
"internal labour markets". The principal function of these 
hierarchically organised structures/as will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, is : 
(a) to maintain output in the face of unpredictable 
.. . d dId varlatlons ln eman, an 
(b) to ensure stability and control over input markets, 
including labour. 
As a consequence of (a), departments operate with enough 
manpower slack to ensure every new recruit a well defined 
sequence of promotions throughout his working life. As a 
result of (b), increasing emphasis on stability implies that 
maintenance and control of work effort and loyalty assume 
paramount importance in personnel policies. Abuse of 
seniority . provisions and external recruitment seems to 
interfere with the pursuit of these aims. Statistical 
discrimination based on educational qualifications (but 
also on sex or race) at the "entry ports" of hierarchical 
structures may well have durable effects. A less educated 
worker, although potentially more able than an educated one, 
may not have the opportunity to catch up in the rigid pro-
motion ladder governed almost exclusively by seniority pro-
visions. The loss of one grade at the hiring point may well 
1. This argument has been advanced by V.L. Rawlints and L. 
Ulman, in "The Utilization of College-Trained Manpower 
in the United States", in M.S. Gordon Ced.), Higher 
Education and the Labor ~arket. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1974, pp. 198-236. 
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have irreversible effects inside "internal labour markets". 
The theory of screening~ especially in its 
stronger version, appears to have radical implication for 
educational policy. Suppose that there are two levels of 
schooling, university and high school and that university 
graduates are not perfect substitutes for high school grad-
uates. An educational expansion of higher education is 
unlikely to have much impact on earnings differentials 
because an increased flow of university graduates will 
simply promote upgrading of hiring standards: college grad-
uates will be worse off in absolute terms but so will high 
school graduates, and hence earnings differentials by educ-
ation will remain more or less the same. What the theory 
of credentialism amounts to is that the use of intereducat-
ional earnings differentials in the calculation of the social 
return to education is unwarranted. The social rate of 
return to educational investment is a rate of return to a 
particular occupational selection mechanism. If university 
graduates are not perfect substitutes for high school gradu-
ates, the social rate of return may indeed be positive. 
Following Thurow,l therefore, instead of blindly calculating 
rates of return based on intereducational earnings differ-
entials, the following questions have to be answered; 
1. Thurow, Ope cit. 
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(1) Who bears the training costs - the em~loyer or the 
employee? 
(2) What set of background characteristics did the 
individual have prior to improving his education 
and what set of background characteristics does 
the individual possess after improvements in his 
education ? 
(3) What is the elasticity of training costs with 
respect to increases in education across the 
lifetime-income ladders ? 
Unfortunately no human capital theorist has been able to 
quantify the incidence 'of training, estimate its cost, or 
even explore the relationship between training and job 
design. l While the screening hypothesis concentrates its 
fire on the social rate of return to education, the private 
rate of return is left intact as an explanation for the 
demand for education. Signalling models do not conflict 
with the fundamental notion of human capital - of forgoing 
current income for increased future earnings. Screening by 
employers in terms of educational qualifications creates 
the incentive on the part of employees to produce the 
'!signal" that maximizes the probability of being selected, 
and this signalling incentive is in fact conveyed by the 
1. The only attempt directed to tackle the much neglected 
topic of job design can be found in J. Scoville, 
Manpower and Occupational Analysis: Concepts and 
Measurements. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972. 
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private rate of return to educational investment. 
The screening hypothesis, by drawing attention to 
the demand side of the labour market and the human capital 
theory by concentrating on the supply side can be better 
thought as complements rather than substitutes. The real 
difference between them is whether private rates of return 
are totally at variance with social rate of return. 
(v) 
In all likelihood, as Blaug l has pointed out, 
Human capital theory and credentialism will 
be swallowed up in a new, more comprehensive 
theory of the labour market in which employers 
and employees select each other when their 
attributes matter but when information about 
these attributes is subject to uncertainty. 2 
The Objectives of this Thesis 
After this brief discussion of the outstanding 
issues in human capital theory/ the obj ectives of the present 
thesis have to be expounded. 
The research undertaken consists of three essays 
in human capital theory using data that have been collected 
from Greece. 
Chapter (2) undertakes the estimation of the 
1. M. Blaug, "The Empirical Status of Human Capital 
Theory: A Slightly Jaundiced Survey", Journal of 
Econ. Literature, September,1976, pp. 827-855. 
2. Ibid., p. 850. 
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private rate of return to university education in the 
Banking and the Civil Service sectors of Greece/which trad-
itionally employ the bulk of Greek university graduates. 
It is seen that State legislation allows people to reap 
even infinite returns to their educational investment, 
providing thus a strictly economic explanation of the phen-
omenon of the "overeducated" Greek and of the disproportion-
ately large migrating flows from the countryside to the Greek 
capital throughout the twentieth century. The incidence of 
exceptionally large private rates of return to university 
education and the implied divergence between private and 
social returns raises some doubts about the potential use 
of the social rate of return as a social investment crit-
erion. Since the supply of education in democratically 
elected governments varies directly with the demand and 
hence the private returns to education, the signals conveyed 
by the social returns are unlikely to have any practical 
significance in educational planning. 
In Chapter (3), the concept of the"internal 
labour market" (ILM)i which has already been mentioned in 
rela tion with the screening hypothes is, is discussed and its 
relationship with human capital theory (or neoclassical 
economic theory) is elucidated. It is seen, that the real 
difference between human capital theory and IL~ theory lies 
in the neglect by the former of the organisational impera-
tives of firms of a usually large size. Furthermore, some 
criteria necessary for identifying the existence of ILMs 
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are established and applied to a four-company sample of 
GLeek white collar employees. Lastly, the implications of 
(a) strong ILMs and (b) the use of education as a screening 
device by employers on educational demand is explored. In 
one of the models presented, it is shown that an increase 
in the supply of highly educated people does not necess-
arily lead to a reduction of the demand for higher education. 
Chapter (4) is devoted to sex discrimination and 
ln particular to discrimination inside hierarchically org-
anised ILMs. It distinguishes between the various theories 
of discrimination and in particular the labour supply (or 
human capital) and the demand based statistical theories of 
discrimination. It is shown that statistical theories of 
sex discrimination are the exact counterpart of screening by 
employers in terms of educational qualifications. In the 
context of ILMs early statistical discrimination by educ-
ation or sex can have irreversible effects in the wage 
determination process. 
Furthermore, the importance of marriage and child-
ren variables in sex discrimination is analyzed and finally 
the two leading theories of sex discrimination (i.e. labour 
supply and statistical discrimination theories) are put into 
an empirical test using a three company sample of white 
collar employees. It was found that the data were not con-
sistent with the predictions of the labour supply hypothesis. 
On the other hand, a version of statistical discrimination 
could not be refuted by the evidence. 
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The rejection of some of the predictions of the 
supply based human capital theory of sex discrimination 
does not necessarily imply that it should be dismissed 
outright. As in the case of education it may well be that 
the human capital theories and the statistical theories of 
sex discrimination are indeed complementary. 
CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN TO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 
IN THE GREEK BANKING AND CIVIL SERVICE SECTORS 
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Private demand for higher education is deter-
mined by a combination of social and economic factors 
(although social factors are not usually devoid of economic 
content). It is the object of this essay to set aside the 
social or institutional interpretations developed in the 
introductory chapter and concentrate on whether pay differ-
entials on their own are capable of providing a satisfactory 
explanation of the ever-growing demand for university educ-
ation in Greece. 
Private rates of return to university education are 
computed separately for the Banking Sector and the Civil 
S . . G 1 erVlce ln reece. Since both the Banking and the Public 
Sector in Greece are significant employers of labour with 
secondary or university education, it is reasonable to ass-
ume that earnings within these sectors provide one of the 
. 2 
signals influencing the private demand for education. 
Section 1 elucidates the problem of who is the 
decision making unit in the educational investment process. 
1. There are over 75,000 people employed in the Banking 
Sector and over 300,000 employed in the Civil Service 
(including teachers, employees in public corporations, 
etc. ) . 
2. For another effort to calculate rates of return for the 
Public Sector in Iran, see G. Psacharapou1os and G. 
Williams, "Public Sector Earnings and Educational 
Planning", International Labour Review, July, 1973, 
pp. 43-52. 
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Section (2) provides a rationale for the disaggregated 
rates of return approach undertaken in this study. Sect-
ions (3) and (4) present the earnings functions analysis 
for the Banking Sector and the Public Sector respectively. 
Section (5) presents and discusses the rate of return 
results. Section (6) discusses some policy implications, 
whilst Section (7) presents the conclusions. 
(1) Private Investment in Education: Household, Parental 
or Student Decision? 
It is widely accepted that people invest in 
education for uhe financial benefits that it confers. But 
is this an investment undertaken by the households, the 
parents or the students ? 
A. Human capital theorists have assumed that households 
maximize a utility function, thereby regarding households 
as the basic decision unit. Becker's important article, 
for example, on the "Theory of the Allocation of Time",l 
is concerned with the production of utilities by households. 
Schultz 2 has long been inclined to look at households and 
the 1973 and 1974 J.P.E. Supplements dealing with family 
1. G. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time", 
Economic Journal, September, 1965, pp. 493-517. 
2. Schultz, T.W., Investment in Human Capital. New York: 
Free Press, 1971. 
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investment in children and with "Marriage, Family, Human 
Capital and Fertility" have further advanced this view. 
If it is a household decision, then a model of 
household saving and investment decisions is most approp-
riate. Such a model would start out with households max-
imizing a multi-period utility function, similar to the 
traditional economic theory of household investment in 
durable capital goods or in a home, and subject to approp-
riate multi-period budget and time constraints. It could 
develop the interdependence with the family's investment 
in health, with instalment credit and mortgage financing, 
and with parents' saving over their life cycle as they 
plan toward retirement. 
There are several possible assumptions in a 
family saving and investment decision model with respect 
to the degree of homogeneity within the household. It may 
not be too bad an approximation to assume that the tastes of 
the parents and the student are homogenous and that the 
family budget constraint is relevant. l A good part of the 
psychological stock of tastes and habits held by the 
younger family members are likely to be acquired from 
within the home environment over many years. An alternative 
possibility is to assume that the utility function is that 
1. Research in the United States has shown that the choice 
made by the prospective freshman to enter and finance 
a college education is more likely to be a family deci-
sion and the selection later of a major field is more 
likely to be independent. 
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possessed by the head of the household who has previously 
taken the tastes of the prospective student and other 
family members into account. In either event, the parents' 
aspirations for the son or daughter are relevant and the 
family budget restraint which includes the income and assets 
f h . d l' 1 o t e prospectIve stu ent app lese 
B. If, on the other hand, the decision is made independ-
ently by the student as he contemplates his own future, 
especially now that the voting age in most countries has 
been lowered to 18, an independent student model is more 
appropriate. In this event, the parents' income and assets 
are also relevant but with a different significance. In 
this case attention is likely also to be given to student 
borrowing. In the independent student decision model, if 
the parents are assumed to provide financial support during 
the years of study, the difference between forgone earnings 
and the income provided by the parents has to be included 
on the cost side. 2 In the calculation of rates of return, 
earlier years take a much heavier weight in the discounting 
process. One should, therefore, expect that rates of return 
1. A third possibility (that of a collective family 
indifference curve and allocations within the family) 
is considered by P. Samuelson in the article, "Social 
Indifference Curves", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
February, 1956, pp. 1-22. 
2. Direct private costs of schooling are usually negligible 
since in most countries education is publicly urovided. 
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calculated for the student as the decision-making unit will 
be much higher than rates of return calculated for the 
household for the very reason that earnings forgone in the 
former case will be much less than in the 1atter. 1 
c. In this part, the possibility of an independent parent-
a1 investment decision will be explored. It will be shown 
that, especially in the case of less developed countries 
(LDCs), it is perfectly rational to consider parents 
independently as investors and compute a separate rate of 
return to their investment decision. 
Suppose that an Indian father decides on whether 
to send his son to an institution of higher education. 
What are the costs and benefits that confront him? On the 
cost side, he has to pay for tuition fees (if there are 
any), books, travel expenses, etc., plus food, clothes and 
all other expenses that accrue while the child is studying 
and staying with the family. On the benefit side, there are 
non-pecuniary and pecuniary benefits. On the non-pecuniary 
side he enjoys the recognition of society of being a model 
parent, willing to sacrifice his own well-being for the 
advancement of his children. But more importantly, by 
providing higher education to his children and consequently 
1. In the independent student model, even if students are 
assumed to subsidize their parents! pension after 
retirement, the reduction in disposable income that 
this will entail is unlikely to affect rates of return 
since later years receive a much lower weight in the 
discounting process. 
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increasing their earning capabilities, he simultaneously 
maximizes their ability to help him financially in the 
later periods of his life, especially after retirement. l 
This incentive will be stronger in LDC countries lacking 
comprehensive pension schemes. But even if pension schemes 
exist, the amount of money they offer is usually low and 
further support is needed. The parents' investment dec-
sision is portrayed in Figure 1. 
The father is assumed 
(a) to start work at 25 and be employed for a 
40-year period until 65; 
(b) his consumption equals his income (i.e. no 
savings are assumed); 
(c) his consumption profile is depicted to be 
monotonically increasing until retirement, 
when he receives a flat pension rate. 
Suppose that the father reaches the age of 45 and 
contemplates whether or not to send his son to university. 
What are his options? He can either choose consumption 
profile A and refuse to incur the costs of education (but 
1. This explanation is quite similar to some recent 
economic theories of fertility. According to these 
theories, in many underdeveloped, poverty-stricken 
countries, the phenomenon of high fertility rates is 
explained as a sound investment decision by the parents. 
The more children they produce (especially sons), the 
higher the probability that one or more of the child-
ren will succeed later on in his life and the likelier 
it becomes that he (or she) will be able to support 
them in the last stages of their life. 
Figure 2 
ALTERNATIVE PARENTAL LIFETIME CONSUMPTION PROFILES 
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simultaneously accept a lower consumption profile after 
retirement) or profile B with less consumption between, say, 
45 and 49, but with higher consumption after retirement 
(since he expects his child to subsidize his pension). 
In mathematical notation: 
20 
Present Value for Profile A = L 
t=l 
4 
35 
wt p 
+ L 
( l+r)t (l+r)t t=2l 
wt-C 
+ 
20 
1 
Present Value for Profile B = L ( l+r)t t=l 
L 
t=5 (l+r)t 
where w = 
p = 
C = 
H = 
wage at time t 
pension rate 
the costs that the 
35 
+ L 
t=2l 
father 
p+H 
(l+r) t 
incurs over 
four-year period when he pays for his 
education 
the additional income he expects after 
retirement 
the 
child's 
r = rate of interest (or rate of time preference) 
If B > A, it is rational for the father to undertake the 
1. At retirement the father expects to live for another 
15 years. 
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educational investment. 
But even if, ideally, a researcher had collected 
all the data necessary to compute the two present values, 
it would be hard to prove that profile B is preferable to 
A.I The difficulty arises because in rate of return cal-
culations, the individual is assumed to have a constant 
rate of time preference throughout his lifetime. Earlier 
years take a much heavier weight than later years in the 
discounting process and it is, therefore, unlikely that 
additional income after retirement will outweigh income 
forgone at present. Moreover, in this model, the parents 
are assumed to be certain about the willingness of their 
children to provide financial support in old age. 
Under the constant rate of time preference ass-
umption one should generally expect negative rates of 
return to the parents' investment decision. But if the 
time preference rate at the age of 65 is much higher than 
the corresponding rate at 45 (which is very likely, esp-
2 
ecially in countries with non-existent pension schemes), 
the provision of education might prove to be a perfectly 
rational economic decision. Profiles A and B,portrayed in 
Figure l,do not exhaust the parents' options. As can be seen 
in Figure 2, the parents also have the option of 
profile C. by which parents can save, say, between 45 and 65 
1. For example, a survey can be conducted among old pen-
sioners to find out the extent of financial support 
that their children provide. 
2. In this case one can think of an infinite rate of time 
preference at retirement age. 
Figure 3 
ALTERNATIVE PARENTAL LIFETIME CONSUMPTION PROFILES 
~i~~~;~" 
:Lifetime 
consumpti 
of a fath 
Notes: 
",. 
f ,,'" ., . 
r .. • 
· l • • .' • • • 
· t, • 
• · ,! 1 , . , • ,., ~ ~ 
• 
.. 
• l ~ t • • ~ · 
, .' • 
2 5'" .·-----·---··4 5 49 
The dashed line depicts profile B 
65 
The continuous line depicts profile C. 
• 
. 
-
68 
" 
" 
Age 
69 
(or, alternatively, during their whole working life) and 
consume these savings after retirement. l 
So if the parents are assumed to invest in their 
children's education solely for the reason of financial 
support at old age, we distinguished three possible options 
portrayed by profiles A, Band C. In profile A the parents 
consume everything they earn, in profile B they forgo 
present consumption only during the years of the children's 
studies in order to receive financial help after retirement 
and in profile C they save during some or all of their 
working life to consume more at old age. (Options Band C 
are, of course, not mutually exclusive). 
In principle, therefore, the parents should be 
able to assess the costs and benefits of profiles A, B or 
C or any other possible combination of investment (savings) 
decisions. As pointed out before, comparison of profiles 
A and B would result in a negative rate of return. Comp-
arison between Band C, though, does not lead to any 
similar a priori predictions. 
The object of this section was to underline the 
fact that there can be 3 rates of return to investment in 
education corresponding to the household, the parents or the 
student as the decision unit. The rates of return that are 
1. Profile C would correspond to the life-cycle consump-
tion/saving theories first expounded by F. Ando and F. 
Modigliani, '!The Life-Cycle Hypothesis of Saving: 
Aggregate Implications and Tests", American Economic 
Review, March, 1963, pp. 55-89. 
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computed in this study assume that the household is the 
decision making unit and, therefore, include the full 
earnings forgone on the cost side. It should be kept in 
mind that these rates of return are lower than the ones 
calculated for the individual student as the decision 
unit. 
(2) Occupationally Disaggregated Rates of Return to 
Education 
(a) The Rationale of Occupation Disaggregation 
The first attempts to estimate the private rates 
of return to education, treated as if they were an invest-
ment, were made on a highly aggregate basis. All occup-
ations were combined with distinction made among individ-
uals at each level of education only by categories of race 
and sex. 
But although rates of return, as conventionally 
calculated, may, for example, show high returns to univer-
sity education, they are not able to distinguish between, 
say, high rates of return to mechanical engineering and 
low rates of return to liberal arts degrees. 
In considering the returns to an educational 
investment one must first estimate the earnings differential 
between those persons who would undertake the additional 
education and those who would remain at the educational 
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level from which the first group advances. Ideally, 
therefore, one should compare the two groups of individuals 
with approximately the same ability and socio-economic 
background, in order to arrive at meaningful rates of return. 
Occupational disaggregation helps in defining 
groups of individuals with relatively homogenous personal 
characteristics of intelligence, physical aptitude and 
personality and to isolate the effects of education on 
income. On the other hand, although occupations have diff-
erent ranges of requirements for physical an~ mental cap-
abilities and personality attributes, these ranges overlap 
among occupations. Moreover, individuals may typically 
possess a range of these attributes which make them potent-
ially useful for a variety of occupations as the existence 
of interoccupational mobility suggests. These consider-
ations qualify the assumption that each occupation is 
characterized by a unique distribution of personal qual-
ities. Even so, it is more informative with respect to 
the effects of education alone to compare the incomes of 
electrical engineers with varying levels of education than 
to simply compare the income profiles of all persons with, 
say, a high school and college education. Occupational 
disaggregation also helps to achieve homogeneity in the 
socio-economic backgrounds of the labour forces that are 
being compared. Since there seems to be a certain degree 
of social immobility among occupations, occupational dis-
aggregation provides, to a limited degree, a means of 
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standardizing for these influences. 
In order to achieve the greatest possible degree 
of homogeneity, therefore, the alternative age-income 
profile for the lower level of education has to be taken 
from the occupation itself. For occupations in which an 
age-income profile associated with lower levels of education 
cannot be estimated, an alternative has to be chosen from 
an occupation that appears to be comparable in terms of the 
level of physical and mental attributes that characterize 
the first occupation. 
An example of the latter can be found in a study 
by Davis l when he tries to estimate the rate of return to 
medical education in Australia. In this particular study, 
the age-income profiles for doctors were compared with 
those for bank employees who were assumed to obtain pro-
motion at the minimum possible age in order to equate their 
ability with the presumed natural ability of the medical 
students. 
The first attempt to compute returns to education 
in an occupationally disaggregated framework was made by 
B. Wilkinson. 2 He calculated the discounted present value 
to different levels of education for six different occup-
ational categories, namely, Labourers, Carpenters, 
1. Davis, D., "Manpower Planning, Rate-of-Return Analysis 
and the University Medical Schools: The Case of Aus-
tralid~ Higher Education, November, 1977, pp. 301-311. 
2. B. Wilkinson, "Present Values of Lifetime Earnings 
for Different Occupations", Journal of Political 
Economy, December, 1966, pp. 556-73. 
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Compositors and Typesetters, Draftsmen, Science and Eng-
ineering Technicians and Engineers. R. Eckhaus l in 1973 
computed rates of return to 70 different occupational 
categories while P. Taubman and T. Wales 2 in 1974 repeated 
the exercise using only seven broad categories, namely, 
Professional, Technical, Sales, Blue Collar, Service, White 
Collar and Owner Manager. 
Proponents of the occupationally disaggregated 
approach accept that even in this framework, a wide range 
of individual attributes other than education can influence 
the results. Nonetheless, they think that a greater degree 
of standardization is achieved by these means than by com-
paring the age-income profiles associated with different 
levels of education for the entire labour force. 
(b) The Basic Criticism Levelled Against the 
Occupationally Disaggregated Approach 
Various scholars of the human capital tradition 
have argued that the existence of occupational labour 
mobility not only justifies but even necessitates an 
aggregate approach to the estimation of education income 
relations. Sceptical arguments with respect to occupational 
1. R. Eckhaus, Estimating the Returns to Education: A 
Disaggregated Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1973. 
2. P. Taubman and T. Wales, Higher Education and Earnings: 
Colle e as an Investment and a Screenin Device. 
New Yor: McGraw-Hill, 1974. 
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disaggregation have been made since the birth of the human 
capital approach. Becker has written: 
... education has little direct effects on 
earnings; it operates primarily indirectly 
through the effect on knowledge and skills. 
Consequently, by standardizing for enough 
measures of knowledge and skill, such as an 
occupation or ability to communicate, one can 
eliminate the entire true effect of education 
and earnings. 1. 
It is not clear what Becker means by saying that 
an occupation is a "measure of knowledge of skill". 
Hanoch's2 argument on the futility of occupational 
comparisons is more clear: 
... an individual who completed more years in 
school would expect to move upward in the 
occupational scale and, perhaps, to work in a 
better industry. This is, in fact, a main 
channel by which he can realise some returns on 
the additional investment in schooling. If 
he were to be restricted to staying in the same 
occupation-group or industry, he would be much 
more limited in the opportunities to increase 
his income. 3 
According to this argument, interoccupational 
mobility is an important instrument for the realization 
of the returns to education. Occupationally disaggregated 
rates of return tend, therefore, to underestimate the 
1. G. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis with Special Reference to Education. New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964, p. 86. 
2. G. Hanoch, !fAn Economic Analys is 0 f Earnings and 
Schooling", Journal of Human Resources, Summer, 1967, 
pp. 312-320. 
3. Ibid., p. 312. 
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returns to education. 
(c) A !!Job Family" Disaggregated Approach ? 
Following the work of J. Dunlop, James Scoville 
in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies attacked the much 
neglected topic of job content. Scoville conceived the job 
content to have two main dimensions: 
(a) the job family; and 
(b) the level of job content. 
In Scoville's words: 
A job family is defined by the material, 
equipment or function about which the jobs 
in it are centred. It determines the focus 
of the job. Jobs with similar focus will be 
grouped into job families by this major focus . 
... The content-level breakdown will relate 
to all the factors which affect the complexity 
of the job. As has long been recognised, the 
narrow concept of skills is inadequate to 
describe the content of most jobs. The level 
of content depends not only on manual dexter-
ity, but on the mental function, as well as 
responsibility and coordinating duties. In 
accordance with the relative range of duties, 
skills and abilities involved, jobs should be 
ranked within the job families, just as they 
are ranked in actual job evaluation systems. 
Such a twofold breakdown will indicate for the 
whole economy the major tachnical foci of jobs 
as well as the relative levels of job content. 
Within the blue-collar occupation/Scoville 
1 
identified four job families which focus on tools, machines, 
the operation of vehicles and inspection and supervision. 
Within white-collar and service jobs the following families 
1. J. Scoville, The Job Content of the U.S. Economy, 1940 
-1970. New York: McGraw Hill, 1969, FP' 12-13. 
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were identified: Sales, clerical, personal services, 
entertainment, protection, education, health services, 
welfare services, administrative jobs and jobs in research 
and design. Critics of the occupationally disaggregated 
approach were seen in the previous section to argue that 
rates of return computed in such a framework,underestimate 
the true returns to education since they do not allow for 
interoccupational mobility. 
The problem of interoccupational mobility can be 
partially surmounted, though, by applying a "job family" 
disaggregated approach. When a person decides to change 
his job, it is much more likely that he will choose one 
belonging to the same job family than to another job family 
with a completely different focus. For example, it is a 
rather remote possibility that someone with a job in the 
Vehicle Operation job family will move into the Sales, 
Health or Education job family and vice versa. A "job 
family" disaggregated approach, therefore, seems able to 
deal effectively with the problem of interoccupational 
mobility while, at the same time, providing some degree 
(even limited) of standardization with respect to ability 
and socio-economic background. 
(3) Earnings Function Analysis in the Banking Sector of 
Greece 
The exceptional feature of this study is that it 
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has used data pertaining to the population and not to a 
sample of the National Bank of Greece (only full-time 
employees were included in the data; part-time and cleaning 
staff were excluded). The Bank, incidentally, belongs 
to the 100 biggest financial conglomerates of the world 
·~ith.numerous' branches overseas includinR three in London 
alone. 
In post-war Greece, the banking system, in close 
collaboration with the State, played a major role in the 
growth and direction of the productive forces. Whereas, 
during the early inter-war period/there was a plethora 
of small banking establishments, after the 1929 economic 
crisis, amalgamations began. Then after the Civil War, which 
ended in 1950, a very complex process of mergers and take-
overs,resulted in the emergence and consolidation today of 
a duopolistic situation in which two giant commercial 
banks control virtually all economic transactions: The 
National Bank of Greece and the Commercial Bank of Greece, 
mainly owned by a variety of public corporations through 
which the state has majority control. 
To give an idea of the degree of concentration 
in banking, it suffices to say that, in 196~ the assets of 
these two concerns amounted to 96.3% of the assets of all 
Greek commercial banks together. l If one also takes into 
account that Greek banking capital is growing much faster 
1. D. Psi10s, Capital Market in Greece. Athens: Centre 
of Economic Research, 1964, pp. 185-6. 
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than industrial or merchant capital, the enormous power 
of these two establishments becomes clear. Between them, 
they handle not only 90% of the country's considerable 
savings, but also participate directly in the ownership 
and management of an important part of the insurance and 
industrial sector. As far as industry is concerned, quite 
apart from enterprises under direct bank ownership, the 
banking system has very tight control by means of its 
credit policies. This control is particularly strict in 
Greece because, due to the exceptional weakness of the stock 
market, not many alternatives for financing are available 
to Greek entrepreneurs. At least up to the late 'fifties, 
Greek industrial and commercial capital was highly depend-
ent on the commercial banks, not only for short-term but 
also for long-term financing. 
(a) Fringe benefits 
In Greece, Banking Sector employees are consid-
ered a priveleged class of Public Sector employees/ basically 
because of a more generous allowance and fringe benefit 
system. Fringe benefits l can be classified into two categ-
ories: 
(i) pecuniary benefits, defined as goods, serVlces or 
deferred money income received by the employee but 
1. For a good review of the literature on fringe benefits, 
see G. Psacharopoulos, Earnings and Education in OECD 
Countries. Paris: OECD, 1975, ch. 6. 
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paid for by the employer. Examples of this kind of 
benefit include medical insurance, pension plans, 
paid vacations and sick leave, free or subsidized 
meals or merchandise, stock options, low interest loans, 
etc. 
(ii) Nonpecuniary benefits~ which, in turn, can be 
divided into two categories: 
(a) Working Conditions - examples of working 
condition benefits are the health and safety 
characteristics of the job, the rigidity of work 
schedule, the degree of work autonomy afforded to 
the worker and the characteristics of grievance 
procedures. Some working conditions (such as 
adequate lighting or noise level) impose clearcut 
and potentially measurable costs on employers, 
while others (such as autonomy) are more diff-
icult to quantify. Furthermore, the benefits of 
certain working conditions may depend upon the 
characteristics of the employees. Autonomy, for 
example, may not be considered a benefit to all 
individuals. 
(b) Consumption Benefits - comprising the pos-
itive flow of satisfaction provided by the work 
1. For an interesting attempt to estimate nonpecuniary 
benefits, see J.G. Duncan, "Earnings Functions and 
Nonpecuniary Benefits", Journal of Human Resources, 
Fall, 1976, pp. 462-83. 
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situation. Enjoyabi1ity is a consumption benefit 
of some jobs, as are the interest, challenge and 
social relationships. Most consumption benefits 
represent subjective reactions of individuals to 
the job situation. As such, they are much more 
difficult to evaluate than either pecuniary ben-
efits or most working conditions. 
Earnings data, as usually recorded in official 
statistics, do not take into account fringe benefits. If 
more educated employees enjoy more fringe benefits than 
less educated do, then crude earnings differentials are 
expected to underestimate the returns to education. 
1 The data provided by the National Bank of Greece 
(the earnings data refers to salaries paid out in October 
1978) allow for the direct or indirect calculation of various 
pecuniary fringe benefits. They are the following: 
(1) Annual bonuses and annual vacations with pay. 
Instead of receiving 12 months' salary during the 
year, the bank employee receives l4! months' 
salary, one extra salary during Christmas, half 
a monthly salary 'during Easter and half a monthly 
salary during the summer. In addition, he receives 
an extra half-monthly salary as a bonus. 
(2) Overtime pay. Overtime of up to 20 hours a month 
receives an extra 25% on top of the standard hourly 
1. I am indebted to this-organisation for providing the 
tape with the relevant data. 
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wage rate. Any additional overtime receives a 
standard 200 Dr. (£2.0) per hour. 
(3) Employers' contribution to (a) pension funds, 
(b) provident funds, (c) medical care and 
hospitalization funds. The National Bank of 
Greece pays 30% of total gross earnings to these 
funds which provide (i) pensions after retirement; 
(ii) an auxiliary pension amounting to 45% of the 
standard pension; (iii) a lump sum after retire-
ment of at least £lO,OOO,according to years of 
experience and grade (senior managers may receive 
up to £40,000); (iv) medical care and hospital-
ization both before and after retirement. 
(4) Housing loans and supplementary housing loans 
of up to 1,000,000 Dr. (£10,000) repayable in a 
; 
period of 20 years at an annual interest rate of 
4 ~ o • Surprisingly or not, the data revealed that 
some employees surpassed the borrowing limit. 
(5) Personal loans of up to 3 months' salary, repay-
able in 16 months' time at an annual rate of 
interest of 4%. 
(6) Low interest loans (at 4%) to buy certain consumer 
durab1es. 
(7) Housing allowances between 60% and 100% of the 
I 
rent paid for those employed in provincial 
I 
branches (according to their grade in the ~ier-
archy). 
(8) Fuel allowances for those employed in the northern, 
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colder parts of Greece. 
(9) Automobile allowance for top management employees. 
(10) Allowance for children's school fees, reaching up 
to one-third of the total outlay. 
How has the monthly value of these fringe benef-
its been imputed? 
Overtime pay, employers' contributions to the 
various funds, housing and fuel allowances were simply 
added to gross earnings. For bonuses, the extra 2! months' 
salary that each employee receives) was divided by 12 and 
the imputed value was added to the gross monthly earnings. 
For the children's school fees allowance, the total amount 
provided was divided by 12 and the imputed value was added 
to monthly earnings. Imputation of the fringe benefits of 
low interest loans was made as follows: the data provided 
for the monthly repayments to these loans at the 4% interest 
rate. I then computed the monthly repayments at the arb-
itrary 15% rate (to reflect the unsubsidized, free market 
interest rate) and subtracted the latter value from the 
former. The imputed monthly value was then added to the 
earnings stream. 
The total monthly value of the fringe benefits 
was added to the gross sum of: 
(a) Basic Salary (the Internal Basic Salary Structure 
can be found in Appendix II). 
(b) Family Allowances (10% extra for wife or husband 
and 5% for every child). 
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(c) Many years of service allowance: 
(For over 5 years of service 5% of basic salary 
For over 10 years of service 10% of basic salary 
For over 15 years of service 15% of basic salary 
For over 20 years of service 20% of basic salary 
For over 25 years of service 25% of basic salary 
For over 30 years of service 30% of basic salary) 
(d) Allowance for holding higher degrees (ranging 
from 15% - 40% of basic salary). 
(e) Special allowances for belonging to the highest 
six grades of the hierarchy ranging from £8 to 
£80 (monthly). 
(f) Allowances for holding positions requiring 
considerable technical skills (like computer 
operators) or effort levels (like bank tellers, 
branch managers, telephonists, information 
analysts). 
(b) Regression Results 
Having arrived at a comprehensive calculation of 
the monthly compensation package, let us now turn to 
earnings function analysis. 
Table 9 presents the regression results of monthly 
earnings (regressions (1) and (2)) and log earnings 
(regressions (3) and (4)) on sex, education (in both cont-
..., 
inuous and dummy form), experience and experience~. Three 
dummy variables) are also included to check whether the 
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locational characteristics of the particular branch in which 
the persons are employed have an independent effect on earnings. 
The 3 dummies in question are BRAN 1, BRAN 2 and BRAN 3. BRAN 1 
takes the value of 1 if the branch in question is located in 
the Athens area, BRAN 2 takes the value of 1 if the branch is 
located in towns of over 10,000 people and BRAN 3 takes the 
value of 1 if the branch is located abroad (provincial branches 
constitute the excluded category). Two additional dummy 
variables KLAD 1 and KLAD 2 were used to test whether white-
collar employees receive more or less earnings than engineers 
and technical workers: KLAD 1 takes the value of 1 if the 
employee is engaged in administrative, clerical, sales and 
research work. KLAD 2 takes the value of 1 if the employee 
happens to be an engineer or technical worker (e.g. engineer 
in the computing unit of the Bank). Security guards are the 
excluded category. 
Five educational dummies were used in regressions 
(2) and (4). The five educational dummies correspond to the 
following educational qualifications: 
EDUC 1 - three years of secondary education 
EDUC 2 - secondary school completion 
EDUC 3 - student in higher education 
EDUC 4 - university first degree 
EDUC 5 - postgraduate degree (M.A. or Ph.D). 
Primary school completion is the excluded category. 
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The results from all four regressions in Table 9 
can be summarised as follows: (Variables are defined in 
Table 9a.) 
Sex seems to have an independent effect on 
earnings. But this is to be expected since males are doing 
more overtime than females. An extra year of education 
raises earnings by 1176 Dr. in regression (1) or by 2.6% 
in regression (3). 
Turning to regression 4 which includes education 
as a dummy variable we see that only EDUC 4 and EDUC 5, 
which correspond to university education and postgraduate 
education respectively, have a substantial influence on 
earnings. A university degree raises earnings by 18% over 
a secondary school certificate. A postgraduate degree (M.A. 
or Ph.D) raises earnings by less than 1% over a first degree. 
With respect to the locational dummies, we observe 
that the excluded category, i.e. branches in the provinces, 
are associated with higher earnings than the branches situated 
in the capital and the big cities. The obvious explanation 
is that employees are attracted to the provinces through 
a more generous allowance system (e.g. free lodgings or 
houshing allowances). Employees working abroad (BRAN 3) 
receive a much lower salary than domestic employees. They 
do receive a double salary, one paid abroad in foreign 
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TABLE 9 
GREEK BANK EMPLOYEES 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EARNINGS EQUATION IN WHICH THE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS MONTHLY AND LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
*Coefficient insignificant at both the 5% and 1% level. 
** Coefficient significant at 5% but not at the 1% level. 
(l)Y (2) Y (3) log Y (4)log Y 
Constant 2789 13030 9.440 9.695 
(596) (577) ( .018) (.017) 
SEX 4451 4290 .111 .106 
(238) (238) ( .007) ( .007) 
EDUC 1176 .026 
(46) (.001) 
NEXP 1633 1550 .066 .064 
(37) (37) (.001) (.001 ) 
NEXp2 
-4.8 -2.7** -.0008 -.0008 
(1.2) (1. 2) ( .00003) ( .00003) 
KLAD 1 -799* 1577 .025* .093 
(489) (547) ( . 015) ( .016) 
KLAD 2 6646 7646 .221 .249 
(727) (729) (.022) (.022) 
BRAN 1 -236* -411* -.028 -.034 
(306) (304) (.009) ( .009) 
BRAN 2 -742 -565** -.035 -.031 (245) (243) ( .007) ( .007) 
BRAN 3 -25164 -25531 -.776 -.787 
(1618) (1592) ( .049) (.049) 
EDUC 1 -1572 -.073 
(547) (.016) 
EDUC 2 1629 -.003* 
(532) ( .016) 
EDUC 3 1595 -.018* 
(602) ( .018) 
EDUC 4 9132 .181 
(559) ( .017) 
EDUC 5 9207 .188 
(1592) (.049) 
-2 
R .696 .706 .643 _nt:;.1 
SEX 
NEXP 
NEXp2 
EDUC 
EDUC 1 
EDUC 2 
EDUC 3 
EDUC 4 
EDUC 5 
TABLE 9a 
GREEK BANK EMPLOYEES 
Variable Definitions 
- 1 if male 0 if female 
- Years of work experience 
- Square of previous variable 
- Years of schooling completed 
- 1 if three years of secondary education 
o otherwise 
- 1 if secondary school graduate 
o otherwise 
- 1 if student in higher education 
o if otherwise 
- 1 if university first degree holder 
o otherwise 
- 1 if postgraduate (M.A. or Ph.D. holder) 
o otherwise 
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Primary school graduates is the excluded category 
KLAD 1 - 1 if employed in clerical or administrative work 
0 otherwise 
KLAD 2 - 1 if engaged in engineering or technical work 
0 otherwise 
BRAN 1 
-
1 if branch is in Athens area 
0 otherwise 
BRAN 2 - 1 if branch in towns of over 10,000 people 
0 otherwise 
BRAN 3 - 1 if branch is located abroad 
0 otherwise. 
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exchange and the other paid in Greek Dr. in Greece. Only 
the second salary appears in the data and/therefor~ the 
explanation of the negative coefficient of BRAN 3. 
Turning to the dummies KLAD 1 and KLAD 2, we see 
that the coefficient of KLAD 1 is not significantly diff-
erent from zero in three out of the four regressions. The 
coefficient of KLAD 2 is highly significant in all equation~ 
which show that engineers and technical specialists receive, 
other things being equal, 6069 Dr. more or 16% more than 
the employees in KLAD 1, simply because of differential 
allowances for "technical capacity" (Regressions 2 and 4). 
In order to calculate the private rate of return 
to a university degree as compared with a secondary school 
certificate, regression adjusted experience-earnings 
profiles are used. The regression model 
Log Y = a + b NEXP + c NEXp2 
where Y is income and NEXP are years of experience is 
estimated from the data for the two educational categories 
separately. What is being done, therefore, is smoothing out 
the crude experience earnings profiles that appear in Graph 
1. The regression adjusted experience-earnings profiles 
appear in Graph 2 and the results are presented in Table 10. 
An additional point deserves attention. Since a 
university graduate is assumed to enter the labour force 
four years later than a secondary graduate, he has a lower 
probability of being married at the time of recruitment. 
Non-standardization for marital status will, therefore, 
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TABLE 10 
MARRIED BANK EMPLOYEES 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF MONTHLY LOG AFTER TAX 
EARNINGS ON EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIENCE 2 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Secondary School Graduates 
Both Sexes Males 
Constant 9.969 10.090 
(.010), (.014) 
NEXP .047 .041 
( .001) ( .002) 
NEXp2 .0005 .0004 
Females 
9.987 
(.013) 
.043 
(.002) 
.0004 
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(.00004) ( .00005) ( .00009) 
No. of 
Observations 
.627 
3326 
University Graduates 
Both Sexes 
Constant 10.084 
(.014) 
NEXP .057 
(.002 ) 
NEXp2 .0008 
C·00006) 
R2 
.677 
No. of observations 1229 
.559 .660 
2250 1076 
Males Females 
10.182 10.012 
(.018) (.024) 
.050 .051 
(.002 ) ( .006) 
.0006 .0007 
(.00007) (.0002) 
.624 .553 
957 272 
Notes: All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
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underestimate the returns to higher education since a 
married man with two children receives roughly 20% more 
than an unmarried man. In the calculation of rates of 
return, therefore, standardization for marital status has 
been undertaken. 
Having done that, we repeat the exercise for the 
Civil Service. 
(4) Earnings Function Analysis in the Civil Service 
Sector of Greece 
This study is based on a sample of 2011 civil 
servants drawn from five ministries in the Athens area ln 
1977. 1 
The only earnings data available were basic salary, 
gross salary and net salary (net = gross - tax - employees' 
contributions to various funds). These data did not contain 
fringe benefits and cannot distinguish between the various 
allowances/like premiums for holding university degrees, familyall-
owances, etc. But in contrast to the banking sector, the 
data on educational qualifications are richer,since they 
distinguish between different special subjects of study in 
1. These data formed part of a larger set of data used 
by G. Psachar&poulos and A. Kazamias in a research 
project sponsored by the Ministry of Education. I 
am indebted to G. Psacharopoulos,on whose recommendation 
the Ministry of Education gave me its permission to use 
the data. 
93 
university education and they also distinguish between 
different sorts of postgraduate education like Diplomas, 
M.A. 's or Ph.D. 'so 
Table 11 presents the regressionl results with 
education in continuous and dummy form; variables are 
defined in Table lla. In regression l,monthly gross salary 
is regressed on sex, education (in continuous form), 
experience and experience 2 . In regression 2,monthly gross 
salary is regressed on the same variables but with educ-
ation in dummy form. A university Arts degree (includes 
all social sciences like law, economics, politics, etc.) 
is associated with an extra (5956 - 2865) = 2091 Dr. over 
a secondary school degree. An engineering degree from 
Athens Polytechnic (5 years of study) is associated with 
an extra (13026 - 5956) = 7070 Dr. over an Arts degree. 
An M.A. or Diploma halder gets (7294 - 5956) = 1338 Dr. more 
than an Arts degree holder. A Ph.D. holder receives on 
average (23466 - 7294) = 16172 Dr. more than a M.A. or 
Diploma holder and 17510 Dr. more than an Arts degree holder. 
Equation 3 regresses log monthly salaries on the same variables 
with education in continuous form while Equation 4 regresses 
1. In all regressions in-firm experience is used as a 
proxy for total experience in preference to age. 95% 
of the Civil Servants in the sample entered the Service 
under 30 years of age and it is reasonable to assume 
that in-firm experience is the only form of experience 
that matters. This remark holds for the banking 
sector as well. 
TABLE 11 
GREEK CIVIL SERVANTS 
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REGRESSION RESULTS OF EARNINGS EQUATION IN WHICH THE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS, MONTHLY AND LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Y Y log Y log Y 
Constant 4194 2525 8.612 8.469 
(305) (342) ( .020) (.021) 
EDUC 137 .010 
(12) (.0008 ) 
NEXP 374 346 .050 .047 
(31) (26) (.002) ( . 001) 
NEXp2 L * I. ~ - .0005 - .0005 
( .8) ( .c,·fl) (.00005) (.00004) 
SEX 1548 1018 .095 .062 
(151) (133) (.010) ( .008) 
EDUC 1 1982 .114 
(447) (.028) 
EDUC 2 2865 .241 
(292) (.018) 
EDUC 3 5956 .463 
(287) (.018) 
EDUC 4 13026 .944 
(985) (.063) 
EDUC 5 - 2139** .246 
(984) (.062) 
EDUC 6 7294 .520 
(745) ( . 047) 
EDUC 7 23466 1.015 
(2516) (.160) 
EDUC 8 2265** .206 
(924) (.059) 
R2 
.662 .775 .701 .818 
Notes: Number of observations - 1712 
* Coefficient insignificant at both 1% and 5% level 
** Coefficient significant at 5% but not at 1% level 
EDUC = 
NEXP = 
NEXp2 = 
SEX = 
EDUC 1 = 
EDUC 2 = 
EDUC 3 = 
EDUC 4 = 
EDUC 5 = 
EDUC 6 = 
EDUC 7 = 
TABLE lla 
GREEK CIVIL SERVANTS 
Variable Definitions --
years of schooling completed 
years of work experience 
square of previous variable 
1 if male, 0 if female 
1 if three years of secondary education 
zero otherwise 
1 if secondary school graduate 
zero otherwise 
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1 if social science or arts university graduate 
zero otherwise 
1 if engineering gr~duate 
zero otherwise 
1 if holder of technical school certificate 
zero otherwise 
1 if Diploma or MA holder 
zero otherwise 
1 if Ph.D holder, 
zero otherwise 
EDUC 8 = 1 if classified as student 
zero otherwise 
Pri~ary school completers are the excluded category. 
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log monthly salaries on the same variables again but with 
education in dummy form. Being male rather than female 
is associated with 6.2% more pay. As noted before, this 
is hardly surprising since women tend to do less overtime 
than men and they are not as easily promoted to the higher 
grades of the service which are traditionally male 
dominated. Turning to the educational dummies we see that 
completion of three years of secondary school is associated 
with 11% more salary than primary school completion, every-
thing else being the same. An arts degree holder is getting 
22% more than a secondary graduate. An engineering degree 
is associated with (.944 - .463) = 48% more salary over an 
arts degree. A Ph.D. holder is getting 101% more salary 
than a primary graduate, 76% more than a secondary graduate, 
and 54% more than an arts graduate if/again/all other 
variables are held constant. 
The above results point to extremely high rates 
of return to Ph.D. and engineering degrees. They should be 
interpreted though with caution since the number of cases 
possessing engineering degrees or Ph.D. 's is less than 15. 
Therefore, in the private rate of return results in the 
next section, the rate of return to an arts higher education 
is calculated as compared with secondary education. These 
two educational categories comprise more than 1600 out of 
1712 total number of cases. 
As in the case of the banking sector, the rates of 
return are calculated from regression adjusted experlence -
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earnings profiles, i.e. by fitting a regression of the 
form log Y = a + b NEXP + NEXp2 for each of the two educ-
ational categories which is effectively smoothing out the 
crude experience-earnings profiles. The results appear in 
Table 12 and the plot of the crude and regression adjusted 
profiles in Graph 3. 
(5) Private Rates of Return to University Education in 
the Greek Banking Sector and the Civil Service. 
The Case of Infinite Rates of Return to a First and 
a Second First Degree 
Tables 13 and 14 present the private rates of 
return to university education for the Banking and the 
Civil Service sector of Greece respectively. The only 
pecuniary costs included in the calculations are the four 
full years of forgone earnings whilst at university, since 
tuition fees have been abolished since 1964 and books and 
notes are publicly provided. 
The results, rates of return of 1.5% for males 
and 0% for females in the Banking Sector and 6% and 4.5% 
respectively in the Civil Service, seem unable to explai~ 
at first sight, the well established phenomenon of the 
"overeducated" Greek. These rates of return, however, 
should be interpreted as minimum rates of return. As will 
be explained below, some peculiar characteristics of the 
Greek educational system and of government pay legislation 
allow for the realization of even infinite rates of return 
TABLE 12 
CIVIL SERVANTS 
REGRESSION OF MONTHLY LOG AFTER TAX EARNINGS ON 
EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIENCE 2 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Secondary School Graduates 
Males Females 
Constant 8.722 2.655 
(.034 ) (.020) 
NEXP .058 .057 
(.004 ) ( .002) 
NEXp2 
.0008 .0007 
(.0001) ( .00007) 
R2 
.704 .789 
No. of Observations 299 489 
University Graduates 
Males Females 
Constant 9.059 8.985 
(.029) (.019) 
NEXP .035 .038 
(.003) ( .002) 
NEXp2 
.00009* .0002 
(.00007) ( .00007) 
R2 
.754 .897 
No. of Observations 530 223 
Notes: * Coefficient insignificant at both the 5% 
and 1% level. 
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TABLE 13 
PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN I TO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 
(MARRIED BANK EMPLOYEES) 
Notes: 
Private Rates of Return 
Both Sexes 
Males 
Females (a) 
Females (b) 
.ml 
.015 
.000 
- .025 
(i) The only costs assumed in the calculation 
of rates of return are four years of forgone 
earnings. 
(ii) There is a compulsory retirement age of 65 
for males and 60 for females in the Banking 
Sector. .Therefore,male secondary completers 
are assumed to stay in the labour force for 
44 years and university graduates 40 years. 
Females have the option of earlier retirement 
and,therefore,two rates of return are being 
calculated, (a) assuming 41 and 37 years of 
service for secondary completers and graduates 
respectively and (b) assuming 30 and 26 years. 
1. I am indebted to G. Psacharopoulos for kindly 
providing the Fortran program which made the cal-
culation of the above rates of return possible. 
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TABLE 14 
PRIVATE RATES OF RETURN TO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 
IN THE GREEK CIVIL SERVICE 
Notes: 
Private Rates of Return 
Both Sexes 0.065 
0.060 Males 
Females (1) 
Females (2) 
0.045 
0.000 
(i) The only costs assumed in the calculation of 
rates of return are four years of forgone 
earnings. 
(ii) There is a compulsory retirement age of 65 
for males and 60 for females in the Civil 
Service. Therefore male secondary comp1eters , 
are assumed to stay in the labour force for 
44 years and university graduates 40 years. 
Females have the option of earlier retirement 
and)therefore,two rates of return are being 
calculated, (a) assuming 41 and 37 years of 
service for secondary completers and graduates 
respectively and (b) assuming 30 and 26 years. 
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to higher education. 
The Greek higher educational system displays some 
unique features: 
(a) It does not impose any time limit upon the 
completion of a university degree; 
(b) there is no compulsory attendance at lectures 
or classes; 
(c) even if the student fails one or more subjects 
in the June examination, he has another two 
examination periods to put things right. 
The conditions mentioned above, permit a person, 
no matter whether he attends lectures or passes examinations, 
to register as a student for the rest of his life. More-
over, pay legislation in both the Civil Service and the 
Banking Sector provide a premium for holding a university 
degree, no matter when it is obtained. 
The facts mentioned above render the following 
sequence of events perfectly possible: a person after 
graduating from secondary school passes the entrance exam-
inations for Greek Universities and soon afterwards finds 
a job in the Civil Service. After a period of time, no 
matter whether short or long, he manages to receive his 
degree and automatically qualifies for the premium granted 
to all degree holders. 
In such a hypothetical case, it lS evident that 
the individual forgoes zero earnings whilst he is regis-
tered as a student and hence the rate of return to his 
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educational investment is almost infinite. It is almost, and not 
precisely infinite/since the person incurs direct monetary and 
psychic costs to pass the university entrance examination. 
Direct monetary costs consist of fees paid to the so-called 
Frontisteria, or crammers, which undertake to prepare the students 
f h .. 1 or t e entry exam1nat1ons. 
Although the assumption of zero foregone earnings is, 
admittedly, an extreme (albeit realistic) possibility, it serves 
to highlight the fact, . usually neglected in the literature, 
that rates of return are extremely sensitive to the number of 
years of forgone earnings/as well as to the magnitude of these 
earnings. In the Greek public sector, state legislation allows 
the number of years of forgone earnings to range between zero 
and four. (Four years is the length of the university courses). 
Since, in effect it allows people to choose rates of return ran-
ging from zero (or even negative value~to infinity, it becomes 
obvious that people would try to realise a value closer to the 
latter than to the former. Table l4a presents rates of return 
to university education in the Banking and Civil Service Sector 
of Greece, under different assumptions about the years of forgone 
earnings (which can range from 0-4). It can be seen that by 
assuming one year of forgone earnings in the discounting process> 
rates of return double as compared with those assuming four 
years of forgone earnings. 
But let us now turn to some evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that private rates of return are much larger than the 
calculation assuming four years of forgone earnings would suggest. 
1. More than 100,000 secondary school students are attending 
these privately owned frontisteria in Athens alone, in 
their frantic scramble for access to higher education. 
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TABLE l4a 
RATES OF RETURN TO UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE 
AND BANKING SECTOR OF GREECE UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT YEARS OF FORGONE EARNINGS 
Civil Service Banking Sector 
Years of Years of 
Forgone Rate of Foregone Rate of 
Earnings Return Earnings Return 
1 0.115 1 0.155 
2 0.085 2 0.11 
3 0.07 3 0.09 
4 0.06 4 0.075 
Notes: (a) The Rates of Return to the Civil Service are 
calculated for males only. 
(b) The Rates of Return to the Banking Sector are 
calculated using the Internal Basic Salary Pay 
Structure that appears in Appendix II. 
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An obvious way to test the hypothesis that the 
length of the university course differs from the number of 
years of forgone earnings is to check how many people 
received their degrees whilst working or,alternatively, to 
look at the proportion of employees classified as students. 
Running a frequency distribution on the educational qual-
ifications variable, 1025/out of the total 9405 bank 
employees,were found to be classified as students.Looking at the 
age distribution of these employees, 70% of them were less 
than 30 years old, which, in turn, implied that they stand 
a good chance of receiving the university degree during 
their working life. Some additional evidence supporting 
the inequality of years of forgone earnings and years of 
study was provided by the results of a questionnaire 
survey distributed to all candidates of the big Pan-Hellenic 
examination of the 11.12.77 for entry in the National Bank 
1 
of Greece. Out of 8919 candidates, 2397, or 36%, were 
classified as students. The evidence once again showed 
that people are perfectly aware of the ways by which they 
can realise large returns to their educational investments. 
Another extraordinary feature that the data for 
the Greek Civil Service revealed was that almost 8% of the 
university degree holders possessed not only one but two 
first degrees. 2 Three things become immediately apparent: 
1. I am indebted to the Personnel Department of the National 
Bank of Greece for providing the detailed questionnaire 
results. 
2. Some additional scandalous legislation allows the holder 
of a first degree to register automatically to the third 
year of another degree. (Having a degree in Law, for 
example, allows you to register as a third year student 
in Economics.) 
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(a) the holder of a second first degree registered 
for and was awarded this degree during his 
working life. 
(b) The second degree is sought because it increases 
the chances of fast promotion and hence entails 
higher earnings. 
(c) If, on average, holders of two first degrees are 
promoted more quickly in the grade and salary 
scales than holders of one first degree, then the 
average private rate of return of holding a second 
first degree (compared with holding only one) 
becomes infinite. 
Enough has been said to demonstrate the fact that 
institutional forces may well have resulted in large 
private rates of return to university education in the 
public sector. These high private rates of return will 
undoubtedly result in 
(a) a growing social demand for a further expansion 
of places in the Greek higher educational system; 
(b) a growing political demand for an increase in 
public sector jobs; 
(c) since most public sector jobs are located in 
the capital of Greece, continuing rural-urban 
migration flows are to be expected. 
High rates of return to university education In the public 
sector coupled with the clientelistic nature of politics 
especially prevalent in the countryside, may well have 
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contributed to the fact that more than 40% of the Greek popula-
tion lives -in the Athens area alone. l 
Additionally, another important observation has to be made. Even 
if earnings of degree holders in the private sector are much 
higher than those in the public sector, rates of return calcula-
ted separately for the private sector will not necessarily exceed 
those in the public sector since an employee of a private company 
has no incentive to receive his degree whilst working since doing 
so will not guarantee him higher pay. Rates of return to higher 
education in the private sector, may well be lower than rates in 
the public sector and hence the signals that these two sectors 
produce might be at odds with each other. 2 
Finally the incidence of large private rates of return to 
university education and the implied divergence between private 
and social rates, raises serious doubts about the practical use-
fulness of the social rate of return as a social investment cri-
terion. The supply of education by de~ocratically elected 
governments varies directly with the private returns and hence 
social returns cease to have any practical significance in 
educational planning. 
(6) Policy Implications 
If the OEeD forecast, for Greece, that by 1985 94% 
of the relevant age group will be enrolled in institutions 
1. Another related point, usually neglected, is that the 1976 
Educational Act which raised the school leaving age to 15, 
implies at the same time a loss of income for the poorer 
farmer families (with small landholdings), who profited until 
now from their adolescent children's labour in the fields. 
This is turn may well reinforce the rural-urban migration 
flows and exacerbate the population congestion in the urban 
centres. An educational reform, therefore, however equitable it 
may appear, may well have other undesirable social consequences 
2. It is interesting to note that Leibenstein, op.cit., also re-
cognised the fact that rates of return in the public sector may 
well be higher than those in the private sector. 
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of higher education, proves correct, one has (albeit 
regrettably) to accept that this phenomenon will be accom-
panied by considerable "educated" unemployment unless the 
over-inflated public sector grows to meet the increased 
supply. 
I rather doubt that the social benefits of a 
highly educated population will outweigh the problems and 
social unrest that even a transitory cohort of unemployed 
intelligentsia can create. What then can public policy do 
to avoid such a potentially dangerous situation? The 
answer is clear-cut. Policies to reduce the private present 
value of investing in higher education must be undertaken. 
Private returns to investing in education depend on the 
earnings and unemployment probabilities of educated workers 
relative to the uneducated and on the private costs of 
acquiring an education. This points to the areas where 
leverage might be exerted: 
(a) pecuniary benefits associated with university 
education can be reduced in the public sector 
(including the nationalised Banking Sector); 
(b) students can be charged the full cost or part 
of the cost of their education. 
More concretely, the following measures are proposed: 
(i) Make attendance at lectures and other classes 
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compulsory. 
(ii) Abolish the legislation which allows degree 
holders to transfer and register to the third 
year of an alternative degree. 
(iii) Reduce the premium associated with a first 
degree in the Civil Service and the Banking 
sector respectively; the productivity in the 
public sector is so low, that this measure is 
unlikely to result in any further loss in prod-
uctivity. 
(iv) Charge the full or part of the costs of a univ-
ersity education. To take account of equity 
considerations, however, this proposal should be 
complemented by 
(a) an income contingent loans scheme at subsid-
ized rates of interest, extending to a minimum of 
25 years or a graduate tax, whereby graduates 
whose income falls below a minimum level are 
automatically excused repayment of the loan; 
(b) a grants system and/or further tax relief 
to the families with children in the last few years 
of secondary education and with income under a 
certain threshold. As mentioned before, attendance 
at the privately owned frontisteria is an almost 
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necessary precondition for passing the entrance 
examinations for Greek Universities. Consequently, 
if educational planners are interested in equal-
izing access to education they should provide 
direct or indirect help to low-income families 
in the last few years of secondary education. l 
(v) Since the official exchange rate is artificially 
kept undervalued by the Greek monetary authorities, 
students studying abroad should buy foreign 
exchange at its higher, real (shadow) price. 
Proposals (i) and (ii) will exclude the possib-
ility of infinite private returns to higher education, since 
working and studying will no longer be compatible. Prop-
osal (iii) will affect the pecuniary benefits associated 
with university education and hence will act to reduce the 
rates of return. Proposals (iv) and (v) will undoubtedly 
increase the cost of acquiring higher education and hence 
diminish the pay-off of the educational investment. People 
should come to realise that education is not a free, cost-
less public good and that government allocations to higher 
1. Similar propositions can be found in M. Blaug and M. 
Woodhall,,"Patterns of Subsidies to Higher Education in 
Europe", Higher Education, November, 1978, pp. 331-361; 
and in D.M. Windham, "Economic Analysis and the Public 
Support of Higher Education: The Divergence of Theory 
and Policy" in D.M. Windham (ed.), Economic Dimensions 
of Education. Washington: Report of a Committee to 
the National Academy of Education, 1979. 
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education may well be used more efficiently elsewhere., 
None of the proposals would be easy to implement, 
given the political power of the groups)whose interests 
would be adversely affected. But when one considers the 
disastrous effect on the economic and social development 
of a country, of continuing to spend scarce public funds to 
produce a well educated and unemployed population, while 
many other pressing social needs remain unsatisfied, there 
is cause for concern. 
(7) Conclusion 
Calculation of the private rate of return to 
university education for the Banking and Civil Service 
sectors of Greece showed that depending on the assumptions 
made about foreign earnings, the rate of return can range 
between zero and infinity. 
The absence of any time limit upon the completion 
of higher degrees, the optional attendance at lectures and 
classes/and the rigid premium associated with degree 
holding enables employees in the Greek Public Sector to 
complete their university studies whilst working, thus 
, 
reaping large returns to their educational investment. 
Large rates of return in the Public Sector in 
turn will strengthen the social pressures for further 
expansion of the higher educational 3ystem, will strengthen 
the demand for Public Se~tor job creation and will encourage 
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ever growing numbers of people to migrate to the urban 
centres. All the above will cause continuous headaches to 
the ruling politicians, but should come as no big surprise. 
It is very common that pay legislation which assured them 
of election victory will eventually ensure their downfall. 
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APPENDIX I 
The classical linear regression model is capable 
of generating spuriously high R's and low standard errors 
when the error terms of the equation are 
(1) not distributed with zero mean and constant 
unknown variance; 
(2) they are not distributed independently of each 
other and independently of the explanatory 
variables. 
Especially the presence of heteroscedasticity (i.e. varCu) 
f constant) is a common feature of most cross-section 
data. 
I checked the standard assumptions of (1) homo-
scedasticity and (2) independence/by plotting the residual 
values of the dependent variable Y against the predicted 
values of Y for regressions 2 and 4,that appeared in Table 
9 and for regression 2)that appeared in Table 11. The plot, 
portrayed in Graphs 4, 5 and 6 respectively, yields a 
spherical, symmetrical pattern of residuals, thus vindicating 
the use of least squares. 
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APPENDIX II 
Internal Wage Structure (National Bank of Greece) 
(1978) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years Grade Basic Salary Years Additional % Basic 
(Dr) increase to Salary -
Basic Salary (Total) 
0 I 7230 0 46% 10556 
2 56% 11279 
4 65% 11930 
6 74% 12580 
9 83% 13231 
12 85% 13376 
2 II 8000 2 45% 11600 
4 55% 12400 
6 69% 13520 
8 74% 13920 
10 83% 14640 
12 85% 14800 
6 III 9070 6 50% 13605 
8 56% 14149 
10 66% 15056 
12 76% 15963 
14 84% 16689 
16 85% 16780 
10 IV 10020 10 56% 15631 
12 63% 16333 
14 72% 17234 
16 78% 17836 
18 85% 18537 
15 V 12560 15 50% 18840 
17 56% 19594 
20 66% 20850 
23 77% 22231 
26 80% 22608 
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Appendix II continued 
(1) 
Years 
18 
21 
24 
27 
30 
33 
Notes: 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grade Basic Salary Years Additional % Basic 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
(Dr) increase to Salary -
Basic Salary (Total) 
12990 18 50% 19485 
20 61% 20914 
23 70% 22083 
26 75% 22733 
29 80% 23382 
14110 21 48% 20883 
23 65% 23282 
26 73% 24410 
29 80% 25398 
15740 24 49% 23453 
26 54% 24240 
29 68% 26443 
32 80% 28332 
16690 27 51% 25202 
29 67% 27872 
32 80% 30042 
18450 30 80% 33210 
27370 33 80% 49266 
(a) There are 11 grades in the Bank (Column (2)). 
(b) Column (1) refers to the minimum number of 
years of in-firm experience necessary for 
promotion to the relevant grade (e.g. to get 
promoted to Grade III, someone needs at least 
six years of previous experience in Grades I 
and II). 
(c) Column (3) refers to the basic salary for 
every Grade. 
Cd) Column (4) refers to the number of years one 
can stay in a particular Grade and column (5) 
refers to the percentage increase to the basic 
salary according to years of experience. 
Column (6) comprises the total sum of basic 
salary plus the additional percentage increase 
to basic salary. 
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In most cases, a person at a higher grade receives 
more basic salary than someone at a lower grade, but with 
the same number of years of experience. Reading the table 
through, surprisingly enough, one can find two exceptions. 
An employee at Grade V with 23 years of experience receives 
22231 Dr., whilst someone at Grade VI with the same number 
of years of experience receives 22083. A similar finding 
applies to Grades VII and VIII with 26 years of previous 
experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ON INTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS 
The object of this qhapter is to analyse, discuss 
and elucidate the concept of the "internal labour market" 
(ILM. ) . 
Section (1) discusses the work of C. Kerr and 
J. Dunlop who provided the first insights on the ILM con-
cept. Section (2) critically assesses the work of P. 
Doeringer and M. Piore with which the ILM concept is usually , 
associated and tries to clarify the difference between 
J 
that theory and neoclassical economics. Section (3) 
establishes some criteria that can be used to test for the 
presence of ILMs. Section (4) provides some evidence on 
the existence of ILMs in a particular job cluster of the 
Greek Labour Market, using a four company sample. Section 
(5) discusses the relationship between ILMs and the Job 
Competition or Bumping Models developed by L. Thurow and 
G. Fields respectively. Section (6) discusses the implicat-
ion of these models with respect to educational demand. 
Section (7) presents the conclusions. 
(1) Labour Market Analysis and the Institutionalists of 
the '40s and '50s. 
There is a long standing fundamental dispute 
among the proponents of labour market analysis. The 
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problem is to determine the relative importance of "market 
forces" (notably maximization of gain by individual buyers 
and sellers exposed to competitive conditions and confronted 
by costs of information) and "institutional influences" 
(usually either behaviour not consistent with optimal 
exploitation of opportunities for gain or group behaviour 
designed to provide the members with some insulation from 
the forces of competition). 
The positions of the various parties to the 
debate might be described by paraphrasing James Tobin's 
famous statement about a similar debate over the import-
ance of money supply: Market forces do not count; market 
forces do too count; market forces count for everything. 
The first position has been attributed to J.R. Commons 1 
and most of the older institutionalists before and after 
the First World War; the third to Milton Friedman and 
many newer neoclassicists after the Second World War. The 
second position was originally espoused by the older 
neoclassicists like Henry C. Simons and later by newer 
institutionalists like Slichter, Kerr and Dunlop. Their 
position is most lucidly displayed in Clark Kerr's seminal 
essay on the "Balkanization of the Labour Markets".2 
According to Kerr, labour markets are divided into two 
broad types: (1) the structureless (classical, open) in 
,; 
which (a) there are no unions with seniority and other 
1. J.R. Commons, Institutional Economics. ~ladison: Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1934. 
2. C. Kerr, "The Balkanisation of the Labour Markets" in 
E. Wight Bakke et al., Labour Mobility and Economic 
Opportunity. Cambridge: Technology Press, 1954. 
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rules, (b) the relation between the employer and the emp-
loyee is a transitory, impersonal one, (c) the workers are 
unskilled, (d) payment is made by unit of product and (e) 
little capital or machinery is employed. "The only nexus", 
says Kerr, between an employer and an employee, "is cash".l 
(2) the structured (closed, internal); although Kerr admits 
that structure is introduced into labour markets even 
without institutional rules (he cites the influence of the 
specificity of skills and the money costs of physical 
transfer) he strongly believes that institutional rules 
put added structure into labour markets. 
Kerr writes: 
Institutional labour markets create truly 
non-competing groups. Markets are more 
specifically delimited, and entrance into 
them, movement within them, and exit from them 
are more precisely defined ..... The 
institutionalization of labour markets is one 
aspect of the general trend from the atom-
istic to the pluralistic and from the largely 
open to the partially closed society. 2 
According to Keer, internal (structured markets) 
are classified into two types, (a) guild and (b) manorial. 
Guild type markets are stratified horizontally. Guild 
systems tend to predominate in skilled crafts that are 
highly unionized. Workers remain within an industry or 
craft, but move freely from firm to firm so long as they 
have the proper credentials. Admission of outsiders into 
1. Kerr, op. cit., p. 95. 
2. Kerr, op. cit., p. 96. 
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the guild system is often closely controlled through 
training and other requirements, thus preserving the dom-
ain of those inside the guild. 
Manorial markets emphasize attachment to the 
place of work and vertical stratification. Ports of entry 
are few and usually confined to the lower job classific-
ation. Movements take place vertically along the job 
ladder and seniority governs layoffs and other movements 
within and outside the system. 
It is interesting to note that Kerr was careful 
to acknowledge the important impact of external market 
forces on manorial structures in a previous essay (with 
L. Fisher), "The Effect of Environment and Administration 
on Job Evaluation".l 
During the same period that C. Kerr was writing 
on "manorial ll structures, John Dunlop developed the rel-
ated concept of the "job cluster:!. Dunlop has defined a 
job cluster in the following terms: 
It is a stable group of job classifications 
or work assignments within a firm (wage 
determining unit) which are so linked together 
(a) by technology, (b) by the administrative 
organisation of the productive process, 
including policies of transfer and promotion 
or (c) by social custom that they have common 
wage-making characteristics 2 
One can easily see the link between the two 
concepts. Different manorial structures can be attached 
1. InJ.T.Dun1op (ed.), The Theory of Wage Determination. 
London: Macmillan, 1957. 
2. John T. Dunlop, "The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory", 
in J.T. Dunlop (ed.), The Theory of Wage Determination. 
London: Macmillan, 1957. 
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to different job clusters with a one to one correspondence. 
As will be seen in the next section, the writings of Kerr 
and Dunlop on manorial structures and job clusters heavily 
influenced P. Doeringer and M. Piore when they developed 
the concept of the "internal labour market". 
(2) P. Doeringer and M. Piore and the Internal Labour Market 
Concept 
The "internal labour market" CILM 1 concept 1S 
usually associated with the names of P. Doeringer and M. 
Piore, who developed the theory of ILMs in their book 
Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis. In the 
first place, it seems rather odd that they decidedto call 
a market "an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing 
plant, within which the pricing and allocation of labour 
is governed by a set of administrative rules and proced-
ures".l 
The term hierarchical structures (since a lot 
of emphasis is placed on seniority) or hierarchical job 
clusters- (since these hierarchical structures are associated 
with specific groupings of jobs within which an employee 
1S customarily upgraded, downgraded or laid off) seems to 
me a more appropriate phraseology. But since the ILM 
terminology is well established in labour market literature, 
1. P. Doeringer and M. Piore, Internal Labour Markets and 
Manpower Analysis. Lexington: Heath, 1971, pp. 1-2. 
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I will keep on using it for the rest of the analysis. 
(a) The Origins of the ILMs 
The conceptual theoretical portion of the book, 
which develops the ILM concept} synthesizes the institutional 
insights provided by Clark Kerr (with respect to manorial 
structures) with human capital investment theory. 
Major stress is laid on (a) enterprise specific 
skills l and (b) employer investment in on-the-job training 
as cogenerators of the internal labour market. Tech-
nology is implicitly responsible for "enterprise specific 
skills"] which can be most efficiently acquired by on-the-
job training. Since the firm's investment in the employee 
has a better chance of being amortized the longer the 
employee stays with the firm, the employer has every incent-
ive to stabilize employment and reduce turnover so that he 
can reap the benefits of his investment in on-the-job 
training. In other words, labour is considered to be a 
quasi-fixed factor of productio~ since, besides the wage 
1. An enterprise specific skill is defined as a skill 
unique to a single job classification in a single 
enterprise, in contrast to a general skill/which is 
requisite for every job in every enterprise (Doeringer 
and Piore, ov. cit., p. 14) .The existence of skills useful to 
only one employer 1S a fuzzy concept. Doeringer and Piore try 
to clarify it by such notions as having experience 
with the idiosyncracies of the machinery in a particular 
plant or the experience acquired by a team of workers 
who become more productive as they work together over 
time. 
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costs, there are fixed costs of hiring and training. 1 
Up to this point, there is nothing new to dis-
tinguish Doeringer and Piore's analysis from human capital 
theory. Their argument is simple. The existence of enter-
prise specific skills makes on-the-job training the most 
efficient way of acquiring these skills. Stability of 
employment and reduction of turnover becomes then a desir-
able characteristic of personnel policies to enable emp1oy-
ers recoup the costs of their investment in training. 
Added to their skilled based theory of ILM is a 
non-economic concept: Custom. 
Custom or customary law is the natural 
outgrowth of the psychological behaviour 
of stable groups. When stability of emp-
loyment is encouraged a work group will begin 
to develop customs based upon precedent and 
repeated practice. As work rules become 
customary through repetition at the work place, 
they come to acquire an ethical or quasi-ethical 
status within the work group. Even when work 
rules may have initially reflected economic 
forces, custom imparts a rigidity to the rules 
and makes them difficult to change in response 
to dynamic economic forces. Custom seems to 
form more strongly around wage relationships 
and internal allocation procedures ... and is 
an important influence in the maintenance of 
ILM over time. 2 
According to Doeringer and Piore, therefore, custom seems to 
reinforce the permanent employment relationship which was ne-
cessitated by specific skills and on-the-job training in the 
first place. 
1. This argument was first expounded by W. Oi, "Labour 
as a Quasi-Fixed Factor", Journal of Political Economy, 
December, 1962, pp. 538-555. 
2. Doeringer and Piore, Ope cit., pp. 39-40. 
127 
The technology based creation of ILMs and the 
resulting dual labour market model (consisting of the 
primary segment (with ILMs) and the secondary with low 
paying and unstable jobs) that Doeringer and Piore proposed 
represent only one variant of segmentation theories. 
A more radical (Marxist) position can be found 
in the writings of Gordon, Reich, Edwards, Carnoy and 
Carter. l They argue that the labour market segments are 
not necessitated by technology - they function 'as an 
efficient means of labour surplus extraction by the cap-
italist class. Segments, in effect, are a device concocted 
by the capitalists to divide the labour force since each 
I 
segment is primarily concerned with preserving or expanding 
its share of labour income and is less concerned with the 
overall share of labour in the national product. 
Moreover,radical segmentation theorists argue 
that the human capital prescriptions to alleviate poverty 
and equalizing the income distribution by changing the 
educational (or training) characteristics of the labour 
force are bound to fail. Inequality will not be reduced 
unless more jobs are created in the primary segment, an 
event unlikely to occur under the capitalist form of 
1. For a good exposition of segmentation theories see 
M. Carnoy, "On Segmented Labour Markets", in Education 
Work and Employment. UNESCO, IIEP, 1980. 
For a neoclassical critique of segmentation see G.G. 
Cain, "The Challenge of Segmented Labour Market Theories 
to Orthodox Theory", Journal of Economic Literature, 
December, 1976, pp. 1215-57. 
d . 1 pro uctlon. 
(b) A Critique 
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An analysis of the origins and functions of the 
ILMsthat relies on a specific human capital approach 
(embellished with the non-economic concept of custom) tends 
/ 
to raise many logical and historical questions. Moreover, 
it overlooks some other factors responsible for the growth 
and maintenance of ILM structures. 
(i) Historical problems. If it could be shown 
at some point in the past that the skills required by 
1. It is noteworthy that the segmentation theorists' 
prediction of the ineffectiveness of human capital 
variables in reducing the inequality of income, rests 
on the assumption of ever-growing numbers of people 
queuing up for "secondary" jobs. Under a static or 
even moderate growth of the labour force assumption, 
a change in the distribution of personal (human capital) 
characteristics may well have equalizing income effects. 
Suppose, for example, that after a substantial expan-
sion of the education system, the inequality in the 
distribution of education has been greatly reduced. 
This will undoubtedly affect the occupational choice 
of people and result in growing numbers queuing up for 
good, "primary", jobs. This will tend to reduce the 
wages in the primary segment, while, at the same time, 
it will relieve the supply pressures in the "secondary" 
market and eventually raise the wage levels in that 
segment. 
Thus, even if we accept the existence of segments in 
the labour market, human capital variables may indeed 
improve the distribution of income, provided, of course, 
that (a) there are no floods of poor immigrants queuing 
up in the "secondary" market and (b) popUlation grows 
at moderate rates. 
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manufacturing became more enterprise specific (presumably 
as a result of a change in techno1ogy)( then a sufficient 
condition for the appearance of ILMs would be established. 
However, it is not at all certain that machinery or tech-
nology were becoming more enterprise specific at the time 
of the formation of the ILMs in the industrialized world. 
It is true that mass production industry was developed 
1n the early part of this century, which may have led 
to enterprise-specific technologies, as firms found it 
necessary to begin research departments and instal their 
own (or licensed import) machinery. At the very same time 
as these developments were occurring, however, capital 
goods industries were emerging and firms could purchase 
identical machinery from national or international vendors 
instead of having to craft their own as in the nineteenth 
century. There is reason to believe that this earlier 
lack of standardization across plants which characterised 
the nineteenth century led to enterprise-specific technol-
og1es as significant as those Doeringer and Piore have in 
mind. The growth of capital goods industries and the 
resultant use of standardized equipment underscores the 
importance of enterprise-specific skills in twentieth 
century manufacturing industry. 
(ii) Logical problems. Setting aside the 
historical perspectives, the basic problem with the 
specific human capital approach to the ILMs is the para-
doxical focus on training and skill as co-generators of 
the internal labour market. Right from the beginning 
of their book, Doeringer and Piore distinguish not only 
I between specific and general skills but between specific 
and general jobs and specific and general technology. 
Specific technology is assumed to give rise to enterprise 
specific skills which are contained in enterprise specific 
jobs. (A completely specific job is one which utilises 
only specific skills, in contrast to a completely general 
job all of whose skills are general). The first thing 
that comes to mind is to question the assumption that a 
change of technology gives rise to enterprise specific 
skills. Doeringer and Piore defend this assumption by 
the following argument: 
A general principle appears to govern many 
technologies: the greater the variety of 
tasks a machine is built to perform, the 
less efficient it tends to be in the perf-
ormance in anyone of them. Since production 
departments are under continued pressure to 
1. The terms "specific" and "general" have been borrowed 
from G.S. Becker who used them to describe two types 
of training. A discussion of training especially in 
the context of ILMs can be found in the next section. 
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minimize costs, the operation of this 
principle results in the tendency for 
technology to become increasingly enter-
prise specific over time. 1 
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It is rather surprising, however, that immediately 
afterwards, they concede that: 
Countervailing pressure against specificity 
is generated by the savings in fixed capital 
costs and fixed labour costs associated with 
standardized equipment which can utilise 
widely available skills. Economies of scale 
in production generally make standardized 
equipment cheaper than custom-made machinery. 
The availability of standardized parts reduces 
repair and maintenance costs and the need for 
spare parts inventories. 2 
According to Doeringer and Piore,however, the 
strength of the first argument 3 seems to outweigh the 
importance of the second. 
My impression is that technology· mayor may not 
lead to enterprise-specific skills, depending on the part-
icular industry in question. In the automobile industry, 
for example, the introduction of automated equipment has 
de-emphasized skills on a widespread scale. Even if 
enterprise-specific skills were required under the new 
technology, (a) it is dubious whether the time involved 
in learning these skills, viewed by the employer as a cost, 
1. Doeringer and Piore, Ope cit., pp. 16-17. 
2. Doeringer and Piore, Ope cit., p. 17. 
3. I am sure that many critics would also question the 
validity of the first argument. Is it necessarily 
true that the wider the applicability of a machine, 
the lower its efficiency in performing any given set 
of tasks ? 
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could have justified the much larger sunk costs entailed 
by the establishment of internal labour markets; (b) one 
would expect that job design would lead to reduced emphasis on 
enterprise-specific skills. A technology based on the inter-
changeability of workers cannot at the same time make them 
more indispensable. 
Moreover, it seems that Doeringer and Piore 
believe that a change in technology leads to a fixed number 
of well defined jobs associated with enterprise-specific 
skills, largely independently of labour force supply 
h .. 1 c aracterlstlCS. The statement "Plants mould men to jobs, 
not jobs to men,,2 does not allow of any other explanation. 
I am amazed that, despite so may years of micro-micro 
research effort (to borrow a term established by H. 
Leibenstein in a recent issue of the Journal of Economic 
Literature), they have not realised that a job is not a 
fixed but a malleable concept. A job that someone is 
doing today may be different from the job that he is doing 
tomorrow/exactly in the same way as a kilogram of apples 
today is a completely different good from a kilogram of 
apples tomorrow. The phenomenon of job design and re-design, 
which is so common in most manufacturing enterprises, pro-
vides ample support of the following statement: "Plants 
1. M.J. Piore, "The Impact of the Labour Market upon the 
Design and Selection of Productive Techniques within 
the Manufacturing Plant", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November, 1968, pp. 602-620. 
2. Ibid., p. 619. 
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mould men to jobs and jobs to men". 
In addition to the economic factors, Doeringer 
and Piore claim that custom plays a very important role in 
the formation and maintenance of ILMs. Surprisingly 
enough, though, they devote a disproportionately small por-
tion of their book to explaining the relevance of this 
concept in their analysis. Their discussion of custom 
and its role in the origins of the ILMs is not integrated 
with the rest of their argument. Their point seems to be 
that custom exerts an independent force on the economic 
factors called into play by the specific human capital 
theory, and constrains the development of these internal 
structures in the direction of continuity with past 
practices. 
Exactly how custom comes to bear in the process 
of internal labour market formation is never made clear. 
The best that can be said about the argument 1S that it has 
at least recognised non-economic factors which, though, 
remain unspecified. 
(c) An alternative (or complementary) explanation 
That the specific human capital explanation of 
ILMs of Doeringer and Piore had neglected some 
other important factors/was firstly emphasized by A.J. 
Alexander. l He found that both concentration (size) and 
1. A.J. Alexander, "Income, Experience and Internal Labour 
Markets", Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1974, 
pp. 63-85. 
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capital intensity were significant determinants of "manorial 
structure". 
Why should 1LMs be associated more with bigger 
firms than smaller ones? Are enterprise-specific skills 
more important to the big firm? Do big firms enjoy 
economies of scale in providing on-the-job training? 
Unfortunately, Doeringer and Piore do not seem to elabor-
ate on these questions. 
My feeling is that the importance of enterprise -
specific skills and on-the-job training as the main factors 
leading to the development of the 1LM concept has been over-
estimated. Although there is no doubt that specific human 
capital might have played a part in the foundation of 1LM 
structures, Alexander's finding points to the fact that 
stability of employment and the resultant 1LM may be a 
feature of big (usually oligopolistic) firms quite indep-
endently of enterprise-specific skills and on-the-job 
training. 
The massive increase in firm size (mainly due to 
economies of scale in production) that characterizes oligo-
polization implies a qualitative change in the prospects 
and problems confronting such firms. With the threat of 
ruinous competition over market shares reduced and the 
solvency of the firm reasonably assured, large firms can 
extend their time horizons and undertake long-run planning 
of future growth to ensure better utilization of their 
large capital investments. Such planning requires stability 
and control over input markets, including labour. As the size 
of the firm grows, increasing emphasis on stability implies 
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that maintenance and control of effort and loyalty assume 
paramount importance in personnel policies. l Widespread ex-
ternal recruitment and abuse of seniority provisions seem to 
interfere with the successful pursuit of these aims. The 
question then becomes: What is the size of firms which makes 
these organizational constraints imperative and necessitate 
the use of hierarchical job ladders? 
In any case, the choice of hierarchical structures 
in personnel policies was not an event that occurred at 
random. As Ronald Dore has noted, the greater stability and 
likelihood of oligopolistic profits allowed for experiment-
ation in personnel policies, "Planning of production all-
owed for planning of employment".2 Implicit in this ex-
planation of the ILMs is a recognition of the need to 
identify the contraints that firm structure imposes on the 
choice of personnel policies. The withdrawal of effort at 
the individual, group or firm level (as reflected, for 
example, by indiscipline, output restriction or strikes) 
becomes increasingly untenable as the size of the firm 
grows. The internal labour markets seem to provide the 
optimum environment for the control of work effort and 
loyalty. The incumbent employee, irrespective of enterprise 
specific skills, receives on-the-job training which probably 
1. The incidence of frequent rotation inside ILM structures 
seems to corroborate this argument. 
2. Ronald Dore, British Factory-Japanese Factory: The 
Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations. 
California: University of California Press, 1973. 
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increases identification with the firm and inculcates 
dependable work habits. The firm-trained skilled labour 
force is more likely to be loyal, stable and resistant to 
unions. I have never read or heard, for example, that the 
administrative and clerical personnel of the big multinat-
ional companies (with strong hierarchical structures) 
have been on strike. 
Is, therefore, one entitled to say that the 
internal labour market is another device invented by the 
capitalists to divide and conquer the working class ? 
Bowles and Gintis,l co-authors of the famous book, 
Schooling in Capitalist America, would certainly agree. 
(d) Training, Internal Labour Markets and the Shape 
of the Age-Earnings Profiles 
It appears that "training" is actually a somewhat 
vague term which has often given rise to a lot of confusion. 
It may co~prise one or all of five things: 2 (a) Formal 
schooling; (b) on-the-job learning from experience some 
of which is unavoidable and hence does not constitute 
training; (c) on-the-job in-plant training/involving 
training under supervision or an initial rotation of new 
1. S. Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist 
America. New York: Basic Books, 1976. 
2. Figure (4) provides a picture of the different kinds 
of training. 
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workers among departments; Cd) off-the-job in-plant 
training l involving formal orientation programmes for newly 
hired workers or formal courses provided inside factories 
during working hours; Ce) off-the-job out-of-plant 
training/including the government sponsored Manpower Re -
Training Programs or formal courses provided by firms 
or institutions. Cutting across these types of training 
is Becker's distinction between rtspecific" and "general" 
training. According to Becker, specific training is 
defined as training that has no effect on the productivity 
of trainees that would be useful in other firms. Comp-
letely general training, on the other hand, increases the 
marginal productivity of trainees by exactly the same 
amount in the firms providing the training as in any other 
f " I lrms. New firms operating under competitive conditions. 
I 
have no incentive to pay the costs of general training 
because they cannot ensure that they will be able to retain 
workers who have received training. This does not mean 
that general training will not be provided. What it does 
mean is that the costs of general training are passed on to 
trainees ln the form of reduced earnings during the training 
period. In short, firms do not finance general training, 
they only provide it. Firms will bear the burden of train-
lng exnenses only when the training is specific. Eventually, 
1. G.S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis with Special Reference to Education. New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964, pp. 11-12, 
18-19. 
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of course, workers pay for it anyway as the training ex-
penses are recouped out of their increased productivity; 
nevertheless, specific training must raise earnings if the 
an 
trained worker is to have/incentive to stay on with the 
firm. Becker and Mincer l seem to argue that individuals 
are aware of this distinction between general and specific 
training and tend to invest in themselves after completing 
schooling by choosing occupations that promise general 
training; in so doing, they lower their starting salaries 
below alternative opportunities in exchange for higher future 
salaries as the training begins to payoff. This will give 
rise to age-earnings profiles that are initially convex 
from below as the worker is paying for all or a good part 
of the training by forgoing earnings; during the later 
years of his working life, he receives returns on his invest-
ment in training and hence the profile becomes concave from 
below. The steep rise in the age-earnings profiles after 
the training period has been vindicated by evidence for 
some forty countries around the world. 
If, on the other hand, however, it is assumed 
that all training is specific, the firms have the incentive 
not only to provide but also to finance this kind of 
training. Sharing the costs of training implies (a) that 
earnings forgone during the training period will be much 
1. J. Mincer, Schoolin Ex erience and Earnin s. New 
York: National Bureau of Economic Researc , 1974. 
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less than in the case of general training. (b) The shape 
of the age-earnings profiles will be much flatter (as port-
rayed in Figure 5),since the employer knows that he can 
recoup the costs of training by paying later trained workers 
less than their improved marginal product. 
In the presence of ILMs, where stability of emp-
loyment and low turnover rates are the rule rather than the 
exception, the distinction between general and specific 
training, in terms of who finances the training (the 
employer or the employee), loses its meaning. If a firm 
were certain that a trainee would never leave, the question 
of the generality or specificity of training becomes irre1-
evant and the firm" can behave as if all training were 
specific whatever its content 1 (i.e. bear the burden of the 
training costs). This proposition was expressed by Oatey2 
as a theorem: the higher the mobility of labour, the more 
training is general rather than specific, paid for in the 
first instance by workers rather than by firms. 
Firms with ILMs) therefore,will tend to behave as 
if all training were specific, regardless of its content, 
giving rise to the prediction that the rise of the age -
earnings profiles will not be particularly steep during the 
early years of the working life. 
1. It is interesting to note that Doeringer and Piore 
recognised this point in their book, albeit in a 
footnote. (p. 15, fn. 5). 
2. M. Oatey, "The Economics of Training with Respect to 
the Firm", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
March, 1970, pp. 1-21. 
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Figure 5 
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Setting aside the difficulties that general and 
specific training involve, the content of on-the-job training 
has not be-en sufficiently clarified by both Doeringer and 
Piore and human capital theorists. According to Doeringer 
and Piore: 
On-the-job tralnlng is characterised by 
its informality. In many ways it appears 
either to occur automatically by "osmosis" 
as the worker observes others or repeatedly 
performs his job. 1 
Their definition of on-the-job training (a) fails to 
distinguish between learning from experience (or learning 
by doing) and learning under supervision, and (b) fails to 
emphasize sufficiently that the former is costless 2 since it 
is a joint input in the production process while the latter 
is costly. 
(e) Efficiency and Internal Labour Markets 
The specific human capital approach that Doeringer 
and Piore basically adopted as an explanation of the ILM 
structure has lessened the criticisms and objections of 
neoclassical economists. Even recently, there has been an 
attempt by neoclassicists to interpret the ILM concept as 
an efficiency-oriented mode of organization necessitated by 
1. Doeringer and Piore, op. cit., p. 39. 
2. In principle, however, learning by experience cannot 
be assumed to be costless. So long as it is possible 
to compare the output of experienced and inexperienced 
workers in the same department, the costs of on-the-job 
training in the form of output forgone can be estimated. 
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the presence of transaction costs l generated by enterprise spe-
} 
cific or idosyncratic jobs and on-the-job training. The effi-
ciency argument can be summarized in the following manner: 2 
Idiosyncratic jobs that require specific training;present a 
pervasive problem of bilateral monopoly. An important purpose 
of the internal labour market is to neutralize the issue so that 
it does not absorb the resources of the firm to the detriment 
of both workers and management. Accomplishing this ailm invol-
ves minimizing bargaining and turnover costs; encouraging 
workers to exercise their specific knowledge; and ensuring 
that investment of idosyncratic types, which constitute a 
source of job monopoly, are undertaken without risk of exploi-
tation by either side. In ILMs, firms, by attaching wage 
rates to individual jobs and not to workers, reduce bargain-
ing costs since they do not have to strike a deal with every 
single employee. (Jobs are filled by promoting meritorious 
workers through the organisational structure as they acquire 
1. Good examples of the growing literature on transaction 
costs can be found in O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierar-
chies: Anal sis and Anti-Trust 1m lications, New York: 
Free Press, 1 75 an O.E. W1ll1amson, "Transaction-Cost 
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", 
Journal of Law and Economics", July, 1980, pp. 233-261. 
For an interesting recent attempt to rationalize wage 
stickiness and the slow wage (price) adjustment (with 
long and variable lags) to exogenous disturbances, in 
terms of transaction costs involved in idiosyncratic 
exchange; see M.L. Wachter and O.E. Williamson, "Obliga-
tional Markets and the Mechanics of Inflation", The 
Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn, 1978, pp. 549-571. 
2. This argument has been advanced by O.E. Williamson, M. 
L. Wachter and J.E. Harris, "Understanding the Employ-
ment·Relations: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange", 
The Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, 1975, pp. 250-
278. 
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training. High-wage jobs do not make high-wage workers; rather 
the internal labour market screens workers and places the good 
ones in good jobs.) 
Using the jargon of the organizational failures frame-
work, lLMs economize on the following set of factors that the 
incidence of bilateral monopoly (between employer and employee) 
generates. 
(a) Opportunism and Small Numbers. By attaching 
wages to jobs rather than workers, lLMs reduce the small number 
bargaining indeterminacies that bilateral monopoly entails and 
curb potential opportunistic behaviour (i.e. self-interest plus 
strategic behaviour) by either of the parties involved. 
(b) Uncertainty. Hierarchies economise on uncer-
tainty since in the absence of it, sequential spot contracting 
would be the most efficient way of contracting • 
(c) Bounded Rationality. Hierarchies economize also 
on bounded rationality. Unbounded or unlimited rationality 
would make contingent claims contracts the most efficient way 
of contracting. lLMs economize on the prohibitive transaction 
costs that contingent claims contracts entail under the assump-
tion of bounded rationality. 
The efficiency properties of rLMs/although elegantly 
rationalized in terms of transaction costs involved, rest on 
the assumption that jobs and skills are enterprise specific 
or idiosyncratic. 
As was pointed out in section (c), however, the 
specifid human capital approach is not an entirely convincing 
explanation of the lLMs. The size of firms seems to exert 
a much more telling influence on lLM formation. As the size 
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of the firm grows, increasing emphasis on control and 
stability over input markets, including labour, becomes 
the rule. The hierarchically organised ILMs may well then 
provide the necessary environment for controlling work 
effort and eliciting workers' loyalty. 
Associated with the efficiency aspects of ILM 
structures another important question crops up with imp-
ortant implications for employment creation and manpower 
policy. Are good jobs (internal labour market jobs) scarce, 
relative to a Pareto optimum? It is not only the propon-
ents of the dual labour market) but many neoclassicists as 
well, who provide an affirmative answer to this question. 
M. Wachter, for example, claims that market power (whether 
in unions or oligopolies) results in a socially inefficient 
undersupply of good jobs. l High wages that are not offset 
by savings in turnover costs, reduce the output in hier-
archically organised labour structures (and hence the derived 
demand for good jobs) and generate a substitution toward 
capital and away from labour. 
Contrary to the view that internal labour market 
jobs are scarce relative to a Pareto-Optimum, run two arguments 
that have been advanced by Rawlins and Ulman. 2 According 
1. M.L. Wachter, "Primary and Secondary Labour Markets: a 
Critique of the Dual Approach", Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, August 1974, pp. 634-680. 
2. V.L. Rawlins and L. Ulman, "The Utilization of College 
Trained Manpower in the U.S.", in M.S. Gordon, Higher 
Education and the Labour Market. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1974. 
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to the first, the smooth functioning of departmental oper-
ations may induce decision-makers to operate with enough 
manpower slack to handle emergencies in their stride. 
This slack may include more employees than 
is necessary for everyday operations. The 
appearance of waste must always be avoided; 
but real cost-cutting, especially in the 
area of manpower, may run counter to the 
requirements of contingency planning. In 
cases where the firm experiences extreme 
financial pressure, the cost-minimizing 
objective may take precedence, and occasional 
performance failures are written off as evi-
dence that department managers are operating 
with lean staffs in the overall interest of 
the firm. In normal times, however, perf-
ormance is the standard criterion for success 
and the wise department head will accumulate 
some manpower slack as insurance. This will 
even allow some room for cutbacks in a financ-
ial crisis without seriously affecting 
performance. 1 
According to the second argument, ILMs may contrib-
ute to a situation in which there are more educated employ-
ees than may superficially appear optimal. Tough comp-
etition among a pool of high potential workers serves to 
raise their motivation and work effort. Additionally, it 
provides an easier task for management to screen the best 
employees to the top positions of the hierarchical structure. 
To corroborate their argument, the authors cite 
some strong evidence that during periods of recession, 
firms made drastic cut-backs in the recruitment of college 
graduates and even lay-offs without proportionate decreases 
in production. 
1. Rawlins and Ulman, Ope cit., p. 217. 
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Present-day governments of many countries seem 
to devote increasing attention and resources to employment 
creation programmes. There are many economists who believe 
that small or medium-sized firms do create more jobs than 
bigger ones and, therefore, urge government policy to 
encourage and support them. Evidence that big firms usually 
do have some fat to trim indicates that the issue has not 
been resolved. Big firms (with ILMs) may, well fare better 
in providing jobs that governments are hotly after. Support 
for the big ones, though, (no matter how rational this 
support may be) is likely to entail an unbearable political 
cost which many governments are not prepared to take. 
(f) Wage Determination in ILMs 
In their discussion of wage determination inside 
ILMs, Doeringer and Piore acknowledge the influence of 
neoclassical wage theory.l They argue, however, that the 
forces which in neoclassical theory yield a determinate wage, 
f 
establish, in the internal market, only a series of con-
straints. 2 The indeterminacy of wages is further complicated 
1. They stress the role of such factors as community wage 
surveys, individual merit ratings and job evaluation 
schemes, which are clearly determined by competitive 
forces. 
2. It is interesting that they even concede that, with 
some modification, the competitive market model could 
encompass much of the phenomena of the internal market, 
at least on long-run assumptions. They have deliberately 
avoided such an effort though, since to have done so, 
they argue, would have been "understood as a departure 
from some optimal set of arrangements". Doeringer and 
Piore, op. cit., p. 7. 
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by another set of constraints representing, they argue, 
internal allocative, social and institutional forces. In 
the subsection which follows, the neoclassical constraints 
that Doeringer and Piore had in mind will be discussed, 
whilst in the subsequent subsection another set of constraints 
emanating from the organisational imperatives of big corp-
orations will be analysed. 
(i) Neoclassical Constraints 
The central results of neoclassical theory are 
two-fold. First, an enterprise will pay each employee a 
wage commensurate with what he could obtain elsewhere. 
Second, the wage will be equal to the worker's marginal 
product. These results are dependent upon two assumptions 
seldom made explicit in the development of the theory: the 
absence of fixed labour costs and the temporary nature of 
the employment relationship. Both assumptions are generally 
abrogated by the internal labour market. Internal markets 
tend to be accompanied by significant fixed costs of rec-
ruitment, screening and training, and are designed to create 
a permanent relationship between the worker and the enter-
prise. 
Because fixed costs of receruitment, screening 
and training occur in ILMs, wages (a variable cost) are no 
longer the sole component of labour costs; nor are they the 
single variable controlling labour allocation. The exist-
ence of fixed non-wage costs implies (a) that the equality 
between wages and productivity will no longer hold. l The 
1. It is interesting to note that Becker in his seminal book 
"Human Capital" Ope cit., acknowledged that the provision 
of general training by employers abrogates the equality 
between wages and marginal products. 
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marginal product of labour in the internal market must be 
sufficient not only to compensate the employer for wage 
costs, but also for non-wage expenditures on hiring and 
training; (b) employers will encourage a permanent 
employment relationship with their work force to recoup 
their investment in training. The incentive to reduce 
turnover no longer compels the profit-maximising firm to 
equate the wage and marginal product of labour in every 
pay period. Employers should be willing to pay a wage 
greater than the marginal product in early periods, prov-
ided they are compensated by marginal product in excess of 
wages in some subsequent period. 
The permanent employment relationship has start-
ling implication for neoclassical wage theory. When the 
relationship is permanent, neither workers nor employers 
necessarily concern themselves with the connection between 
wages and marginal productivity at any point in time. 
There is instead a much more liberal, but 
nonetheless competitive constraint that 
relates labour costs, earnings and product-
ivity streams over the employee's entire 
work career within the enterprise. As a 
result, there is a set of internal wage 
structures consistent with this constraint. 
Where the worker typically holds a number 
of different jobs over the course of his 
employment life within the enterprise, this 
constraint implies little or nothing about 
the wage on any particular job. The dis-
ruption of the neoclassical equivalencies 
between the wage and the marginal product in 
each pay period, in other words, involves the 
disruption of these equivalencies for a given 
job as well. The worker, therefore, may 
never produce enough in a particular job 
classification to cover his wages during the 
period in which he is employed in that 
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classification. 1 
Finally, Doeringer and Piore argue that wage and 
2 
employment decisions apply to groups of workers rather 
than to individuals. 
When wage determinations are made for groups 
of workers the influence of economic cons-
traints - labour costs, productivity and so 
forth - is estimated in terms of the ex¥ected 
value for the group as a whole and not or 
the individual. As a result, the productivity 
of some workers drawn from any particular 
group is likely to differ from the expected 
value of the group. Some will therefore rec-
eive wages below their individual productivity 
and some will receive wages above it. Thus, a 
worker who produces more quickly than average 
seldom reaps the full gain, but rather he sub-
sidises the worker who produces less than 
average. Similarly, the worker who stays with 
an employer longer than average tends to sub-
sidise the fixed .employment costs of workers 
who stay for less time. 3 
To sum up, in ILMsthe existence of fixed labour 
costs and the permanent employment relationship imply that 
the equality between the marginal product of labour and 
the wage of a job postulated by neoclassical theory is 
reduced to an equality between the discounted present value 
of expected costs and productivity streams calculated over 
the distribution of expected employment tenure for various 
groups within the enterprise. Such constraints are 
1. Doeringer and Piore, op. cit., p. 76. It is rather 
strange that Doeringer and Piore after recogn1s1ng 
that workers on the same job may receive different 
remuneration, insist, subsequently, that in the ILM, 
wage rates are attached to jobs and not to workers. 
2. The group may be defined by characteristics such as age, 
race or education or by seniority and job classification. 
3. Doeringer and Piore, op. cit., p. 77. 
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consistent with a variety of different wages for any parti-
cular job and a variety of internal wage structures as well. 
Furthermore, the other important neoclassical wage 
determinant, the wage on alternative employment 
opportunities, is also not a binding constraint. The emp-
loyer can meet competitive pressure upon his wages through 
compensating adjustments in recruitment, screening and 
training. Competitive market pressures upon the wage 
structure are felt almost entirely at entry-level jobs. 
In addition to the neoclassical constraints, 
Doeringer and Piore mention the importance of social and 
institutional constraints in the wage determination 
process. How these constraints interrelate with the neo-
classical constraints is not clarified. All that they say 
is that these constraints exert added pressure on the 
indeterminacy of wages. 
The confusion that these added constraints create 
is best demonstrated by the following example. Suppose 
that an oversupply of workers develops at entry level jobs 
in a particular ILM job cluster. According to Doeringer 
and Piore the wage for these entry level jobs will not 
remain fixed but will fall. Is the cohort which entered 
the market at reduced wages going to catch up with the 
previous cohort which entered at higher wages or is there 
going to be a permanent "cohort effect"? Unfortunately, 
their analysis is not capable of answering such a dis-
turbing question. If there is a tendency for firms to 
promote individuals by seniority along well-defined job 
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ladders and to raise pay through "standard" increases over 
starting rates, there will be a ltcohort effect" and the 
evidence cited by Freemanl seems to corroborate this 
argument. Doeringer and Piore's wage determination anal-
ysis seems able to explain both a "permanent cohort effect" 
and a !lcatching up" for those entering the firm at lower 
wages because of over-supply. The forces of custom will 
reinforce the "catching up" argument whilst the "neo-
classical constraints" would lend support to a "permanent 
cohort effect". One is left to wonder whether efficiency 
or inefficiency will tend to predominate. 
Cii) Organisational Constraints 
It was argued in previous sections that the 
presence of ILM structures can better be explained by the 
organizational imperatives that increasing firm size has neces-
sitated. As the size of the firm grows, maintenance and 
control of workers' effort and loyalty assume paramount 
importance in personnel policies. On-the-job training 
may then be used by the firm as a means to increase 
workers' identification with the firm and to inculcate 
dependable work habits like loyalty and resistance to unions. 
If one adheres to this explanation, it would be logical to 
expect that firms with ILM structures should have a tend-
ency to offer a premium to secure a steady flow of labour 
services quite apart from the neoclassical constraints 
1. R. Freeman, "The Effect of Dempgraphic Factors on Age -
Earnings Profiles", Journal of Human Resources, Summer 
1979, pp. 289-318. 
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mentioned before. This premium will tend to differ among 
employers since (a) they are expected to have different 
attitudes towards risk, and (b) they attach different 
subjective probabilities to discontinuities in the smooth 
and steady flow of labour services. 
Evidence, although indirect, that large firms 
(with ILMs) do indeed pay a premium to secure stability of 
employment was provided in the U.K. by the Bolton Committee 
on Small Firmsl which estimated the difference in earnings 
between employees of small and large firms to be 20% and 
which also found that this difference was mainly due to lower 
wage rates of similar jobs with only a small part of the difference 
explained by the incidence of shift work, part-time work 
and overtime payments. 
In general then, the competitive market does not 
determine any individual rate within the firm (except for 
an entry job that is not part of a promotion ladder).2 
Even so, firms cannot set their relative wages arbitrarily. 
As the literature on job evaluation schemes emphasizes, 
they are designed to advance intrafirm efficiency. For 
example, the wage structure attaches sufficient wage inc-
reases to promotions to provide sufficient motivation to 
1. The Report of the Bolton Committee of Inquiry on Small 
Firms. London: HMSO, 1971. 
2. Even that statement can be disputed since a firm with 
a reputation for good promotion possibilities could 
pay a lower entry wage. The insatiable demand for 
civil service jobs might be a good example of this 
possibility. 
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employees to seek after them. Authority relationships are 
cemented by paying a worker more than those he supervises. 
As Meij summarizes, lithe internal wage-structure is the 
value dimension of the organization structure!!.l 
In general, one can expect to find different pay 
structures within internal job clusters for the following 
reasons: 
(a) Different employers attach different premiums to 
stability of employment and control of work 
effort and loyalty; 
(b) The job content of identically classified jobs 
in different firms might be different since job 
design is continuously changing the nature of the 
job content. It is obvious, therefore, that 
wages attached to these "jobs" will tend to 
differ. 
(c) The job ladder among firms might be of a diff-
erent nature. For example, the number of pro-
motion steps might vary from firm to firm. 
(3) Criteria for Establishing the Existence of ILMs 
Doeringer and Piore do not lay down vigorous 
criteria for the identification of ILMs. 
1. J.L. Meij, "Wage Structure and Organisation Structure", 
in J.L. Meij (ed.), Internal Wage Structure. Amsterdam: 
North Holland, 1963, p. 115. 
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1 Mace argues that since 1LMs are the result of 
forces that do not give rise to a unique set of precisely 
quantifiable consequences in firms, no single statistic is 
sufficient to establish the existence of an 1LM. I share 
his view that a collection of characteristics occurring 
together is necessary to establish the existence of 1LMs. 
And, though he says that 
the investigation of this concept (1LM) 
may require the small sample social 
surveys usually undertaken by sociol-
ogists rather than the large sample, 
statistic and techniques currently 
favoured by most economists, 2 
I will attempt to show that even regression analysis, the 
bread and butter of economists, might prove to be helpful. 
The first thing to remember is that in order to 
test for the presence of 1LMs, the associated job cluster 
has to be identified. When Mace is providing evidence for 
the existence of ILMs among engineers, I am not sure 
whether he is aware that an engineer with a university 
qualification and an engineer with some other lower level 
technical education might not belong to the same internal 
labour market (e.g. a university graduate may work in the 
research department, while an engineer with some lower 
technical qualifications may be directly employed in 
production). My experience from Greek industry shows that 
this may well be the case. 
1. J. Mace, "Internal Labour Markets for Engineers in 
British Industry", British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, March, 1979, pp. 50.63. 
2. Ibid., p. S1. 
156 
Be that as it may, I consider the following neces-
sary criteria for proving the existence of 1LMs: 
(a) Turnover 
Turnover is expected to be low in the presence 
of 1LMs. Alexander l in his QJE article measures turnover 
I I 
as the proportion of workers who left their firms between 
the first quarter of 1965 and the first quarter of 1966 
and he selects an arbitrary 10% figure as an indication of 
1LM structure. Mace argues that the turnover statistic 
should be E/V where E = external recruitment and V = all 
vacancies arising within the firm. But if a firm is 
expanding, say, and the majority of employees are recruited 
at entry level jobs, then the ratio E/V will be biased 
upwards. I do think that, ideally, the turnover rate 
should not include retirees. It should include the prop-
ortion of employees under 60 who left the firm between two 
points in time (say, one year). Even if the firm is 
contracting, this will not seriously bias the turnover rate 
since the firm can actually contract without recruiting or 
firing, simply by letting people who reach retirement age 
to leave the firm. 
Although turnover rates, on their own, may be 
an insifficient criterion, I do think that the arbitrary 
10% used by both Alexander and Mace can be legitimately 
applied as one, but only one, measure of ILM structure. 
1. Alexander, Ope cit., p. 67 
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A supplementary criterion to the turnover rate might be 
considered to be the proportion of employees who have 
been with the firm all their working lives, i.e. propor-
tion of employees without previous work experience. 
(b) Entry Ports, Promotion Ladders and Salary 
Structure 
In firms with strong ILMs, vacancies that occur 
at senior levels will be reserved for those already employed 
in the firm. Entry will usually take place at the bottom 
of the job ladder, since a vacancy near the apex of the 
hierarchy will be filled by internal promotion and 
consequently be shifted downwards to the base. The foll-
owing criteria may then be employed: l 
(i) Since recruitment typically takes place at 
younger ages, there should be a significant 
difference between the average age at entry and 
the average age of the work force. Alternatively, 
one can calculate the proportion of the work 
force recruited under the age of 25. 
(ii) There should be a significant difference between 
the level of responsibility at entry and the av-
erage level of responsibility of existing job 
incumbents. 
(iii) One can also calculate for, say, a two-year period, 
1. Some, but not all of them, have been developed by Mace. 
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the proportion of newly recruited employees app-
ointed at the lower levels of job responsibility. 
(iv) Years of in-firm experience should be the most 
important determinant of salaries inside an 
internal labour market. One should therefore 
expect that R2 in simple OLS regression of earn-
ings against in-firm experience, will be high. 
Both seniority and ability playa part in wage 
determination inside the firm. Very high R2 in 
a simple regression of earnings against in-firm 
experience imply that more emphasis is laid on 
seniority and less on ability. Strong emphasis 
on seniority is of course a salient character-
istic of ILMs. 
(v) Since entry typically takes place at younger ages 
and entrants are not expected to have any previous 
work experience, the correlation coefficient 
between age and in-firm experience is expected to 
be high. 
(vi) Even when the new entrant has some form of 
previous experience (either related or unrelated 
to the present job)) in the presence of ILM struct-
ures, one should expect that when in-firm exper-
ience and previous experience are entered separate-
ly in an earnings function regression model, the 
coefficient of previous experience will generally 
be expected to be insignificant. Even when it is 
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significant, one can use a t-test to test the 
equality of in-firm and out-firm coefficients. 
An extra year of in-firm experience is expected to 
be more important than an extra year of out-firm 
experience. 
(vii) In the wage determination process, competitive 
forces are felt at entry level jobs, at the base 
of the ladder. Once inside the ILM, wage determin-
ation abstracts from external market forces and 
different firms are expected to have different 
pay structures for the same job clusters. 
One should therefore expect that average entry 
level salaries for the same job cluster (at the lower level 
of the job ladder) should not be significantly different 
among firms, although they are generally expected to have 
different overall pay structures. In order to prove that 
the pay structure is different among firms, one can employ 
a Chow test. l A simple earnings function regression model 
involving experience and education can be fitted separately 
to the data for each firm,and the Chow test can then be used to 
test the equality of the coefficients in the two separate reg-
ressions by means of an F-test. If equality cannot be 
assumed there is evidence that pay structures, for the same 
job cluster, are different among firms. 
1. D. G. C. Chow, "Tes ts of Equality Between Sets 0 f 
Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions", Econometrica, 
July, 1960, pp. 591-605. 
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(c) Adjustment Mechanisms 
According to Doeringer and Piore, there are two 
adjustment instruments available to firms, the "constrained" 
and the "less constrained". The "constrained" instruments 
are those suggested by competitive theory and include 
altering the wage or job structure. Such instruments are 
not frequently used by firms with ILMs. They will, there-
fore, tend to use more of "less constrained" instruments, 
such as job re-design, sub-contracting, allowing for 
vacancy levels to rise (especially at lower levels), 
increasing overtime, widening recruitment and screening 
procedures, curtailing production and re-training. 
If ILM structures exist, adjustment is expected 
to take place mainly through the "less constrained" instr-
uments. This is, of course, a relative, rather than an 
absolute, criterion of ILM structures. 
(d) Training 
One characteristic of ILM structures is the 
formalized provision of on-the-job training. It is not 
possible to formulate the training criterion precisely. In 
all firms, with or without ILM structures, there is some 
sort of on-the-job training, either formal or informal. 
Provi~ion of formal training is at least indicative of 
ILMs, but it does not follow that formal training is a 
necessary condition for the existence of ILM structures. 
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(4) Some Evidence on the Existence of ILMs in Greece 
(The Clerical Job Cluster) 
In this part of the essay, the criteria that 
have been developed in the previous section will be applied 
to the data collected from the personnel records and personal 
interviews with the Personnel Managers of four big Greek 
corporations. l (These firms included a banking firm, a 
bauxite extraction firm, a cement firm and a textiles firm). 
As mentioned before, ILM structures have to be linked with 
specific job clusters. In this section, the clerical job 
cluster will be considered. The clerical job cluster includes 
the majority of white-collar employees with the exception of 
managerial, sales, security and cleaning staff. It includes 
accountants, bookkeepers, secretaries, etc. The occupational 
title given by the firms for most of them was "office 
employee". 
For the Banking Corporation (Firm 1), there were 
9375 observations, for the textile firm (Firm 2) there were 
129 observations, for the bauxite extraction firm (Firm 3) there 
were 171 observations and for the cement company (Firm 4), there 
were 143 observations. With the exception of the textile 
company, for which a random 20% sample was selected, the 
1. The four firms are the "National Bank of Greece", 
"Voxitae Parnassou", "Tsimenta Chalcidos" and 
"Piraiki-Patraiki". I am indebted to these organi-
sations for the provision of these data. The data were 
collected in 1978 and 1979. 
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remaining three firms provided data for all their "clerical" 
employees. 
(i) Turnover 
The turnover rate was calculated as the prop-
ortion of employees under 65 for men and under 60 for women 
who left the firm in the one-year period preceding the day 
of the interview. For all four firms, the turnover rate 
was found to be less than 10%. 
Furthermore, the proportion of employees with no 
previous experience was as follows: 
Firm 1 
93.5% 
Firm 2 
90.3% 
Firm 3 
84.7% 
Firm 4 
80.2% 
It should also be noted that the bigger the firm, 
the lower the turnover rate recorded. (Size was approximated 
by the number of people employed). These findings corroborate 
A. Alexander's point that turnover rates are related to 
size. 
(ii) Entry Ports, Promotion Ladders and Salaries 
Age at entry was computed from the data supplied 
by the four firms. A t-test showed that the difference 
between age at entry and age at present was significant at 
the 0.05 level for all firms. In firm (1), 80.1% were 
recruited under the age of 30, in firm (2) 83%, in firm (3) 
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73.8% and in firm (4) 69.5%. From the interviews with the 
~ 
Personnel Managers, I learned that in all firms, over 90% 
of new recruits, over the past two years, were appointed to 
the lower levels of job responsibility. The stated policy 
of all firms was to recruit people below the age of thirty 
and reserve senior posts for the incumbent employees. 
Within ILMs, the correlation coefficient between 
experience and age is expected to be high since entry is 
taking place at younger ages. The correlation coefficient 
is found to be between 0.65 and 0.80 for all firms. Part-
itioning the samples by sex shows that for females the correla-
tion coefficient between age and experience is much higher 
than males. The probable reason is that the majority of 
women in Greece enter the labour force in their early 
twenties, while men are expected to enter the labour force 
over a much wider time period (usually between the ages 
of twenty and thirty). 
From Table 15, it can be seen that years of in -
firm experience on its own explains more than 50% of the 
variance of in monthly earnings. As noted before, high R2 
can at least be considered as partial indicators of ILM 
structures. 
In Table 16, experience 2 was added into the 
regression. 
In Table 17, education (in continuous form), 
previous experience and its square were added to in-firm 
experience and its square. For two firms, the coefficient 
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TABLE 15: REGRESSION OF LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS ON 
EXPERIENCE 
NEXP 
Constant 
R2 
Number of 
Cases 
Firm 
(1) 
.0423 
(.0003 ) 
9.876 
C. 005) 
.62 
9405 
Firm Firm 
(2) (3) 
.078 .041 
(.0002) (.004) 
9.567 9.254 
(.004 ) (.044) 
.71 .56 
129 171 
Notes: NEXP = years of in-firm experience. 
Firm 
(4) 
.039 
( .005) 
9.408 
(.037) 
.51 
143 
Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
All coefficients are significant at the 1% 
level. 
TABLE 16: REGRESSION OF LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS ON 
EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIENCE 2 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
NEXP .067 .082 .051 .057 
(.001 ) (.003) ( .016) (.016 ) 
NEXp2 
-.0008** .002 -.0006* -.001* 
(.0005) (.0001) (.0005) (.001) 
Constant 9.771 9.382 9.392 9.358 
(.006 ) (.005) (.087) (.058) 
R2 
.64 .75 . 58 .52 
Notes: * Coefficient insignificant at both 5% and 
level. 
1% 
** Significant at 5% level but not at 1% level. 
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TABLE 17: REGRESSION OF LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS ON 
EDUCATION, EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE 2 , 
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AND PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE 2 
Firm Firm Firm Firm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EDUC .024 .073 .060 .046 
( .001) (.018) ( .012) (0.153) 
NEXP .068 .056 .044 .065 
(.001) (.012) (.014) (.013) 
NEXp2 
-.0008* -.002* -.0003* -.001* 
(.0006 ) (.0002) (.0004 ) (.0007) 
PEXP .023 .016* .022* .032 
(.007 ) (.014 ) (.016) (.023) 
PEXp 2 .0003* -.0001* -.0001* .0002* 
(.0002 ) (.0005) ( .0007) (.002 ) 
Constant 9.235 9.082 8.623 9.309 
(.015) (.075) (.176) (.150) 
.062 .78 .59 .725 
Notes: * Coefficient not significant at both 5% and 
1% level. 
NEXP = years of in-firm experience 
PEXP = years of previous experience 
EDUC = years of schooling completed 
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of previous experience was found insignificant. In the 
remaining two firms, where it was significant, at-test 
showed that the coefficient of previous experience could 
not be accepted as being equal to the coefficient of in -
firm experience. The findings again comply with the crit-
erion that in the p~esence of ILM structures, previous 
experience 1S either insignificant or less important than 
in-firm experience in determining earnings. 
Firms with ILMs are also expected to have diff-
erent pay structures. A Chow test was performed for all 
possible pairwise combinations of regressions presented 
in Table 17 and the null hypothesis of equality of coeff-
icients could not be accepted at both the 5% and 1% level. 
Thus the hypothesis that the firms have similar pay struc-
tures can be rejected. 
When the average salary of new entrants (emp-
loyees recruited during the year preceding the date of the 
interview) was computed, a striking similarity was found, 
corroborating the argument that competitive forces are 
mainly felt at entry ports. 
(ii) Adjustment Mechanisms and Training 
All Personnel Managers admitted that in the face 
of an expansion or contraction of the firms' activities 
vacancies rose or fell only at the lower levels of job 
responsibility. They also stressed the incidence of job 
re-design, re-training, and overtime payments. Changes in 
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the salary structure were not considered to be important 
instruments of the firms' policy in the event of expansion 
or contraction. Again, the qualitative criterion that in 
ILM structures, "less constrained" instruments are the rule 
rather than the exception, was corroborated. 
(5) Internal Labour Markets, the Bumping Model of the 
Labour Market and Educational Demand 
The early seventies saw the development of two 
very similar models of the labour market - the Job Competit-
ion and the Bumping models,associated with the names of 
Lester Thurowl and Gary Fields 2 respectively. 
As Barth3 has noted, the basic contribution of 
Thurow's Job Competition model is the imposition of the 
labour queue at the entry ports of internal labour markets. 4 
As contrasted with a "wage competition" model in which 
workers compete with each other for jobs by altering the 
1. L. Thurow, "Measuring the Economic Benefits of Educ-
ation", in M.S. Gordon (ed.), Higher Education and the 
Labour Market. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974. 
2. G. Fields, "The Private Demand for Education in Less 
Developed Countries", Economic Journal, Decembe~ 1974, 
pp. 906-925. 
3. M. Barth, "Generating Inequality: A Review Article", 
Journal of Human Resources, Winte~ 1977, pp. 92-102. 
4. In other words, the presence of strong internal labour 
markets is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the operation of the Job Competition model. 
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wage rates for which they will work, in a "job competition" 
world, individuals compete for places in a labour queue. 
The ranking in the queue is based upon training costs, 
which employers attempt to minimize. Employers have only 
imperfect knowledge of what the training costs for any 
particular employee may be, so they must use one or more 
screens or rules-of-thumb. These rules-of-thumb necessarily 
rest on the obviously discernible characteristics of work-
ers. As a result, workers are ranked in the labour queue 
according to background characteristics. Onc~ the worker 
is in a background-characteristic class, according to this 
theory, selection for a job is essentially by lottery. 
(While Thurow suggests there are many background character-
istics, when using the model he almost always employs 
education as the sole screen ), All training is acquired on 
the job; the labour market is thus a market for training 
slots. 
Training opportunities occur when there is a job 
opportunity that creates a demand for the skill in question. 
That is, the demand for labour creates its own supply. In 
a diagram of the model in the wage quantity space, 
the supply curve for trained labour coincides with the demand 
curve for trained labour (above some opportunity wage, the 
determination of which is not discussed). That is, there is 
no supply of trained labour unless some particular skill is 
demanded. The wage is given to the firm exogenousl~ and 
the intersection of the horizontal wage line with the supply -
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demand curve determines the quantity employed. 
There exists at any time a distribution of job 
opportunities that depends on technology, the sociology of 
wage determination (for example, Dunlopian wage contours) 
and the distribution of training costs - that is, the shape 
of the labour queue. The labour queue and the job distrib-
ution somehow interact to allocate workers to training slots. 
From there, the internal labour market takes over to 
determine a lifetime earnings stream. 
Thurow's basic purpose in developing his model 
was to show that social rates of return, as conventionally 
calculated, could be misleading indicators of the economic 
payoffs of education. He argues that a Job Competition 
model shifts the emphasis on who bears training costs, the 
distribution of training costs across job opportunities 
and the elasticities of training costs with respect to 
education. 
Fields' purpose in developing his model was a 
different one. The scope of the Bumping model was to , 
provide a rational economic explanation for the sustained 
high demand for education in less developed countries, 
despite educated unemployment and under-employment. In 
brief, Fields assumes that there are two jobs in the economy, 
the skilled and the unskilled job respectively. Each job 
commands a fixed wage. (Fields does not seem to discuss 
the importance of ILMsfor his model but it can easily be 
incorporated in the analysis.) Associated with each job 
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there is a labour queue and the rank order in the labour 
queue is determined by two levels of education, the 
"educated" and the "uneducated". In the skill ed job onl y 
educated people are hired. In the unskilled, education is 
a desirable but not an essential characteristic, i.e. 
employers, when faced with a choice, prefer a university 
graduate to a high school graduate. 
One can easily see the similarities of the two 
models. The existence of the labour queue, the importance 
of education in determining the rank order in the labour 
queue and the exogeneity of wages. 
Based on Fields' model, it will be attempted to present 
a slightly modified model to take account of my analysis 
of the labour market in less developed countries. Suppose 
there are two job clusters (or families)l, each of them 
associated with strong internal labour markets. (Entry 
typically takes place at the bottom of the job ladder and 
seniority provisions largely determine the life-time earn-
ings stream). The first is named "managerial" and the 
second "clerical". The first contains jobs whose technical 
focus is management and the second contains jobs whose 
focus is clerical work. For simplicity, there are are only 
two levels of education involved. High school and university. 
Jobs in the managerial cluster can only be filled by univ-
ersity graduates. In the clerical cluster, higher education 
1. The concept of job clusters associated with the names 
of Dunlop and Scoville was discussed in the 1LM section. 
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IS a desirable but not an essential qualification. In the 
clerical cluster, when the employer IS faced with a choice 
between a university and a high school graduate, it is 
assumed that he prefers to hire the university graduate. 
Preferential hiring may take place for a host of reasons, 
the most important being that possession of university 
degree conveys the information that the holder is expected 
to be more trainable than a high school graduate. (Fields 
mentions another two reasons for preferential hiring: 
(a) employers do prefer for economic reasons to associate 
with the better educated, or (b) the educated elite seek to 
legitimize their own position at the top of the pecking order 
by using the "objective" criterion of educational attain-
ment to exclude others.) It is further assumed that the 
fixed wage for entry level jobs in the managerial cluster 
is higher than the corresponding wage for the clerical 
cluster. University holders prefer the managerial cluster 
because it offers higher expected present value earnings 
(PV managerial> PV clerical). 
When the number of university graduates falls 
short of the number of managerial level jobs available, 
expected PV for the managerial job cluster will remain un-
changed if another person receives a university degree. 
Once the educational system has produced more than enough 
university graduates to fill all managerial jobs for which 
hiring is taking place, however, each of them must expect to be 
unemployed part of the time. The expected present value 
for managerial jobs will fall, but so long as the expected 
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PV for managerial jobs> expected PV for clerical jobs, 
university graduates will choose to enter the managerial 
labour market despite the likelihood of some unemployment, 
in preference to full-time employment at a lower wage in 
the clerical sector. After some point there will be suff-
icient unemployment, so that the expected PV for managerial 
jobs will be driven down and equal the expected PV for 
clerical jobs. At this point it becomes profitable for 
university graduates to enter the clerical job queue and 
bump high school graduates from the clerical jobs. Some 
high school graduates are, therefore, forced to leave the 
clerical jobs and select another job cluster with a lower 
expected present value. So long as university degree holders 
are able to bump high school graduates from the clerical 
jobs, the expected PV for managerial jobs will continue to 
equal the expected PV for clerical jobs despite increases in 
the number of university educated people. Hence, the 
demand for higher education, which is a function of the 
expected PV CD = fCPV)),will remain constant despite 
increases in the number of university graduates. After 
some point all clerical jobs will have been filled by univ-
ersity graduates and they will then start competing with 
each other for both managerial and clerical jobs. High 
school graduates will be effectively excluded from break-
ing into the clerical job cluster. When the number of 
university qualified job seekers exceeds the number of both 
managerial and clerical jobs available, expected PV for both 
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clusters will fall and hence the demand for higher educ-
ation will be curtailed. 
The above analysis can be presented in 
Figure (6).In the first zone, expected PV for university 
graduates and hence demand for university graduates is 
constant since the number of university graduates is less 
than the number of managerial jobs available. In the second 
zone, despite the fact that all managerial jobs are filled, 
university graduates prefer to remain unemployed because 
expected PV for managerial jobs > expected PV for clerical 
jobs. In the third zone, bumping takes place and expected 
PV for managerial jobs equals the expected PV for clerical 
jobs. So long as university graduates are bumping out high 
school graduates from the clerical jobs, the expected PV and 
hence the demand for higher education will remain constant 
despite increases in the number of university degree hold-
ers. In the fourth zone, all jobs in both clusters are 
filled by university graduates. Unemployment will start to 
appear among them and hence the expected present value and 
the demand for education will eventually fall. 
The important contribution of the model is that 
when Zone III is in operation and bumping takes place, the 
demand for higher education will remain constant despite 
increases in the number of university educated people. The 
private rate of return and hence the demand for higher 
education might even increase in Zone III if the expected 
present value for high school graduates drops drastically. 
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FIGURE 6: THE RELATION BETWEEN EXPECTED PRESENT 
VALUE AND THE SUPPLY OF UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATES 
Expected Present 
Value and Demand 
for 
Education ZONE 
I 
ZONE 
II 
ZONE 
III 
ZONE 
IV 
Supply of University 
Graduates 
Notes: The continuous line depicts the expected 
PV for university graduates and the demand 
for university education as the supply of 
university graduates increases. 
The discontinuous line depicts the expected 
PV for secondary graduates as the supply of 
university graduates increases. 
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Thus, in order to prove the existence of bumping 
1n particular job clusters of the economy, the following 
steps have to be taken:-
(a) Assuming that there are two educational levels l 
in the economy, identify: 
(i) A job cluster that only employs persons 
from the higher educational levels; 
(ii) Another job cluster which employs people 
with both-educational levels. Employers, 
though, when faced with a choice are assumed 
to prefer people with higher educational 
qualifications. 
(b) Using the criteria analysed in the previous 
section, prove that there are strong internal mar-
kets associated with these clusters; 
(c) Study the recruiting policies of firms with these 
job clusters in common, over time. 
If the proportion of university graduates recruited in the 
job cluster that employs people with both educational levels 
increases over time, there is strong evidence that bumping 
1S taking place and hence the demand for higher education 
is unlikely to fall. 
1. The analysis can be easily extended to include more 
than two educational levels. 
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(6) Some Tentative Evidence of Bumping in the Greek Labour 
Market 
The data collected from the personnel records 
of four big Corporations in Greece l allowed the identific-
at ion of two job clusters, the "managerial" job cluster 
and the "clerical" job cluster. The managerial job cluster 
employs exclusively people with university degrees whilst 
the clerical employs a mix of university and secondary 
school graduates. Section (4), by employing some selective 
criteria, proved that the clerical clusters in all four 
firms were associated with strong ILMs. The last condition, 
therefore, that has to be fulfilled to establish the pres-
ence of Bumping, is that the number of university graduates 
recruited increases through time. 
In order to see whether this last condition is 
satisfied. the proportion of university graduates at entry 
level jobs (clerical jobs) was computed for 1974 and 1979 
respectively. This percentage more than doubled for all 
four firms in the five-year period mentioned above. 
Although it may be hazardous to derive any gen-
era I conclusions from the recruiting policies of only four 
firms, and although it might also be necessary to assume 
that university graduates prefer to work for big companies 
1. Details about the data collected are provided in 
Section (4). 
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(with ILMs)l, it is tempting to say that there is evidence 
that bumping takes place in this particular segment of the 
Greek labour market. The implication is that demand for 
higher education in Greece is likely to increase despite 
an increase in the number of university graduates. As long 
as university graduates keep on bumping out high school 
graduates from this cluster (and that may take a consid-
erable amount of time) the Greek passion for higher education 
(especially in the Social Sciences) will continue to grow 
despite increases in unemployment and under-employment. 
The Bumping model implies that education may well become a 
defensive necessity to individuals. In the words of 
Thurow: 
As the supply of educated labour increases, 
individuals find that they must improve 
their education simply to defend their current 
income position. If they do not, others will, 
and they will not find their current jobs open 
to them. Education becomes a good investment, 
not because it raises an individual's income 
above what it would have been if no one had 
increased his education, but because it raises 
his income above what it would be if others 
acquire an education and he does not. In eff-
ect, education becomes a defensive expenditure 
necessary to protect your "market share". The 
larger the class of educated labour and the 
more rapidly it grows, the more such defensive 
expenditures become imperative. 2 
1. A possible reason might simply be risk aversion. 
It is generally valid that bigger firms offer greater 
job security and higher opportunities for promotion 
than smaller firms. 
2. Thurow, Ope cit., p. 416. 
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(7) Conclusion 
Although the discussion of the rLM concept gave 
the impression that internal markets are a twentieth cent-
ury phenomenon, resulting from rapid technological growth, 
a family business can be thought of as the first, primitive 
example of a hierarchical structure insulated from external 
labour market forces. 
Enterprise-specific skills (and on-the-job 
training), the size of firms (with the concomitant necess-
ity to control work effort) and even attitudes and values 
of different societies l might have played a role in the 
formation, maintenance and development of ILMs. Firm size, 
though, rather than specific skills and attitudes, seems 
to be the most important determinant of the ILM structures. 
The presence of fixed costs of training and the 
resulting permanent employment relationship abrogates the 
equality of the marginal product of labour and the wage rate 
at each period of time. The above equality is reduced to an 
equality between the discounted present value of expected 
costs and productivity streams calculated over the 
1. The literature on rLMs in Japan emphasizes the 
importance of attitudes and values in the formation 
of the so-called "nenko" systems. For a discussion 
of rLMs in Japan see S. Jacoby, "The Origins of 
Internal Labour Markets in Japan", Industrial 
Relations, Sprin~ 1979, pp. 184-196 and M. Sumiya, 
"Japanese Industrial Relations Revisited: A 
Discussion of the Nenko System", Japanese Economic 
Studies, Spring,1977, pp. 3-65. 
179 
distribution of expected employment tenure within the 
enterprise. Moreover, the organizational constraints of 
lLMs (associated with size) imply that these firms are 
forced to pay a premium to secure a steady flow of labour 
services. The real difference between lLM theory 
and human capital theory is the neglect by the latter 
of the organizational constraints that lLM structures 
impose on the wage determination process. 
To test for the presence of ILMs, some selective 
criteria are established and are applied to a four company 
sample of white collar employees. The evidence showed 
that the clerical job clusters of these firms were assoc-
iated with strong ILMs. 
Finally, the relationship between the Bumping 
model of the labour market and ILM structures was analysed. 
Strong ILMs are a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for bumping to take place. Some tentative evidence was 
provided to show that bumping is taking place in the white 
collar job clusters in Greece, i.e. the demand for university 
education will not necessarily decrease as the number of 
university graduates grows. Investment in education becomes 
then a defensive expenditure by individuals to protect 
their "market share". 
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CHAPTER 4 
SEX DISCRIMINATION INSIDE ILMs 
The object of this chapter is to study sex 
discrimination inside internal labour markets and present 
some findings based on a three-company sample. Section (1) 
surveys various theories of sex discrimination. Section 
(2) summarizes the empirical work undertaken to quantify 
the magnitude and extent of sex discrimination. Section 
(3) discusses sex discrimination in the context of Internal 
Labour Markets (ILMs). Section (4) presents some empirical 
results based on a Greek three-company sample of white -
collar employees. Section (5) presents the conclusions. 
(1) Theories of Sex Discrimination in Labour Markets 
The literature on sex discrimination inside 
labour markets (or employment discrimination) distinguishes 
between the following forms of discrimination: 
(a) unequal pay for equal work; 
(b) unequal occupational distribution (or crowding); 
(c) a combination of (a) and (b). 
One could also distinguish between two types of 
theories pertaining to explain the forms of discrimination 
mentioned above~ 
(a) Theories of discrimination - such as those of 
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Becker l and Arrow 2 - that use as building blocks 
(b) 
the utility maximizing behaviour of managers and 
workers and 
3 the theories of others - such as Bergmann or 
4 Thurow - that give important weight to extra -
firm forces. 
(a) Competitive Theories 
The first vigorous attempt to explain sex dis-
crimination was the neoclassical model developed by Gary , 
BeckerS to account for racial discrimination. The model 
is based on the fundamental micro economic principle of 
utility maximization/in the context of a perfectly comp-
etitive economy. Earnings, hiring and promotion differences 
between men and women are seen to derive from "tastes for 
discrimination" - i.e. male preferences to minimize (or 
avoid) the psychic costs of employing, buying from, or 
1. Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 19S7. 
2. Kenneth Arrow, "Models of Job Discrimination" in A.H. 
Pascal (ed.), Racial Discrimination in Economic Life. 
Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972. 
3. B.R. Bergmann, "The Effect on White Incomes of Discrim-
ination in Employment", Journal of Political Economy, 
March/Apri1,1971, pp. 294-313. 
4. L.C. Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination. Washington: 
The Brookings Instltutl0n, 1969. 
5. Becker, op. cit. 
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working with women. According to this approach, wage 
differentials between men and women derive from invidious 
discrimination by the former, in their roles as employers, 
employees and consumers. Becker's work/further employs the 
micro economic tools of trade theory to demonstrate who 
gains and who loses when discrimination occurs. 
Apart from Becker's contribution, the two major 
theoretical perspectives explaining the male-female wage 
differential are 
Ca) the so-called statistical theories of discrimin-
ation) emphasizing demand factors and 
Cb) human capital theory with emphasis on supply , 
considerations. 
Statistical theories of discrimination, usually 
associated with the names of E. Phe1ps1, K. Arrow 2, J. 
McCal1 3 , M. Reder 4 and M. Spence 5 , focus on certain implic-
ations of employer uncertainty about the productivity of 
1. E.S. Phelps, "The Statistical Theory of Racism and 
Sexism", American Economic Review, September, 1972, 
pp. 659- 61. 
2. Arrow, Ope cit. 
3. J.J. McCall, "The Simple Mathematics of Information, 
Job Search and Prejudices", in A.H. Pascal Ced.), 
Racial Discrimination in Economic Life. Lexington, Mass.: 
Heath, 1972. 
4. M.W. Reder, "Human Capital and Economic Discrimination" 
in I. Berg Ced.), Human Resources and Economic Welfare: 
Essays in Honour of Eli Ginzberg. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972. 
5. M. Spence, Market Signalling. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1974. 
183 
racial or sex groups of workers, particularly in the context 
of hiring and placement decisions. The essence of the 
argument in all variants of statistical discriminationl 
theories is that employers reward workers on the basis of 
some underlying productivity-generating characteristic 
that is unobservable, at least in the initial years of 
employment. As a result, the firm must employ proxies 
that measure the underlying characteristic with error, 
according to the relationship 
q = (1 - A)X + AY + u 
where q is the desired characteristic (e.g. intensity of 
work or stability of employment), x is the group mean of 
that characteristic, y is the test score, u is a random 
error and (1 - A) and A can be interpreted as regression 
2 
coefficients. In his pioneering article, Phelps assumes 
that the group means of the characteristic in question 
differ and that this difference is known to the employer 
(
0 M F) 1.e. x > x . But since the actual characteristic is 
unobservable, the employer must rely on a test (y), and 
the relationship of that test to the actual characteristic 
'-
1. For a good review of the various variants of statist-
ical discrimination see D.J. Aigner and G.G. Cain, 
"Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labour 
Markets", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 
January, 1977, pp. 175-87. 
2. Phelps, Ope cit. 
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includes an error term. In this situation, the employer, 
knowing that the group means are different uses sex for 
information, and this results in women receiving lower 
earnings than men with the same y score. 
It is exactly this kind of statistical discrim-
ination that Doeringer and Piore have in mind when discuss-
ing racial discrimination. (There is every reason to 
believe that their argument equally applies to sex discrim-
ination ), To quote from their book: 
In the case of minority groups, inadequate 
experience in developing suitable screening 
criteria may, at least initially, raise 
screening costs and therefore deter their 
employment. Some portion of what appears to 
be racial discrimination is probably generated 
by these costs. Race is an inexpensive 
screening criterion. Where two racial popul-
ations differ significantly in terms of the 
proportion of persons possessing certain des-
ired characteristics, the most efficient 
hiring policy may be simply to reject all 
members of one racial population. 1 
In another source F.B. Blau and C.L. Jusenius 2 
when discussing sex discrimination, claim that 
... stereotyping, the treatment of each 
individual member of a group as if he/she 
possessed the average characteristics of 
the group is appropriately defined as a 
form of discriminationjeven if the employ-
ers' perceptions of the average group diff-
erential are correct. 3 
1. Doeringer and M. Piore, op. cit., ch. 7, p. 139. 
! 
2. F. B1au and C.L. Jusenius, "Economists' Approaches to 
Sex Segregation in the Labour Market: An Appraisal", 
in M. B1axal1 and B. Reagan (eds.), Women and the Work 
Place. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 
3. Ibid., p. 194. 
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It is noteworthy that these authors, although 
they recognise that the employers' decisions may well be 
correct on average, still choose to call such behaviour 
"discriminating". They fail to realise that the assertion 
that an employer is "discriminating" says no more than 
that the decision maker, like the rest of us in our dec-
isions, lacks perfect knowledge! 
Another version of statistical discrimination 
rests on the notion that the reliability of the tests/ used 
by the employer/differs for men and women. It may be, 
for example, that an employer feels less able to judge the 
potential stability or intensity of women workers. The 
mean values may be the same or similar, but the relation-
ship q = (1 - A)X + AY + u may be thought to be less rel-
iable for women, perhaps because a few women withdrew their 
services in an unpredictable manner. Believing this to be 
true, a risk averse employer would pay women less than men 
with the same measured y and q scores. 
In terms of the two extreme forms of discrimin-
ation (unequal pay for equal work and occupational segreg-
ation) statistical discrimination theories can surely 
I 
explain the latter. If, for example, an employer is 
assumed to offer a range of occupations differing ln the 
degree of stability of employment and continuity of work 
effort required, and if it is further assumed that he knows 
that, on average, women have a lower labour force particip-
ation than men, it will be rational for him to allocate 
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women to those occupations where stability of employment 
is not an essential characteristic. On the other hand, 
statistical theories of discrimination do not seem able 
to explain unequal pay for equal work. Learning behaviour 
on the part of the employers will reduce uncertainty and 
hence discriminationjeven if during the first years of 
employment such a form of discrimination might be present. 
But as will be seen in section (3), statistical discrim-
ination theories, when applied to Internal Labour Markets; may 
well explain unequal pay for equal work. 
Human capital theory (or labour supply explan-
ation) is the second theoretical perspective that has inc-
reasingly been brought to bear on observed male/female 
differences in earnings. In the extreme, this approach 
seems to be formulated to demonstrate that observed sex 
differences are the result of differences in productivity 
due to sex differentiation in the household division of 
labour. The essence of the theoretical argument is that 
women have different expectations from males about labour 
force participation over a lifetime and therefore: 
(a) the process of occupational choice is different 
for females than males since they expect, esp-
ecially after marriage, to be "secondary" earners; 
(b) women make different decisions than men about 
investment in their own human capital both during 
and after formal schooling; 
(c) women with families work less intensively than men 
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as a result of their family responsibilities. 
Argument (b) has been utilized by J. Gwartney 
and R. Stroupl to indicate why differences in the earnings of 
single and married women exist and persist. Mincer and Polachek 2 
have stressed argument (c), i.e. that married women with child-
ren work less intensively because of their family resp-
. 
onsibilities. Using a national sample, they found that the 
child variable was insignificant in explaining differences 
in full time earnings among women as a whole, but negative 
and significant in a sample limited to highly educated women 
with strong labour force attachment. They suggest that 
this subgroup adjusts its labour supply in response to 
marriage and children not by working part-time or part of 
the year but rather by working shorter hours or with less 
intensity. There is an additional twist in their argument: 
married men may work harder than single men because of the 
family division of labour (their wives do the housework). 
Although sex differentiation in work intensity 
and in post school investments seem to account for unequal 
pay for equal work, there is only a limited literature 
1. J. Gwartney and R. Stroup, "Measurement of Employment 
Discrimination According to Sex", Southern Economic 
Journal, April,1973, pp. 75-87. 
2. J. Mincer and S.W. Polachek, "Family Investments in 
Human Capital: Earnings of Women", Journal of 
Political Economy, Part II, March/April, 1974, 
pp. S76-Sl08. 
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among human capital theoristsldealing with the phenomenon 
I 
and causes of occupational segregation. Contrary to what 
many critics have argued, human capital theory is perfectly 
able to explain occupational segregation. Occupations 
vary with respect to the continuity of activity required 
(or stability of employment) for acceptable performance 
and with respect to the amount of formal training necessary 
for entrance. Women are aware of that and,therefore, tend 
to choose occupations in which continuity of activity and 
amount of pre and post-school investments are not ess-
ential, since a decision in the opposite direction would 
be in conflict with their roles as wives and mothers. 
Although/admittedly/human capital theory is a 
supply based explanation of occupational segregation; it is 
not the only supply based explanation. It can be argued, 
for example, that the process of occupational choice by 
women, which results in occupational crowding, 
(a) is influenced by discrimination that already 
exists inside the labour market 
(b) is the result of discrimination prior to labour 
market entrance, (i.e. the cultural values incul-
cated at home and at school influence occupational 
choice and hence occupational segregation). 
1. G.E. Johnson and F.P. Stafford "The Earnings and 
Promotion of Women Faculty", American Economic Review, 
December, 1974, pp. 888-903 and S.H. Sandell, "Male -
Female Salary Differences among Scientists with Ph.D. 's", 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1973. 
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The three supply based explanations of crowding 
are obviously not mutually exclusive. It is very likely 
that all three of them are partly true. But the important 
question that emerges from the supply based explanations 
of occupational segregation and is usually neglected in 
the literature is the following: Is it desirable to change 
the role of women in society? If it is accepted that 
women do not possess a comparative advantage over men in the 
upbringing of their children there would be a strong case 
in favour of such a change. But if consensus points to 
the contrary, efforts to equalise the occupational dist-
ribution are meaningless and bound to fail. 
(b) Non-competitive theories 
The salient characteristic of these theories is 
that they abandon the assumption of competitive labour 
markets. A good example of this kind of theory can be 
found in B. Bergmann's research work. l Her approach retains 
much of the neoclassical framework and does not preclude 
the existence of pure wage discrimination, i.e. unequal 
pay for equal work. Basically/the hypothesis is that women 
are crowded into a small number of occupations by the power 
and preferences of men. This crowding generates a situation 
of excess supply to those occupations depressing the 
1. Bergmann, op. cit. 
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marginal productivity of women (and men) ln those segments 
of the labour market. Thus, even if men and women are paid 
the value of their marginal products, sex differentials 
arise and persist. 
Many other theories are based on market imperfect-
ions to explain discrimination. L. Thurow argued that the 
monopsony power of employers is an important explanation. l 
In a similar vein, J. Madden 2 considers both the traditional 
paradigm of monopsony and the implications of assuming the 
existence of male-employee monopoly power over labour 
supply. In the spirit of Madden's work, N.M. Gordon and 
T.E. Mor~on3 have developed a model of wage discrimination 
that emphasizes both market imperfection and discriminatory 
"tastes" of fellow employees to explain sex differentials 
in earnings. Finally, what has recently come to be known 
as "radical" economics seems to incorporate the neoclass ical 
assumption of profit maximization and Marxian assumptions 
of monopoly capitalism and class interests to explain dis-
crimination in the form of segmented labour markets. 4 
1. Thurow, op. cit. 
2. J.F. Madden, The Economics bf Sex Discrimination. 
Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1973. 
3. N.M. Gordon and T.E. Morton, "A Low Mobility Model of 
Wage Discrimination - With Special Reference to Sex 
Differentials", Journal of Economic Theory, March, 1974, 
pp. 241- 53. 
4. For a good survey see R. Marshall "The Economics of 
Racial Discrimination: A Survey", Journal of Economic 
Literature, September,1974, p~. 849-71. 
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Be that as it may, all that can be said about 
these non-competitive theories is that they lack the analy-
tical rigour of competitive ones and,furthermore, they do 
not lead to any decisive and testable prediction that might 
falsify them. 
(2) Empirical Work 
Paradoxically enough, the bulk of the research work on 
sex discrimination in the labour market) did not try to 
distinguish which theoretical framework fared better in the 
light of empirical evidence butJinsteadtfocussed on which 
of the two forms of discrimination, i.e. unequal pay for 
equal work and occupational segregation was more prevalent 
in the labour market. The underlying reason was that the 
forms (rather than the theories) of discrimination provided 
important and diametrically opposite policy implications. 
If the sex differential in earnings can be better explained 
in terms of unequal pay in the same (narrowly defined) 
occupations, equalizing pay legislation could lead to a 
rapid elimination of this differential. If on the other 
hand, the greatest differences in the earnings profiles of 
men and women were across occupations, legislative measures 
to promote "equal pay for equal work" would be unwarranted 
and, hence, far more sweeping changes to alter the occup-
ational distribution might be required. (Which, of course, 
are likely to require several years, perhaps generations, 
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to accomplish.) 
In many empirical studies, the importance of 
labour market discrimination as a source of sex differ-
entials, relies on the identification of discrimination as 
the "residual" after other sources of the differential 
I 
have been held constant. In other words, since discrimin-
atory behaviour is never directly observed, its existence 
must be inferred by (statistically) eliminating the other 
sources of sex differences in earnings (schooling, years 
of experience, occupations, etc.) and observing that 
differential which remains unexplained. This methodol-
ogical technique usually takes the form of regression or 
standardization analysis. Following Becker l , the majority 
of researchers using the "residual" approach have defined 
the market discrimination coefficient as the simple diff-
erence between the observed wage ratio and the wage ratio 
in the absence of discrimination. Tbere are some diff-
iculties with the "residual" approach however, which should 
be mentioned. 
(a) It was stressed in the previous section that 
discrimination can take either of two forms: 
(i) unequal occupational distribution (or crowding) 
(i~ unequal pay for equal work (for the same occup-
ations). 
The important question that arises (and is usually neglected) 
1. Becker, op. cit. 
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by the "residual" approach In the estimation of the 
quantitative importance of these forms of discrimination 
is the following: How do we standardize for equal work 
in the regresslon model? Which occupational classific-
ation do we use for standardizing for occupations, (i.e. 
for equal work)? It is obvious that the finer the occ-
upational classification used, the less the importance of 
discrimination of the form of unequal pay for equal work 
and the more the emphasis on crowding (and vice versa). 
If, for example, ten broad occupational classifications 
are used, it will not be surprising that unequal pay for 
equal work will be claimed to be the dominant form of 
discrimination. On the other hand, this conclusion is 
reversed if, for' example, the researcher uses a three-digit 
classification of occupations. The important thing to 
remember is that his conclusions depend critically on the 
~egree of standardization undertaken. 
(b) It is possible that the wage structure for males 
and females would differ, even in the absence of discrimin-
ation. For example, male-female differences in the coeff-
icients of the experience variable suggest that the rate of 
return to on-the-job training (OJT) may be higher for males 
and/or females invest less in OJT. One might argue, that 
even in the absence of discrimination, females may plan on 
shorter working lives and hence invest less than men. The 
result would be a difference in the parameters of the 
experience variables, yet these differences contribute to 
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the effects of discrimination under the "residual" approach. 
In defence of this approach, however, it should be pointed 
out that occupational barriers against women deny them 
the opportunity to invest to the same extent as men. Moreover, 
the short work life expectancy of women may represent a rational 
response to anticipated discrimination in the labour market. The 
issue becomes one of how much of the male-female difference in 
the coefficients of the regression analysis is due to discrimi-
nation. 
(c) Another difficulty with the residual approach is that 
it does not take into account the effects of the feedback from 
labour market discrimination on the male-female differences in 
the selected individual characteristics. In other words, dif-
ferences in behaviour can be the result as well as the cause of 
differences in earnings, and hence a relatively modest amount 
of direct discrimination may well result in a great deal of 
"cumulative" discrimination. Discrimination in the labour 
market, for example, may influence the occupational choice of 
women and result in further occupational segregation. 
As M. Ferber and H. Lowryl have remarked: 
Focussing on the narrow issue is thus not 
particularly useful and perhaps even mis-
leading. For such an emphasis ignores the 
fact that, like a stone cast into water, 
discrimination introduced into the labour 
market is likely to produce effects consider-
ably more far reaching than the initial impact 
itself' 2 
Unfortunate1Y,the cumulative or "multiplier" effects of 
discrimination cannot be estimated from the data. The 
1. M.A. Ferber and H.M. Lowry, "The Sex Differentials in 
Earnings: A Reappraisal", Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review, JanuarY,1976, pp. 377-387. 
2. Ibid., p. 386. 
sociologists' work on the occupational choice for women 
may throw some light on this important question. 
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(d) A further comment needs to be made with regard 
to the empirical studies using the "residual!! approach. 
All of them assume that the earnings of both men and women 
in various occupations will remain as they are/even as a 
large proportion of women move from one occupation to 
another. This assumption is unwarranted, however, for 
a sharp decrease in supply is likely to result in a higher 
wage rate and an increase in supply in a lower wage rate. 
Men's and women's earnings are not likely to be affected 
to the same extent, because predominantly male occupations 
would experience the greatest influx of workers and, there-
fore, the greatest relative wage reductions. Estimates 
based on present earnings will not reflect accurately what 
would happen if there were a major change in the occupational 
distribution of women. 
(e) Apart from the problems mentioned above, the 
econometric methods employed to hold constant factors 
other than discrimination in computing the residual, may 
produce conflicting conclusions,even with a common data set. 
For example, if there are any interactions between sex and 
other determinants of earnings, regression analysis employ-
ing a dummy variable to represent sex (discrimination) will 
yield quite different conclusions from those obtained by 
estimating separate regression equations for males and 
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females and standardizing on one set of the parameters. 
Furthermore, there are severe multicollinearity problems 
when marriage and children variables enter earnings func-
tions used in the analysis. The difficulty may arise, for 
example, from the correlation between years of experience 
and the marital and children variables. Likewise, the 
earnings function regression techniques used/may generate 
conclusions that differ from those produced by regression 
analysis of a multiple equation model (which may, or may 
not, be a simultaneous system). Research work on sex 
discrimination has been voluminous (especially in the U.S.) 
and,hence ,the review of the literature undertaken below, 
due to space limitation, focuses on studies based on 
national samples of the work force. 
This is not to deny the contribution of many 
studies of more restricted groups such as academics, A.E. 
Bayer and H.S. Astin,l M.G. Darland et al.,2 G.E. Johnson 
and F.P. Stafford3 and S. Sande11;4 non-academic 
1. A.E. Bayer and H.S. Astin, "Sex Differences in 
Academic Rank and Salary Among Science Doctorates in 
Teaching", Journal of Human Resources, Spring, 1968, 
pp. 191-200. 
2. M.G. Darland et a1., "Application of Multivariate 
Regression to Studies of Salary Differences between 
Men and Women". Paper presented at the annual meetings 
of the American Statistical Association, December, 1973. 
3. G.E. Johnson and F.P. Stafford, Ope cit. 
4. S. Sandell, Ope cit. 
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professionals, B. Bosworth,l A.J. Corrazini,2 B.G. Malkiel 
and J.A. Malkiel,3 W.G. Shepherd and S.G. Levin,4 H. Zincone 
and F.A. 
ers, F.D. 
McNulty. 9 
5 Close; 
6 Blau, 
or selected clerical and blue collar work-
J.E. Buckley,7 M.T. Hamilton,8 and D.J. 
Several U.S. economists have employed data from 
decennial Censuses to analyse the sex differential in 
, 
1. B. Bosworth "An Examination of Male and Female 
Earnings in Professional Industry and Occupational 
Classification". Paper presented at the meetings of 
the Am. Stat. Association, December, 1973. 
2. A.J. Corazzini, "Equality of Employment Opportunity 
in the Federal White-Collar Civil Service", Journal of 
Human Resources, Fall,1972, pp. 424-45. 
3. B.G. Malkiel and J.A. Malkiel, "Male-Female Pay Diff-
erentials in Professional Employment" American Economic 
Review, September, 1973, pp. 693-705. 
4. W.G. Shepherd and S.G. Levin "Managerial Discrimination 
in Large Firms", Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Novembe~ 1973, pp. 412-22. 
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earnings. 1 H. Sanborn uSlng data from 1950 U.S. Census 
found the female/male annual income ratio to be .58 which 
implies a male/female wage differential (as a proportion 
of the female wage) of .72. Sanborn's stated objective 
was to consider discrimination only in the context of 
unequal pay for equal work and not to deal with discrimin-
ation stemming from occupational segregation. Using both 
male and female adjustment weights, Sanborn adjusted the 
income ratio for occupational distribution, annual hours 
of work, education, urbanness, race, turnover, absenteeism 
and work experience. In his attempt to approximate equal 
work, Sanborn controlled for 262 detailed occupations. 
These adjustments brought the income ratio up to .87 - .88. 
The residual difference was therefore .13 and about 18% 
of the original differential. He,thus concluded that the 
I 
principal manifest form of discrimination is occupational 
segregation. 
V. Fuchs,2 analysis of 1960 U.S. Census data led 
I 
to conclusions ana1agous to Sanborn's. Fuchs calculated 
the hourly earnings of females relative to males to be .60( 
which implies a male-female wage differential of .66. The 
earnings ratio was raised to .66 after adjustments for 
1. H. Sanborn, "Pay Differences Between Men and Women", 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, July, 1964, 
pp. 534-50. 
2. V.R. Fuchs, "Differences in Hourly Earnings Between 
Men and Women", Monthly Labour Review, May, 1971, 
pp. 9-15. 
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colour, schooling, age, city size, marital status, class 
of worker and length of trip to work. This adjusted ratio 
implies a residual difference of .51 which is 77% of the 
original differential. From the results of his regressions 
of hourly earnings across occupations, Fuchs concluded that 
nearly all of the wage differential could be explained 
away if one chose sufficiently narrow occupational 
categories. He concluded that the principal explanation 
for the lower wages of females is role differentiation 
which affects occupational choice, labour force attachment, 
post-school investments, etc. 
1 Gwartney and Stroup, using appropriate data from 
both the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Census and relying principally 
on frequency-distribution standardization, concluded that 
sex difference in employment preferences seemed more imp-
ortant than discrimination in causing income differences 
according to sex .. 
Consistent with these conclusions are also the 
results of M. Cohen's2 analysis of data for full-time wage 
and salary workers aged 22 - 64 obtained from the 1969 
Survey of Working Conditions. An interesting and unique 
feature of Cohen's study is the analysis of the impact of 
fringe benefit differences between men and women. His 
calculation indicated that not only are the fringe benefits 
1. Gwartney and Stroup, Ope cit. 
2. M.S. Cohen, "Sex Differences in Compensation", Journal 
of Human Resources, Fall, 1971, pp. 434-47. 
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received by women not compensatory for their lower earnings, 
but that holding fringe benefits constant actually widens 
the earnings gap. 
In comparison to the preceding studies, several 
researchers who utilized data from the 1967 Survey of 
Economic Opportunity (SEO) have attributed larger propor-
tions of the observed sex differential in earnings to 
labour market discrimination. In one of the most elaborate 
studies, R. Oaxaca l controlled for a large number of pers-
onal and environmental characteristics in order to adjust 
a female/male hourly wage ratio from .65 to .72 among 
urban whites and from .67 to .69 among urban blacks. When 
he added controls for occupation, industry and class of 
worker, the adjusted ratios rose to about .78 and .80 
respectively. Thus, even if sex segregation by industrial 
sectors, major occupations groups and. class of worker is 
considered to be solely the product of role differentiation 
(e.g. socialization), Oaxaca's findings imply that about 
three-fifths of the wage gap is due to sex discrimination 
in the labour market. Other researchers like B. Bluestone 
et al., who have used SEO data,2 also concluded that stand-
ardization for education, occupation and industry still 
1. R. Oaxaca, "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban 
Labour Markets", International Economic Review, October, 
1973, pp. 693-709. 
2. R. Bluestone, W.M. Murphy and M. Stevenson, Low Wages 
and the Working Poor. The Institute of Labour and 
Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1973. 
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left a substantial female/male disparity in wages unex-
plained. 
Summarizing her more extensive study based on 
1967 Current Population Survey data for wage and salary 
workers, I.V. Sawhilll found that the female/male annual 
earnings ratio could be adjusted from .46 to .56 by cont-
rolling for race, region of residence, education, age and 
hours of work. Additional adjustment for sex differences 
in age-earnings profiles (an approximation to more accurate 
measurement of women's on-the-job training (OJT) provided 
by actual labour experience) increased the ratio only to 
.57. Sawhill concluded that her results were consistent 
with the hypothesis that discriminatory segregation of 
women into occupations is at the root of the earnings gap, 
in that it precludes women from receiving training, lowers 
their aspirations and restricts their job search. 
Finally, A. Blinder2 draws conclusions similar to 
Oaxaca's on the basis of data from the University of Mich-
igan Survey Research Center's Income Dynamics Panel. That 
is, Blinder's analysis of employed, white heads of household 
who were 25 years of age and older (in 1967) led him to 
conclude that two-thirds of the female/male wage differential 
1. I.V. Sawhill, "The Economics of Discrimination Against 
Women: Some New Findings", Journal of Human Resources, 
Summer,1979, pp. 383-96. 
2. A. Blinder, "Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and 
Structural Estimates", Journal of Human Resources, 
Fall,1973, pp. 436-55. 
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was due to outright discrimination in labour markets. In 
addition, he 'attributed the remaining third of the wage 
difference to discrimination in occupational assignment 
(and seniority) by estimating both reduced-form and struc-
tural wage determination equations. 
Research work on sex discrimination using Canadian data 
1 2 
can be found in the work of R. Holmes, R. Robb and M. Gunder-
3 
son. Gunderson, using Oaxaca's residual approach and 1971 
Canadian Census data, found that female earnings were app-
roximately 60% of male earnings with slightly over 60% of 
the gap attributable to outright wage discrimination after 
controlling for education, experience, marital status, 
region and 16 arbitrary occupational categories. 
British research work on sex discrimination is 
represented by two articles by B. Chiplin and P.J. Sloane. 4 
They attempted to assess the relative importance of unequal 
pay for equal work and unequal employment distribution in 
1. R. Holmes, "Male-Female Earnings Differentials in 
Canada", Journal of Human Resources, Winter, 1976, 
pp.l09-l2. 
2. R. Robb, "Earnings Differentials Among Males and Females 
in Ontario, 1971", Canadian Journal of Economics, May, 
1978, pp. 350-59. 
3. M. Gunderson, "Decomposition of Male-Female Earnings 
Differential: Canada, 1970", Canadian Journal of 
Economics, August, 1979, pp. 479-85. 
4. B. Chiplin and P.J. Sloane, "Sexual Discrimination in 
the Labour Market", British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, November, 1974, pp. 371-402 and "Male-Female 
Earnings Differences: A Further Analysis", British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, March, 1976, pp. 
77-81. 
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explaining the gross male-female earnings differential in 
Great Britain, by making use of 1971 and 1974 New Earnings 
Survey. Their findings suggested that unequal pay was far 
more important than unequal occupational distribution in 
explaining the wage gap between the sexes. (Their most 
recent article utilizing the 1974 NES data showed that the 
gross differential of £18.5 can be divided into £12.5 
(or 67.6%) for earnings differences and £4.6 (or 24.9%) for 
occupational distribution differences.) They suggest, 
therefore, that equal pay legislation has more potential 
for improving female earnings than equal opportunity 
legislation. Similar results are also reported by 
Addisonl on an industrial basis, for a comparative study 
using data from four European countries (Germany, Italy, 
Holland and Belgium). 
It is easier to summarize the many studies that 
have been conducted than to synthesize their findings and 
to make confident generalizations about the nature, extent 
and sources of sex differentiation in the labour market. 
The many differences in data sources, in models, and in 
methods of analysis make comparison hazardous and difficult. 
The "residual" approach that many of the studies reviewed 
have used, was seen earlier to suffer from severe defects. 
To add to these difficulties, even if one accepts that 
1. J.T. Addison, "Sex Discrimination: Some Comparative 
Evidence", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
July, 1975, pp. 263-65. 
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occupational differentiation is an important source of the 
observed sex differential in earnings, it is by no means 
clear to what extent the differentiation is produced by 
labour market discrimination (e.g. in promotions) or by sex 
role discrimination in the home and schools. Having said 
that, it becomes apparent that focussing on whether two-
thirds or one-third of sex differential in earnings can be 
explained by unequal occupational distribution, becomes at 
best an issue of secondary importance. 
(3) Sex Discrimination Within Internal Labour Markets 
The salient characteristic of ILMs, as was seen in 
Chapter 3, is the permanent employment relationship. Quite" 
apart from human capital variables, which directly affect pro-
ductivity, stability of employment can be considered as an in-
dependent, desirable characteristic for which employers are 
prepared to pay a premium. It can be thought as the time 
dimension of the productivity vector. 
In Chapter 2 it was also seen that the hierarchical ILM , 
structure may well have been necessitated by the organizational 
imperatives of large firms. 
Bearing these facts in mind and assuming that women 
are on average less stable than men, in large firms (with ILMs) 
one would expect to find (a) a wage differential among the 
sexes (b) a more male oriented composition of the labour 
force as compared to that of small or medium sized firms. The 
Report of the Bolton Committee in Small Firms has confirmed 
this last hypothesis. l 
It is the object of this section to elucidate the 
1. The Report of the Bolton Committee in Small Firms, Ope cit. 
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theoretical implications and predictions of the two dominant 
theories of discrimination, i.e. labour supply (human capital) 
and statistical theories, in the context of Internal Labour 
Markets. As was mentioned before, in analyzing the sex dif-
ferential in earnings, the results are very sensitive to the 
occupational (or job) standardization undertaken. For example, 
the researcher may use 
(a) one, two, three or more digit occupational 
classifications; 
(b) job clusters as those proposed by Dunlop and 
Scoville, that is clusters of jobs with the 
same focus; 
(c) narrowly defined job titles. 
In our own empirical work on wage discrimination, the job 
cluster standardization is utilised, since the job cluster is 
the essential characteristic of the Internal Labour Market. 
(a) Statistical Discrimination 
To recap, these demand based theories of discrimination 
focussing on employer's uncertainty about the prospective 
workers quality, were argued to be able to explain occupational 
(or job cluster) segregation but not unequal pay for equal work 
(i.e. unequal pay inside the same job cluster holding personal 
characteristics constant). 
Occupational segregation takes place at the hiring 
point. If the employer knows thatfon average/women have a 
lower labour force participation than men, it will be rational 
for him to allocate women mostly to those clusters where work 
intensity and/or stability of employment is not an essential 
characteristic. In the context of ILMs, crowding can take place 
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not only among job clusters but within clusters as well. That 
is women may have unequal promotion opportunities compared 
to men (at least during the first years of employment), holding 
pre-employment training and experience constant, since the 
employer rightly believes that they are on average less 
stable than men. Women will be given less on-the-job training 
than men and in general they are not expected to realise re-
turns to their human capital characteristics as high as those 
that men do. This kind of discrimination, although present 
during the first years of employment, is assumed to be 
lessened through time/as learning behaviour on the part of the 
employer reduces uncertainty and hence discrimination. 
Statistical theories of discrimination do not seem, 
therefore, able to explain unequal pay within job clusters. 
the 
It is legitimate/though,to argue that,in/context of ILMs, 
early statistical discrimination may have irreversible effects. 
In hierarchically organised structures, like the ILMs, the loss 
of even one grade in the promotion ladder during the early 
years of employment may render catching up difficult. If that 
is the case, learning behaviour cannot reverse the effects of 
early discrimination. 
Be that as it may, the stability value of married and 
single women within ILMs is another point that deserves clari-
fication. It is generally true that single women (without 
family responsibilities) work harder than married women or 
women with children and,hence,command more pay. One therefore 
expects that when the marriage and children variables are 
entered in an earnings function among women, they will have 
a negative s1gn. Within ILMs, this is not necessarily so. 
Women with children may work less hard than single women but 
I 
from the employer's viewpoint may be more stable (show stronger 
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labour force attachment) than single onesJsince they have 
decided to continue to work despite their family obligations. 
Single women;on the other hand/although hard working, may be 
more unstable from the employer's viewpoint/since it is 
possible that they will withdraw their services at the time 
of their marriage. In the context of ILMs, therefore, it is 
not possible to determine a priori the sign of the marriage 
and children variables in an earnings function among women. 
(b) Labour Supply Theories of Discrimination 
Human capital theories of discrimination are able to 
explain both occupational segregation and unequal pay for equal 
work. Women's belief that their major role in life is in child-
bearing influences occupational choice. This results in women 
choosing on average less career oriented occupations than men. 
Inside occupations, women work less hard than men because of 
their family responsibilities and therefore get less pay. 
Married women and women with children are expected to work 
less hard than single ones. Married men, on the other hand, 
are expected to work harder than single men, according to the 
1 
same division of labour argument. 
In sum, the labour supply theories of discrimination lead 
us to expect a negative sign for the marriage and children vari-
ables in an earnings function among women/and a positive sign for 
the same variables in an earnings function among men. 
1. Especially in the context of LDCs, the last proposition 
might not necessarily be true. In countries without the 
dowry system, for example, a strong financial position 
might be a prerequisite for marriage. 
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(c) Synthesis 
It should be borne in mind that the controversy between 
the labour supply (or human capital) and the statistical theories 
of discrimination in explaining the sex differential in earnings 
bears striking resemblance to the controversy between human 
capital and "screening" theories in explaining the higher earnings 
of more educated people. 
According to supply based human capital theories more 
educated people are more productive than less educated ones 
and hence get more pay. Men, on the other hand, work harder 
than women because they have no household responsibilities and 
receive higher earnings. 
According to the demand based statistical theories, 
education and sex are treated as "screens" by employers, since 
they know that on average these characteristics are associated 
with differential productivity. Statistical discrimination by 
sex or education seems, at best, able to explain differential 
starting salaries, since, as time passes, employers have every 
opportunity to acquire evidence on job performance and do not 
·have to rely on "screens". Early statistical discrimination 
by education or sex, however, may have irreversible effects in 
the context of hierarchically organised ILMs, where seniority 
provisions predominate in wage determination. 
Thus ,it may well be the case that statistical 
theories and labour supply explanations of the sex dif-
ferential in earnings may indeed be regarded as complements 
rather than substitutes. Women get less pay because they 
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work less hard than men) and because they have been stat-
istically discriminated at the hiring point, which, in 
the context of ILMs, makes catching up difficult. 
(4) Sex Discrimination in Greek White-Collar Internal 
Labour Markets: 
Three Case Studies 
This section, using a three-company sample of 
over 400 white-collar employees, analyses sex discrimin-
ation within Internal Labour Markets) whose presence was 
established in the previous chapter. 
This research is hoped to fulfil three object-
ives: 
(a) To analyse and elucidate the role of marriage and 
children in wage discrimination in the context of Internal 
Labour Markets; 
(b) by dividing each company into job clusters, to 
examine how the pattern of discrimination varies in the 
different parts of the company and to facilitate inter -
firm comparisons of similar clusters; 
(c) to distinguish which of the two dominant theories 
of discrimination, i.e. labour supply (or human capital) 
and statistical discrimination, seems more plausible in the 
light of the data. 
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Although academic work on sex discrimination 1S 
voluminous (especially in the U.S.), researchers have been 
shown to be hesitant in the use of firm-level data. The 
first attempt to study pay differentials and hence wage 
discrimination using micro, firm-specific data can be 
found in the pioneering article of Malkiel and Malkiel l j 
who used a sample of 272 professional employees of a 
single U.S. corporation. Althouth the Malkiels examined 
the role of job levels, the jobs in their study seemed 
homogeneous with respect to skill type and thus, in effect, 
the authors studied promotion within the same job cluster. 
Their attempt was followed by the article of F.Cassell, S. 
Director and S. Doctors~who used a three company sample 
of over 2,300 blue-collar and lower-level white-collar 
workers but did not attempt to partition their sample into 
job clusters. The findings of both studies mentioned 
above are congruent in the sense that they conclude that: 
ignoring labour grade, women with job characteristics 
equal to those of men, fail to get the same pay. Yet, 
after current labour grade is- held constant,through its 
inclusion in the regression model, the male-female earnings 
gap disappears. 
1. B.G. Malkiel and J.A. Malkiel, op. cit. 
2. F.H. Cassell, S.M. Director and S.I. Doctors, 
"Discrimination Within Internal Labour Markets", 
Industrial Relations, October,1975, pp. 337-344. 
Therefore: 
... women with the same training, experience 
etc. as men tend to be assigned to lower job 
levels, but within levels it is different 
for discriminatory organizations to give 
male and female employees the same titles 
and pay them different amounts. 1 
2 In an even more recent article, P. Osterman 
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analysed sex discrimination with data on over 700 prof-
essional employees of a New York publishing firm. The 
unique feature of this study is that he partitions his 
sample into clusters of similar jobs (he uses 11 job 
clusters). He finds that the sex differential in earnings 
within clusters is much greater if marriage and children 
variables are excluded; men receive a large "premium" 
from being married, but women do not. On analysing this 
difference)the author rejects a labour supply explanation 
and two variants of statistical discrimination, concluding 
that managers in this firm simply believe that married 
men deserve higher earnings than comparable women. It is 
quite extraordinary that Osterman is not prepared to devote 
even a single paragraph to rationalize his arbitrary 
conclusion. Why do married men deserve higher earnings 
than women? Is it a rational or irrational response by 
employers? Is it rational to expect that in a society 
1. Malkiel and Malkiel,op. cit., p. 704. 
2. P. Osterman, "Sex Discrimination in Professional 
Employment: A Case Study", Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review, Jul~ 1979, pp. 451-64. 
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with a deeply rooted tradition of male chauvinism, males 
will ungrudgingly accept equal remuneration with women of 
similar individual characteristics? If the answer to 
this last question is negative, it will be completely 
rational for employers interested in the smooth functioning 
of their firm, to maintain a wage differential among the 
sexes. 
(a) The Data 
The three companies under study belong to the 
50 biggest companies of Greece. Firm (1) produces cement, 
Firm (2) is engaged in the extraction of Bauxite and Firm 
(3) produces textiles. The factories of these firms I 
employing the blue-collar workers,are situated outside 
Athens, but their headquarters with the white-collar 
employees are located in Athens. 
The data came from 1979. All personnel records 
were surveyed for companies (1) and (2). For Firm (3) ) 
with approximately 700 white-collar employees, a 20% ran-
dom sample was drawn. 
The first step in our analysis is to map the 
'1nternal labour market' in order to control for earnings 
differentials within the firm that arise from con-
ditions in the external labour market. Imagine, for 
example, that a firm does not engage in hiring discrimin-
ation and its work force is divided equally between two 
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jobs: Job A/which pays an average wage of £5 an hour and 
on which 20% of the employees are women/and Job B/which pays 
an average of £3 an hour and on which 50% of the employees 
are women. An average wage, by sex, for the firm, or even 
an estimated wage that controls for personal characteristics, 
will show that women earn less than men. This earnings 
differential, however, is probably not due to discrimin-
ation by the firm but, rather, to conditions in the extern-
al labour market that set the wage for Job A higher than 
Job B and that determine the sex composition of the rel-
evant labour pools. This line of reasoning assumes that 
wage differentials between jobs within a firm are deter-
mined by market forces and not by discrimination. We will 
come to this issue - the possible endogeneity of the job 
structure - in a later section. 
In addition to controlling for the external labour 
market, use of internal job clusters permits a more soph-
isticated analysis of the company itself. On the assump-
tion that the company is not a monolith with homogeneous 
behaviour throughout, the use of job clusters enables us 
to examine how the pattern of discrimination varies in its 
different parts. 
The construction of the job clusters was made 
"by eye". Departments were grouped together if our under-
studying led us to believe that they performed similar 
functions. Job clusters with less than 10 observations 
were excluded from the analysis. This was rather 
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unfortunate, since we were forced to eliminate some job 
clusters from the data. (For example, sales and computing 
clusters were left out). Be that as it may, for companIes 
(1) and (2),the following job clusters were identified: 
(a) administrative and clerical and 
(b) accounting. 
For company (3) the identified clusters were: 
(a) managerial and 
(b) administrative and clerical. 
Table (18) shows the sex composition of the job 
clusters together with the average salary of male and female 
employees in each cluster. 
(b) Regression Analysis and Results 
To explain wage discrimination inside internal 
l.abour markets we estimated the earnings equations using 
the semilog Mincerian form by now standard in the litera-
ture. The variables are defined in Table (19). The education 
and seniority variables are standard and require little 
elaboration. The experience variables measure actual 
years of experience as opposed to the Mincerian proxy 
j = Age - Education - 6 .which is often used in national 
I 
data sets. This difference is particularly important in 
studying sex discrimination because women 1 s labour force 
participation tends to be more sporadic than men. The 
inclusion of marriage and children variables in the 
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TABLE 18 
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS IN SPECIFIED JOB CLUSTERS BY SEX 
Job 
Cluster 
Accounting 
Clerical 
Accounting 
Clerical 
Clerical 
Managerial 
Employees 
37 
101 
33 
135 
102 
36 
Average 
% Salary of 
Female Male Employees 
30 
50 
42 
48 
61 
5 
(Dr. ) 
FIRM (1) 
28557 
22669 
FIRM (2) 
21162 
19295 
FIRM (3) 
19166 
38372 
Average 
Salary of 
Female 
Employees 
(Dr.) 
18863 
15435 
20089 
14619 
14156 
17830 
Ratio of 
Female to 
Male 
Salaries 
.660 
.681 
.949 
.757 
.738 
.452 
ED 1 
NEXP 
NEXP 1 
PEXP 
PEXP 1 
SEX = 
MAR 
CHIL 
CLU 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
TABLE 19 
Variable Definitions 
1 if university degree, 0 otherwise 
Years employed by the Company 
Square of previous variable 
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Years of experience on jobs prior to joining 
the company 
Square of previous variable 
1 if male, 0 if female 
1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Number of children 
For Firms (1) and (2) I 
1 if employed in accounting job cluster 
0 if employed in clerical job cluster 
For Firm (3) I 
1 if employed in managerial job cluster 
0 if employed in clerical job cluster 
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earn1ngs equations raises some questions. Are they "leg-
itimate" variables of an earnings function? It was 
emphasised 1n the previous chapter that stability of 
employment 1S the salient feature of ILMs. Increasing 
emphasis on stability implies that maintenance and control 
of work effort and loyalty assume paramount importance in 
personnel policies. Independently of any possible indiv-
idual characteristic like education and training, the 
employer is therefore prepared to pay a premium for stab-
ility of employment which has two dimensions 
Ca) low turnover rates 
Cb) high and stable work effort levels. 
Marriage and children have a direct influence 
on the stability characteristic. Married men for example, 
I 
may be expected to work harder than single men. They are 
also less likely to switch jobs than single men. Married 
women, on the other hand, may work less hard than single 
women because of the family division of labour argument. 
They may be less likely, though, to quit their jobs than 
single ones. If one recognises that an ea~nings function 
is actually a reduced form of a supply and demand system 
and that stability of employment belongs to the firm's 
demand function, one can see the plausibility of including 
marriage and children variables as proxies for stability. 
Estimates of the earnings equation are included 
in Tables 20, 21 and 22 for the three companies respectively. 
The first two equations in each Table include sex dummies 
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and the first equation includes marriage and child var-
iables, while the second excludes them. The next four 
equations in each Table are separate estimates for each 
sex, 3 and 5 including the marriage and child variables 
and 4 and 6 e~luding them. These equations enable us to 
study in more detail the nature of the overall differential 
in earnings. Dummy variables included to control for job 
clusters will inevitably bias downwards the human capital 
variables like education and experience. Since our aim, 
though, is not to estimate the returns to education, 
inclusion of the job cluster dummies is justified. 
It is interesting to note the the success of these 
earnings equations as measured by their R2 statistics. 
These R2 are higher than those typical of economywide 
studies, as might be expected since we are implicitly 
controlling for company idiosyncracies. On the other hand, 
however, as Wise l has shown, within company R2s are biased 
well down from one because the promotion process is nec-
essarily stochastic and all individuals of like character-
istics cannot be promoted at the same time. 
The sex dummies in equations (1) and (2) show a 
substantial sex differential. This differential is reduced 
however with the introduction of the marriage and children 
variables. For equations (5) and (6) (for women) it is 
1. D. Wise, "Personal Attributes, Job Performance and 
Probability of Promotion", Econometrica, September / 
Novembe~ 1975, pp. 913-931. 
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TABLE 20 
(Firm (1)) 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EARNINGS EQUATIONS IN WHICH 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS 
Independent 
Variable 
SEX 
NEXP 
NEXP 1 
PEXP 
PEXP 1 
ED1 
MAR 
CHIL 
CLU 
Constant 
R2 
No. of cases 
Notes 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Full Sample Men Women 
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6 
.208* .257* 
( .038) ( .038) 
.045* .051* .043* .054* .065* .065* 
(.007) ( .008) (.010) ( .012) ( .014) ( .013) 
- .QCX)4** - .0005** - .0004 - .0006 - .001** - .001** 
(.0002) (.0002) (.0003) ( .0003) (.0008) (.0007) 
.027* .034* .019 .030** .025 .031 
(.008) (.008) (.010) (.011) (.024) (.022) 
- .0008** -.0009* -.0006 -.0008 -.(XU .0008 
(.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0005) ( .002) ( .002) 
0197* .198* .302* .326* -.005 -.004 
(.051) ( .054) (.071) (.080) (.060) (.059) 
.020 .041 .019 
(.034) (.083) (.030) 
.091* .140 * ":' -.011 
( .027) (.041) (.032) 
-.016 -.045 -.053 -.112 .025 
(.046) (.048) (.062) ( .071) (.056) 
9.313 9.330 9.475 9.573 9.293 9.297 
.740 .700 .714 .606 .723 .721 
138 138 75 75 63 63 
Variables are defined in Table 19. 
* - significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% but not at the 
1 % level 
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TABLE 21 
(Firm (2)) 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EARNINGS EQUATIONS IN WHICH 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS 
Independent 
Variable 
SEX 
NEXP 
NEXP 1 
PEXP 
PEXP 1 
ED1 
MAR 
CHIL 
CLU 
Constant 
R2 
No. of cases 
Notes: 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Full Sample Men Women 
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq • 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6 
• 116** .106** 
(.048) (.043) 
.045* .052* .042 .053* .052* .043* 
(.011) (.010) (.015) (.014) (.020) (.016) 
-.0003 -.0005 -.0002 -.0005 -.0006 -.0003 
(.ron) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0006) (.0005) 
.024** .025** .0009 .002 .039 .042 
(.012) (.012) ( .017) ( .017) ( .023) ( .022) 
.00005 -.00005 .0008 -.0002 -.0007 -.0009 
(.0005) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007) (.0015) (.0015) 
.379* .361* .484* .466* .151 .183 
(.057) ( .056) (.067) ( .068) (.109) (.100) 
.075 .159** -.062 
(.053) ( .072) (.079) 
-.014 -.030 
( .029) (.032) 
.049 .050 -.039 -.049 .167** • 160*'" 
(.051) (.051) ( .066) ( .068) (.077) (.076) 
9.191 9.200 9.295 9.315 9.220 9.222 
.724 .719 .766 .744 .703 .699 
168 168 95 95 73 73 
Variables are defined in Table 19 
* = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% but not at the 
1% level 
TABLE 22 
(F i rm (3)) 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF EARNINGS EQUATIONS IN WHICH 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG MONTHLY EARNINGS 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent Full Sample Men Women 
Variable Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq • 6 
SEX .172* • 191* 
(.037) (.037) 
NEXP .027* .030* .038* .041* • 016** .021 * . 
( .007) (.005) ( .013) ( .009) ( .006) ( .005) 
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NEXP 1 .00007 -.00004 - .ro)2 -.0002 .0001 .00005 
(.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
PEXP -.011 -.012 -.012 -.012 -.018 -.009 
( .013) (.013) (.019) (.019) (.065) (.091) 
PEXP 1 .0007 .0007 .0008 .0008 .0005 .0006 
(.0005) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007) (.0004) (.0007) 
ED1 .137** .138** .206** .211* -.006 -.044 
(.060) (.060) (.083) (.080) (.108) (.108) 
MAR .082 .076 .048 
( .049) (.123) ( .036) 
mIL -.015 -.023 .011 
(.027) (.046) (.026) 
CLU .369* .385* .331* .339* .318** .392* 
(.057) (.056) ( .075) ( .073) (.135) (.131) 
Constant 9.258 9.272 9.351 9.350 9.348 9.352 
R2 
.865 1862 .820 .819 .723 .704 
No. of cases 138 138 73 73 65 65 
Notes Variables are defined in Table 19 
* = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% but not at the 
1% level 
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interesting to see that marriage and child variables have 
no significant effect on earnings for all three companies. 
For equations (3) and (4) ,however (for men), the picture 
is less clear. For Firm (1) only the child variable is 
significantly different from zero. For Firm (2) the 
marital dummy is significant but not the child variable 
whilst for Firm (3) both variables are insignificant. 
Possession of a college degree does not significantly 
affect the earnings of women in all three samples. In 
contrast, for the three male equations, a university 
degree is associated with 30%, 48% and 20% more pay than 
secondary school degree,holding all other variables cons-
tant. It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that 
university educated women suffer wage discrimination comp-
ared with their male counterparts, i.e. the returns to 
higher education for males are substantially higher than 
for women. This conclusion should be only tentativ~though, 
since in all samples the number of females : with, university 
qualifications is very small (usually 7 - 8). 
(c) Labour Supply Explanation 
Does the labour supply explanation seem reasonable 
in the light of the data? To recap, this explanation 
argues that women with families, despite being full-time 
full year workers,work less intensely than do men, while 
married men, freed from home responsibilities work harder 
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than single men. Furthermore, sex differentials among 
single persons should not be significant, holding all other 
characteristics constant. 
The coefficients in Tables 20 - 22 reveal the 
following pattern: For men/the marital status variable 
1S only significantly different from zero for Firm (2). 
In this firm, a married man receives 16% more pay than a 
single ma~holding everything else constant. The child 
variable is only significant in the equation for the first 
Firm/where every child increases pay by 14%. For women, 
neither the marriage nor the child variable have a signif-
icant effect (for all three firms). 
Were the labour supply explanation true, 
marriage alone (without children) would increase men's 
earnings and decrease women's, but the earnings of women 
1n this sample show no such effect, presenting, therefore, 
an inconsistent finding. Further, according to the explan-
ation, children should have a negative effect on the earn-
ings of women in terms of the division of labour argument. 
The results again are not consistent with the predictions of 
the labour supply hypothesis. 
A strong believer in the labour supply hypothesis 
would argue that the earnings differential among single 
people is the true measure of discrimination. Running the 
earnings equation among single people did not result in any 
reduction of the sex dummy. The predictions of the labour 
supply hypothesis, once again, are not consistent with the 
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evidence. 
Cd) Statistical Discrimination 
The distinguishing feature of this explanation 
is that differential outcomes are not the result of discrim-
ination by intent or attitude but, rather, of information 
failures. The firm is assumed to reward workers on the 
basis of some underlying productivity-generating charact-
eristic,which is usually defined in terms of intensity of 
work and/or stability of employment. The difference-in-
means version of statistical discrimination assumes that 
the means of these characteristics differ for the two sex 
groups and that this difference is known to the employer. 
In itself this would pose no problem of discrimination. 
The employer could pay each person according to his or her 
stability establishing different group means in earnings; 
but men and women with the same stability value would be 
paid the same and an earnings function would display no 
discriminatory differential. Since the actual character-
istic is unobservable, the employer uses the group means 
of this characteristic as information and this results in 
women receiving lower earnings than men. 
Table 23 presents mean and median values of some 
variables important to this explanation. It shows that 
women in all three companies are considerably less likely 
to be married or have children than men. Average and 
Finn 1 
NEXP 
PEXP 
MAR 
mIL 
Finn 2 
NEXP 
PEXP 
MAR 
mIL 
Finn 3 
NEXP 
PEXP 
MAR 
mIL 
Notes 
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TABLE 23 
MEANS AND MEDIANS OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
(Firms 1-3) 
Men Women Married Women Single Women 
8.307(5.438) 6.143(5.143) 7.690(6.750) 4.938(4.167) 
4.293( .372) 1.063( .118) 1.034 ( .190) .656( .100) 
.760( .842) .485( .996) 
1.147 (1. 281) .444 ( .233) 
Men Women Married Women Single Women 
10.403(7.125) 8.571 (6. 813) 10.138(8.000) 6.300(3.500) 
1.855( .189) 2.102( .407) 2.690(1.125) 1.250( .167) 
.597 ( .662) .592 ( .655) 
.774 ( .412) 0 (0.000) 
Men Women Married Women Single Women 
15.233(16.875) 8.492(7.125) 10.432 (8.917) 5. 929( 4.167) 
.986( .062) .231 ( .033) .270( .044) .182( .023) 
.726( .811) .569( .622) 
1.096( 1.176) .615( .333) 
(a) 
(b) 
values in parentheses are medians 
variables are defined in Table (19) 
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median years of in-firm experience are lower for women than men, 
showing that women tend to stay for a shorter time in the company. 
They are on average less stable than men from the employer's 
viewpoint. 
Employers in these firms, therefore, are perfectly 
justified to discriminate against women, at least during the 
early years of employment, since they are on average less 
stable than men. After a period of time, however, it is 
expected that the employer would learn about individual 
employees"and as a result the uncertainty and discrimination 
will diminish. The evidence though, is that learning behaviour 
does not lessen discrimination: as Tables 20, 21 and 22 show) 
the major source of the earnings differential between the 
sexes is differences in returns to education. 
As was noted before, however, early statistical dis-
crimination inside ILMs may have irreversible effects. The 
first argument is that the loss of even one grade in the 
promotion ladder during the early years of employment may 
render catching up difficult. According to the second/the 
fact that a woman is single does not necessarily imply 
for the employers that she has an equal stability value as 
men. For them, the uncertainty about a single woman's 
stability may not be reduced until the time she gets married. 
In the meantime she is offered less training and less 
promotion opportunities than men. In that case early 
statistical discrimination may indeed have durable effects. 
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In sum, statistical theories of wage discrim-
ination inside ILMs, although admittedly difficult to 
test, cannot be refuted by the evidence. 
(e) Job Structure 
Thus far we have taken the job structure 
of the firm as given. We have used the skill clusters 
as controls without examining differences in treat-
ment of women within them. This task is undertaken 
below. 
The sex and seniority coefficients for 
the earnings equations run within each job cluster 
are shown in Table 24. 
For both Firm (1) and Firm (2) the sex dummies 
show that the accounting job cluster seems to be 
associated with less discrimination than the clerical 
cluster. For Firm (2) in actual fact, the sex 
variable for the accounting cluster becomes insignif-
icant. Thus if one accepts that the accounting 
cluster has a more central role in the company than 
TABLE 24 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEX AND EXPERIENCE VARIABLES 
BY JOB CLUSTERS l 
SEX 
NEXP 
NEXP 1 
FIRM (1) 
.227* 
.073* 
-.002** 
FIRM (2) 
CLERICAL CLUSTER 
.145** 
.050* 
-.0003 
ACCOUNTING CLUSTER 
FIRM (3) 
.189* 
.024* 
-.0002 
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SEX 
NEXP 
NEXP 1 
.201** .059 not applicable 
Notes 
* 
** 
1. 
.046* 
-.0004 
.035* 
-.0003 
Significant at both 5% and 1% levels 
Significant only at the 5% level 
Other variables in the equations are ED 1, 
PEXP, PEXP 1, as defined in Table 19. 
229 
the clerical cluster (the higher average pay in the former 
corroborates this assertion), it appears that wage discrimin-
ation is less intense in the most prestigious job clusters 
of the compan~ contrary to the findings of Ostermanl , who 
jfound _ that the most prestigious clusters are the most 
discriminatory. 
A plausible explanation of this phenomenon could 
be that in the case of the most prestigious and important 
clusters, employers discriminate at the hiring point and 
not inside these clusters. They will scrutinize very 
carefully women employees before appointing them to these 
clusters, which are central for the operation of the firm. 
By doing that, employers' uncertainty about women's ability 
and stability is greatly reduced and hence there is no 
compelling reason for further discrimination. 
It is clear that the results presented above, due 
to the small sample sizes and the possible multicollinearity 
2 problems _ should be interpreted with extreme caution. The 
suggestion also,that the more prestigious clusters are less 
discriminatory is highly tentative (since only two clusters , 
are being compared) and open for further empirical work. 
1. Osterman, Ope cit. 
2. For an exhaustive treatment of the multicollinearity 
problem see J. Johnson, Econometric Methods (2nd 
edition). New York: McGraw-Hl11, 1972, pp. 159-168. 
230 
5. Conclusion 
Labour market discrimination is usually assumed to 
take the form of either occupational segregation or unequal 
pay for equal work (however defined). The voluminous research 
undertaken, especially in the U.S., in an effort to quantify the 
relative importance of these two forms of discrimination pro-
duced a wide variability of results and reinforced the con-
fusion that already existed in the area. Most of the researchers 
failed to realise that their results critically depend on the 
kind and degree of occupational standardization undertaken. 
Moreover, although there seems to be consensus that occupational 
differentiation is an important source of the observed sex dif-
ferential in earnings, it is by no means clear to what extent 
the differentiation is produced by labour market discrimination 
(e.g. in promotions) or by sex role discrimination in the home 
and schools which in turn might have been influenced by direct 
labour market discrimination (the incidence of cumulative 
discrimination). 
In the context of ILMs, direct discrimination is said 
to exist when people with the same productivity generating 
characteristics, including stability of employment (which 
represents the time dimension of productivity) do not receive 
equal treatment. This time dimension of productivity is 
usually neglected in the discussion of wage discrimination and 
may well be one important explanation of the observed sex 
differential in earnings. The reduced stability value for 
women as compared for men may induce employers to invest less 
in women's training and offer them unequal promotion 
possibilities than men, thus, in effect, hindering them to 
realise the full returns to their human capital characteristics. 
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The two main competitive theories of wage discrimina-
tion explaining unequal pay within the same occupations (or 
job clusters) have been the demand based statistical theories 
which focus on the employers' uncertainty about the women's 
stability and/or work intensit~ and the labour supply theories 
which stress that women work with less intensity than men be-
cause of their household responsibilities and,hence,get less 
pay. 
It has been argued that statistical theories of dis-
crimination can only explain differential starting salaries 
among the sexes since learning behaviour on the part of the 
employer, will reduce their uncertainty and hence discrimina-
tion. In firms with hierarchically organised ILMs, however, 
early statistical discrimination may have irreversible effects 
since it is difficult to catch up with someone already higher 
in the promotion ladder. Furthermore, in a society with a deeply 
rooted tradition of male chauvinism/it may be perfectly rational 
for the employers to treat the sexes unequally since equal 
treatment might interfere with the smooth,non-conflicting 
functioning of the firm (male employees may be reluctant to 
take and execute orders from females). 
The three case studies undertaken to distinguish which 
of the two dominant competitive theories of discrimination seemed 
more plausible, could not lend support to the labour supply hypothesis. 
Marriage and children variables in an earnings function among 
women did not have the expected negative and significant co-
efficients. Moreover, in a regression among single people,the 
sex coefficient was hardly reduced. Statistical theories of 
discrimination,on the other hand, could not be refuted by the 
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evidence. This is hardly surprising, however, since one 
expects that demand based theories should fare better in 
demand oriented internal labour markets. 
In general though/labour supply and statistical 
theories of discrimination may indeed be complementary. 
Women may well get less pay than men (in the same occupa-
tions) because they work with less intensity, and because 
they have been statistically discriminated in the early 
years of employment (by being offered less training and 
lower promotion prospects than men), which makes catching 
up difficult. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the last twenty years, human capital theory 
can undoubtedly be considered as one of the most fertile 
research areas in economics. The fundamental notion of 
human capital - of forgoing current income for the sake of 
increased future earnings - has been used to explain why 
people acquire additional education or training, why they 
migrate abroad or to the urban centres, why they purchase 
health care, why they decide to have many children instead 
of a few, why they spend a lot of time searching for the 
best possible job, or even more ambitiously, why women 
receive less remuneration than men (because of their family 
responsibilities, women may invest less in on-the-job 
training than men, and hence, get less pay). 
In the field of education, the principal theoret-
ical implication of human capital theory is that the demand 
for post compulsory education is responsive to variations 
in the private rate of return to educational investment, 
that is, variations in the direct (tuition fees) and indir-
ect (earnings forgone whilst at school) private costs of 
schooling#and to the earnings differentials associated with 
different levels of schooling. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that human 
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capital theory does not claim that private returns are the 
only determinant of the demand for education. Sociological 
explanations based on historical or institutional factors 
and on status, prestige and power considerations may be 
acknowledged as being of some importance, provided they 
do not conflict with the dominant human capital (rate of 
return) explanation. In this sense, however, human capital 
and sociological explanations can be better thought of as 
complements rather than substitutes. Furthermore, high 
private rates of return to, say, university education do 
not imply that everyone will seek to acquire a university 
degree. For some people, the non-pecuniary (psychic) costs 
of going to university may be high relative to the pecuniary 
net benefits or, alternatively, they may have a strong 
attachment to certain types of work which do not require 
higher educational credentials. Moderate changes in the 
salaries in the market will have little impact on the career 
choice of these types of people. The decisions of the 
"average" individuals, however, with no strong commitment 
to a particular job or career, are expected to be influenced 
by variations in the pecuniary (rate of return) incentives. 
In an effort to see whether human capital theory, 
on its own, can explain the phenomenon of "over-education" 
in Greece, private rates of return to university education 
are calculated for the Banking and Civil Service sectors of 
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Greece (sectors which employ a large proportion of unlV-
ersity degree holders). 
which 
In chapter 2 it is seen that state legislation 
(a) does not pose any time limit upon the completion 
of higher degrees, 
(b) does not render attendance at lectures and classes 
compulsory, 
(c) awards a rigid premium to all degree holders, 
enables employees in the Greek public sector to complete 
their university studies whilst working, minimising their 
indirect costs of education (earnings forgone) and allowing 
them, in effect, to realise large returns to their educat-
ional investment. 
Even more significantly, the state, unable to 
provide postgraduate courses, introduced an additional 
piece of legislation which allowed university graduates to 
register automatically as third or fourth year students of 
another first degree. Since a graduate can complete his 
second first degree whilst working, without incurring any 
indirect costs (besides the psychic costs of studying and 
taking up exams), he can realise infinite returns to his 
investment decision to undertake a second first degree 
{assuming, of course, that he has higher promotion opp-
ortunities and hence higher pay possibilities as compared 
with the holder of a single degree). 
The interesting feature of the large private rates 
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of return to university education in Greece, is, therefore, 
that they do not stem from the much superior earnings of 
university graduates as compared with secondary school 
graduates, but rather from the fact that state legislation 
allows the minimization of costs (earnings forgone) of the 
educational investment. This, in turn, will lead to the 
following prediction. Even if the earnings of degree holders 
in the private sector are much higher than those in the 
public sector, rates of return calculated separately for the 
private sector will not necessarily exceed those for the 
public sector, since an employee of a private firm has no 
incentive to acquire a university degree whilst working, 
simply because he has no guarantee that such an act will 
entail high~r earnings. Rates of return to higher education 
in the private sector may well be lower than rates in the 
public sector/even if the earnings in the former are higher 
than those in the latter. The "signals" that these two 
returns produce may, therefore, be at odds with each other. 
Large private rates of return to university 
education in the public sector can not only account 
for the phenomenon of "over-education" in Greece, but are 
also expected to reinforce the social pressures for further 
expansion of the higher educational system and the State 
Bureaucracy. Even more, they will encourage further mlgra-
tion flows from the countryside to the urban centres where 
the educational institutions and the public sector jobs are 
mostly located. 
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All the above will cause continuous headaches 
to the politicians, whose legislation, directed to satisfy 
popular demands, is at the root of all these problems. 
Measures to reduce the private rate of return to university 
education, although essential from a social viewpoint, are 
unlikely to be put forward, unless, of course, the power to 
make decisions on educational matters is transferred to a 
body which is relatively insulated from pOlitical pressure. 
While the private rates of return to education 
have been the alternative that human capital theory offered 
as an explanation of the private demand for education, in 
the field of educational planning, the human capital alternative has 
been the social rate of return to education. Educational 
provision is considered to be a typical investment project 
and hence the costs and benefits of this project have to 
be taken into account. The social benefits are the increa-
sed productivity of the more educated people,which is 
approximated by the wage differential between the various 
educational levels. On the cost side, the direct costs of 
educational provision (in buildings, staff salaries, etc.) 
and the indirect ones (the earnings forgone whilst at 
school) have to be included. Resources are therefore to be 
allocated to levels of education so as to equalise the 
marginal social rate of return on educational investment 
and, furthermore, this equalised yield should not fall 
below the yield on alternative social or private investments. 
Social rates of return to education have been criticised on 
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many grounds (see Introduction), but the most devastating 
criticism has come from the proponents of the so-called 
"s creening" or "s ignall ing" hypothes is which bas icall y 
challenges the view that earnings differentials, even if 
standardised for differences in ability or socio-economic 
background, measure the social benefits of education. The 
basic ingredients of the signalling hypothesis are the 
following: Employers prefer to hire more than less edu-
cated workers, not because they possess cognitive skills 
(which are acquired through on-the-job training), but because 
they possess certain personality traits like achievement 
drive, stability of employment or compliance with organis-
ation rules, which are directly related to the worker's 
potential trainability. These desirable attributes cannot 
be known with certainty at the time of hiring and the emp-
loyer, therefore, concerned with selecting job applicants 
in terms of their trainability, is tempted to treat educ-
ational qualifications as a "screening" device to sort out 
new workers in terms of these attributes. (It should be 
kept in mind that not only educational qualifications, but 
also alternative traits, like race or sex, can be used as 
screening devices). According to the signalling hypothesis, 
therefore, the social rate of return to education is a rate 
of return to a particular occupational selection mechanism 
and the use of intereducational earnings differentials in 
calculating the social benefits of education, is unwarranted. 
This version of the screening hypothesis runs into 
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the difficulty that it accounts for, at best, the starting 
salaries and not for the earnings of long term employees in 
different firms. An employer has every opportunity, with 
long term employees, to acquire independent evidence on 
job performance, without continuing to rely on educational 
qualifications. Yet the evidence has shown that the corr-
elation between earnings and length of schooling, which the 
screening hypothesis predicts will fall with successive 
years of work experience, actually increases, a fact 
difficult to explain by this version of the screening 
hypothesis. 
A stronger version of "screening", however, 
surmounts these difficulties by assuming that the sorting -
out, in terms of educational qualifications, takes place 
at the entry ports of hierarchically organised and depart-
mentally based "internal labour markets". Especially in the 
first grades of the job ladder, promotion is governed 
exclusively by seniority provisions and hence the loss 
of one grade at the hiring point may well have irrevers-
ible effects, since a less educated person has fewer opp-
ortunities than a more educated one to "catch up" on the 
promotion ladder. In this sense, discrimination in terms 
of educational qualifications may well have durable effects. 
While the dispute between the human capital 
theory and the screening hypothesis has figured prominently 
in the literature of the economics of education, human cap-
ital (or labour supply) and screening or statistical theories 
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have also been the two major theoretical frameworks advanced 
to explain the sex differential in earnings (which is the 
subject matter of Chapter 4). 
The human capital explanation of the sex differen-
tial in earnings (in the same occupations) is that women 
work with less intensity and invest less in on-the-job train-
ing, as compared with men, because of their household respon-
sibilities and hence, get less pay. 
Screening or statistical theories of sex discrimina-
tion argue, on the other hand, that the sex differential in 
earnings is the result of the employer's uncertainty about 
the women's stability and/or work intensity. Hiring is an 
investment under uncertainty and employers use sex as a 
"screening" device to sort out workers in terms of potential 
stability or work intensity. 
As in the case of education, it has been argued 
that statistical theories of discrimination can only explain 
differential starting salaries between the sexes, since 
learning behaviour on the part of the employers will reduce their 
uncertainty and hence discrimination. In firms with 
heirarchically organised ILMs, however, early statistical 
discrimination may, once again, have irreversible effects 
since it is difficult to catch up with someone already 
higher in the promotion ladder. Furthermore, in firms with 
ILMs, equal treatment of the two sexes may well interfere 
with the efficient functioning of the firm. (Male employees 
born into a society with deeply rooted traditions of 
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male chauvinism may be reluctant to take orders from females ). 
The three case studies undertaken (using sample 
data on white collar employees of three firms in the Greek 
Manufacturing Industry) to distinguish which of the two 
dominant theories of discrimination (human capital and 
statistical theories) fared better in the context of ILMs, 
could not lend support to the human capital predictions. 
Marriage and children variables in an earnings 
function among women were not found to have the expected 
negative and significant coefficients. Moreover, in a reg-
ression among ~ingle people, the sex coefficient was hardly 
reduced. Statistical theories of sex discrimination, 
though, could not be refuted by the evidence. 
As in the case of education, human capital theo-
ries placing a lot of emphasis on the supply side and 
statistical theories placing their emphasis on the demand 
side, may well be complements rather than substitutes. 
Women may well get less pay than men (in the same occup-
ation) because they work less intensively or because they 
have chosen to invest less in on-the-job training, and because 
they have been statistically discriminated against in the 
early years of employment (by being offered less training 
and promotion possibilities than men), which makes "catching 
up" difficult. 
Unequal pay for the same occupation is not the 
only type of labour market discrimination. Occupational 
segregation, that is, the concentration of women in lower 
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paid occupations, might be another form of labour market 
discrimination. Human capital theorists, following the 
family division of labour argument, insist that this is a 
result of the individual choice of women, since they expect 
to be "secondary" earners (especial.1y after marriage). 
Statistical theorists argue, on the other hand, that emp-
loyers' uncertainty about the potential stability or work 
intensity of women, is responsible for assigning them to 
jobs (occupations) with relatively less responsibility and 
hence lower pay. 
Labour market discrimination in the form of 
occupational differentiation is very difficult to pinpoint 
and quantify however, since it is virtually impossible to 
distinguish between discrimination produced in the labour 
market and sex role discrimination in the home or schools. 
(which in turn might have been influenced by direct market 
discrimination). 
The concept of the "internal labour market") which 
figured so prominently in the discussion of the . signalling 
hypothesis, is the subject matter of chapter 3. 
According to Doeringer and Piore (with whom the 
1LM concept is usually associated), ILMs are the result of 
(a) enterprise specific skills and 
(b) employers' investment in on-the-job training. 
Technology gives rise to "enterprise specific skills" which 
can most efficiently be acquired by on-the-job training. 
Since the firm's investment in the employee has a better 
chance of being amortized, the longer the employee stays 
with the firm, the employer has every incentive to stab-
ilise employment and reduce turnover so that he can reap 
the benefits of his investment in on-the-job training. 
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This human capital explanation of the origins of 
ILMs was not found to be entirely convincing, however. 
There is no evidence to suggest that a change in technology 
leads to enterprise specific skills, that is, the skills 
useful to only one employer. There is some evidence, on 
the other hand, that ILMs are associated with the size of 
the enterprise. In this sense, ILMs can better be thought 
of as the result of organisational constraints that increa-
sing firm size imposes on personnel policies. As the firm 
grows in size, its planning horizon is extended to ensure 
a better utilisation of the large capital investments 
incurred. Such planning requires stability and control 
over input markets, including labour. Increasing emphasis 
on stability implies that maintenance and control of work 
effort, loyalty and morale are the prime objectives of 
personnel policies. External recruitment and abuse of sen-
iority provisions seem to interfere with the pursuit of 
these aims for which the internal labour market provides an 
optimum environment. The incumbent employee receives on-
the-job training,which probably increases identification 
wi th the firm and inculca tes the characteristics of loyalty, 
stability and resistance to unions. 
In the presence of ILMs the distinction between 
"g~neral" and "specific" training, in terms of who finances 
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the training, loses its meaning. If a firm is assured 
about the potential stability of an employee, it can behave 
as if all training were specific, whatever its content 
(i.e. bear the burden of the training costs, even if some of 
it may be useful to other employers). 
With respect to wage determination, the predictions 
of 1LM theory are twofold: 
(a) The permanent employment relationship, which is 
the salient characteristic of ILMs, and the pres-
ence of fixed costs of training/abrogate the 
equality of the marginal product of labour and 
the wage rate at each period of time. The above 
equality is reduced to an equality between the 
discounted present value and productivity streams 
calculated over the distribution of expected 
employment tenure within the enterprise. 
Prediction (a) was recognised long ago by human capital 
theorists like Becker and Oi and says no more that the 
neoclassical prediction of the equality between the wage 
and marginal productivity in each time period has to be 
modified into an equality between labour costs (wages plus 
training costs) and productivity over the entire working 
life of the employees. 
(b) The organisational imperatives,which necessitated 
245 
the formation of 1LMs (control and maintenance 
of high and steady levels of work effort and 
loyalty), imply that firms with 1LMs are prepared 
to pay a premium for these intangible character-
istics over the entire working life of their 
employees. 
The real difference,therefore,between the human 
capital theory and the internal labour market theory lies 
in ~ wage determination, i.e. the 1LM theory allows for 
the possibility that two identically qualified people/with 
the same amount of on-the-job training, the same ability and 
socioeconomic background (and the same age)/receive diff-
erent wages if the one is employed in an 1LM during all 
his life while the second has served more than one employer. 
Leaving aside wage determination, it has been 
argued that firms with 1LMs do not create sufficient 
(optimal) employment opportunities because they have a ten~ 
dency to substitute capital for labour (since they have to 
pay a premium to maintain employment stability). There 
seems to be considerable evidence, though, that large firms 
(with 1LMs) operate with enough manpower slack to handle 
unpredictable variations in demand and also secure a res-
ervoir of labour competing for promotion. It does not 
follow, therefore, as many believe, that small or medium -
sized firms are able to provide more employment opportunities 
than bigger firms (with 1LMs). 
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Besides these theoretical considerations, some 
selective criteria are established to test for the pres-
ence of ILMs and are applied to a four company sample of 
white collar employees drawn from the Greek Manufacturing 
Industry. The evidence showed that the clerical job clusters 
of these firms were associated with strong ILMs. 
The treatment of ILMs in the present thesis can 
by no means be considered to be exhaustive. There are still 
numerous questions begging for answers. We can recommend 
the following list of items for a research agenda which, 
we hope, will contribute to our further understanding of the 
functioning of ILMs. 
(a) If we accept the proposition that ILMs are 
associated with the size of the enterprise, what 
is the size of firm (in terms, for example, of 
the number of people employed) which necessitates 
the adoption of hierarchical promotion ladders ? 
Even more, what is the proportion of the work-
force employed in ILMs ? 
(b) What is the shape of the age-earnings profiles 
inside ILMs? If wages (or salaries) depend 
basically on seniority provisions, is it natural 
to expect that the earnings of university grad-
uates .. inside ILMs rise steeply during the early 
years of employment, a fact consistently 
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corroborated by aggregate Census data? Add-
itionallY,are these profiles levelling off during 
the working life of the employees and if they do 
so, at what age are they stabilised? 
(c) Even if promotions are in general governed by 
seniority provisions, ability considerations also 
playa part. It is a quite common feature of 
personnel policies that in the early years of 
employment virtually everybody is promoted to 
the next grade, in the minimum time required for 
doing so. The higher we move on the job ladder, 
however, the more selective personnel policies 
become. It would be interesting to know at which 
point on the job ladder ability factors outweigh 
seniority considerations. Moreover, there is some 
evidence (drawn from my experience of ILMs in 
Greece), that those who are not promoted to the 
higher grades receive,nevertheless,salary increases 
which reduce the earnings gap between the grades 
(with the obvious intention of maintaining morale 
within the firm). The relation between grades and 
salaries is another area which requires further 
research efforts. 
(d) Although ILMs are associated with low turnover 
rates, there is some external recruitment besides 
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the hiring point. At which point in the hierarch-
ical structure can we trace the incidence of the 
"flyovers"? Is it, for example, more common at 
the highest grades of the hierarchy ? 
(e) ILMs provide economists with a golden opportunity 
to study the process of technology creation. Big 
firms (with ILMs) usually operate their own R. & 
D. departments, the operations of which can be 
directly observed. Research in this area will, 
hopefully, provide answers to questions like: 
Is technology exogenously or endogenously deter-
mined? Is it capital or labour intensive? To 
what extent does it respond to changes in the 
prices of factors of production ? 
(f) Personnel departments of firms with ILMs can also 
provide answers to questions like 
(i) how jobs are designed and redesigned; 
(ii) whether there are economies of scale in 
providing on-the-job training; 
(iii) how training costs vary for groups of 
employees with different educational levels, 
which/in effect/will allow the calculation 
of the social rate of return to education 
as proposed by "screening" theorists like 
Thurow. 
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(g) The extent and degree of unionisation inside 
ILMs is another area in which further work is 
needed. Are unions more common among white 
collar or manual employees? Are employees of 
firms with ILMs reluctant to join unions because 
of their superior earnings and relative employment 
security? 
It becomes clear, after reading the items of the 
research agenda presented above that 
(i) firm specific rather than aggregate data are 
required. The opening of personnel files and the 
direct study and scrutiny of personnel policies 
becomes essential for our understanding of ILMs. 
Undoubtedly, firms are not keen to provide 
evidence on their policies to individual research-
ers, so government sponsored and government 
encouraged projects are therefore needed; 
(ii) an interdisciplinary approach is needed. Econom-
ists should consult researchers from such diverse 
fields as organisation theory, personnel management, 
industrial psychology and industrial relations. 
In particular, the work of organisational theorists l 
1. The work of the so-called Carnegie school is a good 
example of the work undertaken in organisational theory. 
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may be particularly helpful to economists doing 
work on ILMs. 
An elaborate and serious investigation into the 
workings and functionings of ILMs necessitates therefore, 
I I 
a shift to what H. Leibensteinl called micro-micro economics. 
In his own words: 
Given that most sciences have moved from 
the study of less to more micro aspects, 
it would seem reasonable to cultivate this 
area in economics - especially to study 
intra-firm units and intra-firm individual 
behaviour. But in addition to following 
a general scientific trend, there are 
intrinsic reasons to intensify our work in 
the micro-micro area. A body of work 
already exists, which suggests ways of 
studying these problems in greater depth. 
We should take advantage of the fact that 
we can observe intra-firm behaviour and 
study such behaviour intensively ..... 
And last but not least, it would seems 
natural at this stage to pursue work on 
micro-micro elements in order to check the 
consistency of the implications of what we 
know and what can be learned about intra -
firm behaviour with the postulates and 
implications of mainstream micro theory. 2 
1. H. L eibenstein. "A Branch of Economics is Miss ing: 
Micro-Micro Theory", 30urnal of Economic Literature, 
June 1979, pp. 477-502. 
2. Ibid., p. 499. 
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